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ABSTRACT
STATE AUTONOMY, POLITICAL POWER AND
PUBLIC POLICY:
A STUDY OF BRAZILIAN DEVELOPMENT
MAY 1989
LUIZ PEDONE, B.I.E., GEORGIA INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
M.P.A., UNIVERSIDADE DE BRASILIA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS/AMHERST

Directed by: Prof. Eric

S.

Einhorn

This dissertation examines the relationship
among
state, political power and public policy in
Brazil during its

authoritarian regime (1964-74) and the more liberalized
regime
(1974-85).

In order to study the autonomy of the Brazilian
state

with respect to classes, state elites and societal forces

a

framework is developed using Neo-Marxian and Neo-Weberian
concepts.

The methodology to study the public policies includes

decision reconstruction, reputational and structural analyses
using investment data and political action as evidence.

Chapters III and IV study how each regime influenced differently
the decision and implementation of the infrastructure, industrial
and mining policies.

During 1964-74 the political and financial

autonomy of state enterprises
prevailed.

—

and the state in general

—

Autonomy became increasingly restrained by political

liberalization and the economic crises of the 1974-85 period.
Two case studies (Itaipu and Tucurui Hydro-power Projects)

x

exemplify both periods.

The decision to build Itaipu
obeyed

primarily national security interests.

The implementation was

influenced by Brazilian and international
interests. Contrasted
with Itaipu, Tucurui's decision
depended on international
industrial and financial interests as
well as on powerful
national groups and government elites.
This dissertation

concludes that the study of public
policies is an important way
to analyze political power and
state-society
relations.

By

comparing development policies, participation
and influence
patterns are uncovered and conclusions
postulated.

First, the

overlap between the leadership of the
Hydro-projects does not
indicate a pattern of a group equally influencing
more

than one

policy area as assumed by pluralism.

Second, the peasants and

working class did not influence either policy-making
process.
Third, only dominant economic interests benefited
from the Hydro-

projects.

Fourth,

state autonomy was high on the Itaipu decision

but low during its implementation.

both phases.

Thus,

In Tucurui,

it was limited on

it is posited that reduced state autonomy

anc3

the model of development adopted precluded the ability to carry
out integral social development demanded by the majority.

As a

result of this lacuna, elections have helped the demise of the

military regime but they were no guarantee of legitimate
democratic government in the post-1985 period and inclusionary
access to policy-making process.
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(

Ministerio das Relacoes
"

)

ITAMON

Itaipu Industrial Construction Ltd. Construcoes
Industrials Ltda - Montagem Eletromecanica da
Hidreletrica de Itaipu
(

^

IUEE

Sole Tax on Electric Energy
Eneraia Eletrica

(

Imposto Unico sobre

)

IUCLQ

Sole Tax on Liquid Fuels
Combustiveis Liguidos

(

Imposto Unico Sobre

)

ITT

International Telephone and Telegraph Co.

KWU

Kraftwerk Union

LIGHT

Brazilian Traction, Light and Power of Canada,
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LMSA

Light Metal Smelters Association

LTN

toSS B S,
MDB

th * Nati ° nal Treasu

^

(Letras do Tesonro

Brazilian^Democratic Movement (Movimento

n^^.^

MIC

MRN

Mineracao Rjp do Hnri-o

MME

Ministry of Mines and Energy (Ministerio
das Minas

MF

Ministry of Finance

(

~

Ministerio da Fa^nd*)

NAAC

Nippon Aluminum Amazon Corporation

NAI

Nuclei of Articulation With the Industries
(Nucleode
Articul acao com a Industria)

NUCLEBRAS Empresas Nuclearp.s Brasileiras S.A.

NUCLEN

Nuclebras Enaenharia S.A.

NUCLEP

Nuclebra s Eauioamentos Pesados S.A.

OAB

Brazilian Bar Association

(

Brasil)

ORTN

Ordem dos Advoaad os do

Bonds of the National Tressury
do Tesouro Nacional

(

Obrigacoes Reaiustavpis

)

PAEG

Government Plan of Economic Action
Economica do Governo. 1964

(

Piano de Acao

)

PCB

Brazilian Communist Party
Brasileiro

(

Partido Comunista

)

PDS

PDT

Democratic Social Party
Democratic Labor Party
Trabalhista

(

(

Partido Democratico Social

Partido Democratico

)

PETROBRAS

Petroleo Brasileiro S.A.

PETROQUISA

Petrobras Ouimica S.A.

PIN

Nacional Integration Plan
Nacional)
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(

Piano de Integracao

)

PMDB

Party of the Brazilian
Democratic Movement (Partis
n
Partido *do
Movim ento Democratico Brazil pj rn) llovement
(

PND

National Development Plan (Piano
Na^on.i
Desenvol vimentn
(i and II)

hq

^

PNDIMNF

?«SiS

al

^° gram

for the Development of the
Non-Ferrous

PORTOBRAS Empres a Portns Brasil
PP

PSD

Popular Party

(

.q

.

a

Partido Pop ular)

Social Democratic Party

(

D^H.n)

Partido Snr.ia l

PT

Worker's Party (Partido dos Trabalh.Hnr.c)

PTB

Brazilian Labor Party

RFFSA

(

Partido Trabalhista Rr asileiro^

Federal Railway Network

(

Rede Ferrov iaria FP ^r,i

g

SBPC

Sociedade brasileira para o P roaresso

SEPLAN

Secretary of Planning Secretaria de
Planegainento da
Preside ncia da Republica

da

a
}

Ciencia

(

)

SEST

Secretariat of State Enterprises Control
Contro le das Fmpresas Estatais

(

Secretaria da

)

SIDERBRAS Siderurgia Brasileira S.A.
SIPRON

Parallel Program
Nuclear

(

Servico de Protecao ao Proarama

)

SNI

National Information Service
Inf ormacoes

(

Servico Nacional de

)

STI

Secretariat for Industrial Technology
Tecnolooria Industrial

(

Secretaria de

)

SUMOC

Currency and Credit Superintendence
da Moeda e Credito

(

Superintendencia

)

SUDAM

Superintendencia do Desenvolvimento da Amazonia

TELEBRAS

Telecomunicacoes Brasileiras S.A.

TELESP

Telecomunicacoes de Sao Paulo S.A.

UDN

National Democratic Union
xxv

(

Uniao Democratica Nacional

)

USELPA

Usinas Eletricas Paranap *n,lema

USIMINAS

U^nas Siderurgicas
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^
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union of Constructors (Uniao d,
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Valesul Aluminig
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

abertura

autarq ui a

a sem i- independent

Castelista

e

C

government body.
e1

BranC °' the first ^eneralThe ^^nationalist faction
!i
mi ltar y' which derived
their ideology from
i
whe n Castello
Branco directed it.

President

n9L ?^

^

:

Diretas Ja

the mass campaign for direct
presidential
elections during the first semester
of 1984 which
ended up with the defeat of the
Dante de Oliveira
direct elections in November
° f thS defeat
Tancredo Neves
III '^l
I
was
able to
gather support for his indirect
election through the Electoral College.

"-fP-posing

^

'

estatizacao

"statization," or the process of expansion
diversification of state intervention and and
control
over the economy.

empreiteira

a large civil construction company.

empreiteiro

the owner or the executives of large
civil
construction companies.

Geiselista

Supporter of Ernesto Geisel, the fourth GeneralPresident (1974-79), which followed the footsteps
of castelismo, with some nationalist inclination.

grandeza

a predominantly military vision of Brazil's
Emerging Power status, "grandeur."

Itaipu

stone that sings, in Tupi-Guaranian.

Itaorna

rotten stone, or stone that moves, in TupiGuaranian.

Mineiro

a

native or resident of the State of Minas Gerais.

Paulista

a

native or resident of the State of Sao Paulo.

tecnico

a public official with university level education
in engineering, economics, law, management,

usually responsible for presenting alternative
xxvii

Spieiient^ir
Tucurui

a

ernmental

a "d

green grasshopper native ef
the Eastern Amazon.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation focuses
on the Brazilian state during
the bureaucratic-authoritarian
regime (1964-85). More
specifically it studies two show-case
examples
itaipu and
Tucurui.
Itaipu is the world largest
hydropower dam, a
binational enterprise with Paraguay
spanning the international
waters of the Parana River. The
decision to construct Itaipu was
taken at a time when geopolitical
considerations predominated.
Ongoing Argentine-Brazilian rivalry in
the Southern Cone,

-

exarcebated by growing Argentine nationalism,
convinced many
Brazilian elites that national security mandated
the construction
of Itaipu. The second development
project that merits
closer

examination is Tucurui, the largest totally Brazilian
hydropower
plant located in an important mining zone of the
Eastern
Amazon

region.

The decision to build Tucurui included international

considerations as well.

The aluminum industry was to be the

direct beneficiary of the Tucurui project since it faced higher
costs of electricity input in industrial economies as

a

result of

the 1974 oil crisis. Yet even though the project faced severe

drawbacks from the unfavorable international industry's prices,
Tucurui continued, defying sound economic planning in favor of

grandiose export-led growth.

2

The underlying assumption
of this study is that
political power, policy-making
and action of the Brazilian
state
during the bureaucratic-authoritarian
regime can be better
understood by examining the
large-scale programs undertaken
in
the past decades, like the
construction of itaipu and
Tucurui.
The country's economy, apparently
doomed to remain in the exportled agrarian model of the
oligarchies up to the 1930s, was
vigorously redirected toward
industrialization during the
populist era that swept Latin America
in the 1940s and 1950s.
As
the populist regime exhausted itself
in face of

transnationalization of production and markets,
the Brazilian
economy has achieved an unparalleled
dynamism and diversification
in the course of a few decades.
Both hydroelectric projects were only
part of an

integrated national development scheme to provide
the country
with the needed economic infrastructure to
industrialize
and

become an industrial power on its own right.

Electric energy

became one of the preferred state investment sectors:

both the

hydroelectric and nuclear power programs were vastly expanded
during the last two decades.

In the petroleum sector Brazilian

production has increased tenfold since the first oil shock, and
an Alcohol Program has been instituted to replace,

gasoline as fuel for automobile transportation.

in part,

In the steel-

making and mining sectors the state oversaw programs promoting
import substitution and the export of non-ferrous semi-processed

3

products in addition to ores which
had been traditionally
exported.
The state, multinationals,
and local capital joined
together in a coordinated effort
to offset the chronic deficit
in
the production of fertil ize rs
and petrochemical products.
In all
these sectors, these efforts were
instituted to help Brazil
escape from an unprecedented
economic crisis brought on by the
balance of payments crisis in the
mid-1970s and the debt crisxs
and adjustments of the 1980s.
The development programs and projects
that once marked
the Brazilian uniqueness in the Latin
American development now
need to be re-examined, highlighting
specific efforts to

transform the Brazilian political model of
decision-making as
well as the economy.
After twenty years of authoritarian regime
time has come to re-examine a few policy
decisions
of the

period.

This re-evaluation can be

a

learning process on how the

decision-making process did not respond to society demands
and
how it needs to be more responsive on a more democratic

regime.

Moreover, the recent years
invest,

1

's

context of decreased capacity to

of the state-owned enterprises s operational and
1

financial disarray, and of crippling debt crises (internal and
external)

is particularly timely to examine the influence of

these two prototypical projects on the economy.
The state decisions and actions are here presented as
the outcome of an historical, structural, economic, and political

process related to the economic development of

a

particular sort

m

4

a

specific social formation.

Then, generally,

state actions
are analyzed fro, the point
of view of specific
patterns of
development.
This broad analysis, however,
is not conducive to
complete understanding of state
actions; they must also be
studied by taking into account
the internal dynamics of state
apparatuses.
This form of examining
policy-making and politics
demands a conception of the state
as both a social relation of
domination and as a permanent
institutional-bureaucratic

apparatus with interests

a

of its own.

An analytical framework for developing
these broad
lines as a general orientation for
concrete analyses is presented
in Chapter II.
The theoretical aspects of the relations
between
the state, capitalist development, and
society are analyzed,
conveying a general concept of the state as
a player, influencing
and being influenced by the economy and the
polity.
Within this

chapter the specific study of the bloc-in-power
and state
relative autonomy are defined as analytical references
for the
exploration of concrete state actions and politics presented

in

later empirical chapters.

These concepts of bloc-in-power --

provisionally understood as the relationship between political
power and the class structure of society
autonomy

—

—

and of state relative

as the manipulation of a state agency under study by

dominant classes, other state agencies or international
institutions

—

shall be relied upon in this dissertation,

showing that these concepts provide excellent analytical tools

for better conveying the rich
and theoretically important

information contained in the case
studies.

Analyses of state actions and
policies cannot be done,
however, without a thorough
evaluation of the structure and
processes that characterized the
pattern of development.
Thus
Chapter III attempts to address
the question through a historical
analysis of the Brazilian case.
In the past five decades
Brazilian development has undergone
certain periods characterized
by continuities and discontinuities.
During
the first period,

lasting broadly from the late 1930s
until the early 1960s,
import-substitution industrialization and the
state's emergence
as a producer in many basic industrial
sectors induced
deep

transformations in the Brazilian economy.

The foundations of

state intervention in the economy were laid
during this period
with the creation and expansion of sectoral
state productive
enterprises in petroleum, steel, mining and electric
power.

The watershed year of 1964 marked

a

rupture with the

populist regime and its inclusionary social policies but not
with
the

policy of state intervention in the economy.

The

exclusionary policies of the authoritarian regime (1964-85),
directed towards rapid development of the economy, outweighed the

priority given to social policies.

Chapters III and IV analyze

the three markedly different periods of the authoritarian regime,

each having its own political power configuration and its own

policy priorities and modes of state action.

In the period 1964-

67 an important institutional and
political reorganization of the

state occurred.

These reforms created

renewed financial

a

structure for capital accumulation,
facilitated by the
increasingly authoritarian character
of politics,

stage for further changes.

and setting the

The second period (1967-1974)
can be

seen as the embodiment of prior
institutional-political
transformations. The consolidation of
the internationalized
development pattern associated with the
state and with national
capital coincided with the increased
institutionalization
of

authoritarianism, which during this period
was erroneously
thought to be permanent. The economy was
once again jolted by
new surge of activity, spurred by accelerated
capitalist
accumulation generated by special foreign and

a

internal

conditions.

m

the political arena radical opposition was

effectively suppressed by the formidable legal and
clandestine
police-state apparatuses.
During the third period, 1974-1985, crisis shook the

pattern of Brazilian development on both the political and
economic fronts.

Neither the institutionalization of the

authoritarian order nor the promises of the economic "miracle"
had materialized, and the rulers turned

a

strategy of gradual

liberalization ("abertura") that allowed some room for the

reorganization and restructuring of the polity.

In recent years,

especially since 1977, civil society has also reorganized itself,

moving from timid factory stoppages to full-blown rallies

.

demanding "Direct Elections,
Now,. .2
on the economic front
despite an early accumulation
drive in capital goods and
basic
primary input products, a
combination of slow growth,
recession,
high inflation and mounting
foreign debt have dominated
the
scene
Chapter III and IV reconstruct
the decisions on
specific policies and state action
during these three periods, in
an effort to delineate the
dynamics of interests influencing
the
sectoral policies. The analysis
focuses on the historicostructural changes of each state sector,
presenting the
mobilization of different groups, classes
and institutions in the
politics of each of the sectors. The
state actions and decisions
are examined taking in consideration
the relative state autonomy
that is, the capacity to decide the
sector's own objectives
and policies (political autonomy) and
the capacity to implement
them (financial autonomy).

—

Chapter IV analyzes empirically the last period,
19741985,

in terms of the decisional outputs of the
last two

authoritarian regime's presidential terms (1974-79 and 1979-85)
in the fields of energy,

industrial and mining sectors, and

compares them with results.

in this manner not only does the

analysis seek to understand the dynamics of the decision-making
process by analyzing the actors and their political power, but
also how the implementation of the development projects was

affected during the years of crises.

8

Chapter

V reconstructs the basic
patterns of interest
articulation that has marked the
formation, decision and adoption
of Itaipu Hydroelectric
project.
itaipu involved neighboring
Paraguay as a partner in the
binational enterprise, and
Argentina
as a potential power contender
in the project. Political
aspects
of the long-term implementation
of the project are stressed
in
order to demonstrate the underlying
motives, and to map out how

they

evolved in subsequent years as
the Itaipu project
progressed.
As this state policy involved
a number of
specific economic and political interests,
they are described
along with the question of -autonomy"
and the consequences of
this policy initiative.

Another important project in the electric
power sector
is analyzed in Chapter VI, the
Brazilian state's decision to
undertake the construction of the Tucurui
Hydroelectric Project
in the Amazon region.

In this chapter,

the changing global

environment surrounding the implementation of the
project is
analyzed showing how the articulation of interests have

evolved

internationally.

For example, the Tucurui infrastructure project

viability was directly related to the interests of the
international bauxite/aluminum industry and the national mining

sector in the Greater Carajas Program -- important players in the

export-led strategy of the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Yet,

with falling international aluminum prices the infrastructure

even

.

project went on unhurt,
characterizing an
maintaining economic demand and

instruct

for

for the debt adjustment
process.

The last chapter summarizes
the major empirical
conclusions about the publicc Dolirie<=
i
policies and large
scale development
projects with an attempt to
contribute to a conceptual
understanding of the articulation
of the bloc-in-power and
of
politics of power in the past two
decades.
Bringing the analysis
up to date, some of the conclusions
of this dissertation will
explore basic patterns of policy-making
and policy implementation
observed during the authoritarian,
military regime, which were
uncovered by the empirical analyses
of the case studies.

Additionally, this dissertation will try
to connect the case
studies of state intervention to the
question of democracy in
Brazil
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CHAPTER II
STATE, CAPITALISM AND POLICY
ACTION

The fundamental role of the
state in semi-peripheral
societies is one of the principal
reasons why recent analyses
have focused on the state, not
only as a facilitator for private
capitalist accumulation but also a
major producer of goods and
services.
The state therefore has played
a key part in the
accumulation process itself.
It is not clear,

a

priori, which method is best suited

for analyzing of role of the state
in semi-periphery countries
like Brazil in recent decades. Recognizing
that there is no one

best method in the social sciences, one
can begin by suggesting
that any method should at least contain
a set of criteria that
accurately depict the sources and means of state
action. At the

very least, such

a

method should also present the means to

evaluate how successful the state policy actions were
in

promoting and maintaining economic and political stability
peripheral social formations.

in

One of the reasons for

concentrating analytical efforts on the state and its policy
action is that in past decades the society-centered diffusionist

modernization theories, such as Rostow's development stages or
Lipset's industrialization-democracy nexus,

1

have lost their

explanatory power: stable polity and economy characteristic of
11

liberal democratic capitalist
central societies failed
to
materialize in these semi-peripheral
societies.

12

Once these premises about
the strategic importance
of
the state are established,
the central categor.es
for an analysis
of the Brazilian state
during the authoritarian
experience
should convey how the state
and state-building are
related to the
particular semi-periphery economic
development and how the state
is influenced by the
political form of domination.
These two
relationships are presented in the
next sections, drawing from
pertinent state, capitalism, and
political power theoretical and
methodological literature. These
categories allow one to analyze
the policy process, both in
phases of formation and decision,
examining how capitalist development
imperatives and political
domination categories can indicate the
nature of the regime and
policy output in this particular social
formation.
By analyzing
the state's structures and actions,
this framework
lays out the

actors and power relationships, both within
and outside the
state, and their mosaic of interests and
resources mobilized when
these entities interact.
Thus, the perspective set forth in this chapter
results

from reviewing the Weberian and Marxist literature
on capitalist

development and state growth, and the literature that deals with
the specificity of the dependent-peripheral-capitalist

development case.

It likewise is dependent upon literature

analyzing political power and classes, and how policies and state

action may result fro, this
relationship.
This perspective
provi.es insights into the
dynamics of specific state
action an d
the policymaking process by
addressing the degree of
relative
autonomy of the decisionmakers
fro, the state, state
agencies or
state enterprises while at the
same time defining
the

relationship between the decisionmakers
and the
classes in a particular social
formation.

dominant

This perspective

furthermore addresses the question
of shifting interests and
powers that mutually shape and
structurally transform the

patterns of production and of domination
that unfold into
institutional arrangements. This system
of analysis leads to a
clearer understanding of the development
of specific institutions
of dominance and control over
determined periods of time.
This chapter will first examine the
relationship
between the state and capitalist development,
including the

specificity of development in the peripheral
societies.
Secondly, the relationship between state
bureaucracy and class
is examined to elucidate the concept of
bloc-in-power

,

while

paying careful attention to Brazilian state enterprises.
Thirdly, some of the major theoretical assumptions about
the

question of state action and state autonomy are addressed, with

particular focus on the Brazilian case.

a
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The development of capitalism
in center countries is
marked by an increase in the
functions and powers of the
state
over society and economy.
while this occurred in
democratic
social formations, the
politicization of socioeconomic
activities
deepened.
A series of activities once
thought of as being
essentially private became politically
controlled and publicly
scrutinized.
The alternative to the increased
conflict over the
politicization of the capitalist system
was state expansion; that
is the submission of all
activities to some form of regulation.
This power was accompanied by the
unprecedented growth and
exercise of citizen's rights in the
political and social sphere
mediated through political organizations
and institutions, at
least in the liberal democratic social
formations.

Historically, capitalism has been associated
with the
increase in state intervention, either through
regulatory

policies, services dispensed or directly productive
activities.

Capitalist development, as analyzed by Max Weber,
requires

a

complex division of labor and new ways to administer
economic
resources
For Weber,

interpenetration of state and capitalism in

concrete historical instances were thought to lead to

a

degree of rationality, state objectivity and neutrality.

higher
The

growth of bureaucracy
increasingly concentrated
management
resources in the hands of few.
As ne statedj

This concentration occurs f^y
a well
known and typical fash?™' ° r ' nst ance
development of big
capitalist enterprises Cm ^ f
essent "l
characteristics in thi; process
process occurs in
9
.

m

the^^nrgani^^nsT^

Efficiency and profit motive were
fundamental causes for the
bureaucratization process. Therefore
capitalist economic
transformation was the main force
behind growth of

the state:

^^^%^uTg2S£ KSLSS2

be

large modern capitalist enterprise
are
unequalled models of strict bureaucratic themselves
crgan^aticn. 3

Despite the state neutrality and objectivity
conveyed
by Weber, the state has been historically
associated with
determined interests. The capitalist relations
of production
have evolved in conjunction with the separation
of the public and
private arenas previously joined under feudalism.
This meant

separation of producers from their means of production

,

the

separation of the state from production, and the separation of
the coercive functions from individual production units.

As

capitalism transformed the relations of production, it required
increased protection from the state in order to successfully

16

implant

the new node of production.

These developments

contributed to the increase in the
coercive capacities of the
state, beginning first with the
domination of a territorial base
and then going on to surplus extraction
and increased
differentiation of the state itself. 4
Marx's work is

a

richly detailed account of capitalist

relations of production, but little is said
about the social
relations of domination in the sphere of the
state and its

formation.

Nevertheless, the relationship between the
expansion
of the bureaucracies results from the
association of interests
linking the state bureaucracies to the capitalist
class.

For

Marx, the emergence of a relationship between
state-capital

requires increased complexities, refined capacities,
and

technologies of production, assuming
state,

exactly because the state is

of the economic transformation.

a

a

simultaneous growth of the

contradictory expression

5

When examining late-peripheral capitalist social

formations the distinctive characteristic of capitalist

development is its dependent nature.

dependency
decades.

(

dependencia

)

Three variants of

theory have been developed in the last

Gunder Frank proposed that the dependent capitalism was

nothing but

a

form of development of underdevelopment, limited by

metropolis impositions.

It focused on the process of

accumulation in the metropolis rather than the mediating process
of accumulation taking place in the periphery.

6

Since it is

-possible to have autonomous
capitalist development

in the

Periphery, according to this
strand of
theory, the
result is continued underdevelopment.
Marini and Dos Santos
criticized this strand of
because of its faulty
Premises: instead of centering
the analysis on internal
class
relationships, the state, and
struggle within the societies,
it
focused on how the center
industrial capitalism would
prevent
changes from occurring in the
periphery.
However, two

d^den^

d^de^

of the

outcomes predicted

-

regional subimperial ism by the
more

advanced peripheral economies and
revolutionary social movements
-- only occurred partially.
The assumptions ignored the
V
fact
that peripheral industrial
accumulation involve accommodations
of
interests, both on the periphery and
the center, not fulfilled
by prior capitalist development.
In another variant of

dependent a

r

which

chronologically pioneered these studies, the
Economic Commission
for Latin American ECLA) economists,
led by Argentine Raul
Prebish analyzed Latin-American capitalist
development mapping
(

its mono-culture and extractive economic
activity.

The nature of

capitalist development required positive state intervention
through

a

policy of import-substitution-industrialization

designed to increase purchasing power, create jobs, and to
bridge the technology gap thus offsetting the lack of economic

integration and reducing vulnerability of export-oriented
economy.

8

It also prescribed the dependent states to reform

.

education system and institute
aarari™ reform. To placate
agrarian
the
nation capitalist class, increasing
threatened by popull st
Politics, this model foresaw
the state defending
infant
industries against hostile
foreign capital, and
stimulating
demand via state-owned
enterprises. 9 The structural

Umits

ircport-substitution-industrialization

to

predicted by theorists of

this strand of deesndencia,
however, were out of date
by the lat
1960s. The advent of
bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in
Latin
America led to capitalist
development, opposed to what was

argued 10
The third strand of dependencia
takes into account the
exhaustion of the expansion of
capitalist development in center
countries, the process of
internationalization of markets and

production in association with domestic
capital.
exhaustion, the political situation in

Because of thi

specific periphery

societies, in particular in Brazilian
society, has deteriorated,
leading to an opening of the economy toward
the outside.
A

parallel required condition was political
stability.

Dependencistas of this branch have striven to
demonstrate that
capitalist development is possible in the periphery,
despite its
"distortions."

The uniqueness of this branch of dependencia was

its associated-development character which required
state

intervention to mediate, channelling and altering the direction
of capitalist development. 11

In a further study departing from

previous ECLA or dependencia studies under "development of

.

19

underdevelopment" or imperialism
viewpoint,
has been observed.
The broadened role

performed

-

a

crucial differenc e

that the state previousl
y

i.e.,

involvement in

the regulation Qf

a few

^

strategic sectors of the
economy

-

was now

deepened.

The state now invested in
industrial and productive
enterprise, either alone or in
joint ventures involving
transnational or national capital. 12
Both the specificity of the
state as productive enterprise
acting in the market and its
specificity as state agency have
occurred."

The double insertion of public
enterprises requires
future analysis to focus on the
state's intervention in the
economy as being an answer to structural
deficiencies, such as
the ever-important task of providing
basic economic inputs and
infrastructure while occupying strategic
sectors, and to focus on
the state's specificity as an organization
that at least in
theory represents the public interest. Thus
these economic

institutions have

a

political dimension of their own, being then,

the site of articulation and channeling of
conflict in class

interest in the society and economy.
State enterprises act as private firms but they do not

give up their interventionist role.

State-owned enterprise,

inserted in the market, become agents of capital accumulation,

entering markets in which the costs of enticing private capital
to invest are greater than the costs of state entrepreneurship

State enterprises act in the essential, though less dynamic

sectors of the economy.

^
^

Addi tionally the

enterprises can stimulate

_

^

waves Qf

By

directly affecting the
capital goods sector
through
procurement policies, state
enterprises become in fact,
sustainprg by first

g^

110 UP
eStBent initiat
eisewnere in the economv°
9™ 6
for their goods'and service'secondly"
Vlde
basic social overhead capital
^ P r°
essential fAv
6
capital accumulation and'inputfof

\

r

"^

1

^
*™

'

"generaTus"^

Having examined the relations
between the state and the
capitalist economy with its specific
dependent peripheral
character and having also identified
the forms taken by the state
in its entrepreneurial form,
an examination of the political
relationships of the state with classes
and class interests is
now due.

B.

State,

Political Dominati on, and Public Polini es

In a determined social formation of
capitalist nature

there are classes, institutions and players that
contend for
power to politically control the relations among the
dominant and

dominated classes. Specific segments of the dominant class
make
up the

governing class

~

or the "bloc-in-power" 15

bureaucratic apparatus of the state.

—

and the

Each of these relations

.
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reflects political practices that- ^-r
that inform and contribute
to the
formation of public
oubl r policies,
nni in^r.
representing demands from
both the
dominated and dominant ciasses
There are aiso sets of
relations representing the
mediating institutions of
the statesociety relations which may
be political parties,
patron-client
relations, or other forms of
corporatist representation. The
political arena is the site where
the interests and practices
are
Played to change and direct policy
in the struggle
i

.

for its

formation
Political domination, or the
distribution of power
that is inherent to policy struggle,
is a reflection of the
state's relationship with society.
a democratic regime,
political domination entails power
distribution being more
spread out and being held by different
competing

m

economic,

ethnic,

social groups.

The process of power distribution and
the

characteristics of the continued unfolding of new
arrangements
reflects changes in the structure of power.
In authoritarian
regimes, which can assume different forms,
political domination

produces a particular pattern of policy output and
of beneficiary classes.

portrayed by

a

a

specific set

Personalist domination patterns,

caudillo or

a

junta

,

whether civil or military

reflects passive acceptance of domination.

Bureaucratic-

authoritarian exclusionary 16 regimes have coercive capacities to
impose public policies that benefit select groups.

Inclusionary

authoritarian regimes fit the same bureaucratic pattern

but

.

^^

reveal a limited engagement
Qf
the veneer of legitimacy
absent from
Other authoritarian capitalist

exclusionary

^
^.^

regies have heen studied hut
they
do not reflect Latin
American regies in general,
or the
Brazilian case in particular. 17
The mechanisms of interest
representation can likewise
be classified in pluralist
societies where a vast number
of
organized interest compete for
policy adoption.
Corporatism is
one mode of sector representation
in society yet corporatism
manifests itself differently in
a democratic or
authoritarian
regimes,
whereas in democratic regimes it
assumes a
consociational form, 18 in the
authoritarian mode of political
control corporatism is ambivalent.
On one hand, its "statizing"
face
is responsible for the growth
of the state in areas already
"statized" and beyond. On the other
hand its "privatizing"
shows segmented state institutions
opened to organized interests'

representation 19

1

•

State and Classes

The intrinsic character of the political domination
he existence of

a

set of separate classes, both dominant and

dominated. Discussing the presence of

automatically and

i

a

a

dominant class does not

priori imply, in class perspective of

analysis between class and the state, that there is

a

ruling or

23

governing class, as defined in
the Gramscian concept
bloc-inPower.
Political power in dominant
classes does not translate
into state power by fiat
The relation

^^

.

needs to be systematically
researched.

Better understanding this

relationship, its dynamics and
results, can better elucidate
these relations in specific
social formations and specific
periods of time. 20 consistent
examination of the state-class
relationship gives better epistemological
results when
accompanied by simultaneous examination
of public policies under
the optics of a determined regime
type. 21
To focus our analytical framework
on the relationship
between state and class and their
consequent policies and
regimes, one should examine the three
separate methodological

approaches recently presented by Neo-Marxists

.

To some,

expanding on Marx's and others' writings, 22
instrumental class
analysis examines the power resources that
classes have

that can

be mobilized when articulating with the state
in specific moments
of policy formation.

As it is based on decision reconstruction

techniques of analyzing group access to policy-making so
it also
resembles pluralist analytical method of political
domination. 23

analysis is

a

Yet this instrumentalist version of class

re-edition of managerial/elite approaches.

Simply

examining the background and institutional affiliations of elite

members 24 and looking at socialization processes
the

,

education and

kinship relations of public officials are inadequate for

determining the degree of
pwer

hei(j by

eutes>
assumptiQns
at worK here deal with the
affinity between state
officials ana
dominant classes, as they have
sa.e interests, same
background,
same socialization. 25
secondly, the Neo-Harxist
structural approach, however
concentrates instead upon the
rationality or the internal
logic
of capitalist modes of
production that imposes structural
linits
to voluntaristic state action
favoring the capitalist class.

The structuralists claim that
just declaring that the state
serves the capitalist class from
background/reputation analysis,
or from decision reconstruction,
as the instrumentalists do,
is
insufficient to prove effective enlace
(correlation) between
state policies and dominant classes
because, as Poulantzas points
out,

The direct participation of the members
of the
capitalist class in the state apparatus and
in the
government, even when it exists, is not the
important
side of the matter.
The relation between the
class and the state is an objective relation bourgeois
This
means that if the function of the state in a
determinate social formation and the interests of the
dominant class in this function coincide it is by
reason of the system itself: the direct participation
of the members of the ruling class in the state
apparatus is not the cause but the effect and,
moreover a chance and a contingent one, of this
objective coincidence. 26
.

,

,

The fundamental advantage of this structuralist version

over the instrumentalist approach is that it provides an

explanation of why policy outputs
in capitalist social
formations
reflect the interest of capitalism,
even when the capitalist
class is not in direct control
of or does not exert
influence
over the decision-making within
the state apparatuses.
However,

there are drawbacks to this
approach.

The most important one is

the

extraordinary difficulty in determining
precisely how the
capitalist mode limits state action
at any historical moment.
Miliband, in reply to Poulantzas,
has pointed
out the

difficulties of realizing just how
constraining are those
•structural constraints' set out by the
27
structural ists

.

Additionally, the structuralist version
fails to give an account
of what are the political mechanisms
that guarantee that the
state is in fact captured by the capitalist
class.
Specifically,
critics fault the structuralist version for not
explaining the

concrete mechanisms that the state uses to generate
policies
necessary to maintain capital ism 28 Moreover, this
version of
.

class analysis does not consider the possibility that
class

struggle may force the state to adopt policies that are

detrimental to capitalist accumulation. 29
Finally, recent works on the state, political control

and public policies, recognizing that conceptual problems cannot
be fully overcome, have come closest to understanding class,

society and state relationships by utilizing both instrumentalist
and structuralist methods.

The state must be conceptualized as

structurally limited by the internal logic of the mode of

.

production and also as

.

set of instituUons

^

^.^

to manipulations by dominant
classes and class
^
corollary, the degree that
can be understood by
or
the other method is, then,
"histori cal ly contingent "30
in some historical
periods state policies can
be
explained as the self-reproduction
of the state-structure,
dominating and controlling demands
from society.
others state
policies are subject to manipulations
by the dominant class and
fractions thereof.
The extent of
nf state
«=i- a 4-«
action and policies that
can be understood by either
causal categories is always
subject
to empirical verification.
So, as Gold, Lo, and Wright
state,

^

_

p^li^

.

m

->

4.

•

The state is always relatively
autonomous: it is
never completely autonomous (that
is,
active control by the capitalist class)free from
nor
manipulated by members of the ruling class simply
fthat
is, free from all structural
constraints) 3 ±

Because the relations among state and classes
convey policies
according to the political organization of the
dominant classes
the methodology for analysis of state action
also offers
a

dynamic model of how the bloc-in-power shapes class
struggle in
society and how, in turn, the conflicts over policy within
the

bloc-in-power and the state are shaped by the same societal
organizations, institutions, state actions and conflicts that it

helped create. 32

27

The previous sections have
shown how state
intervention and the state bureaucratic
apparatus can be related,
both when performing regulatory
functions and when intervening
directly in productive activities
in the economy, particularly
the late peripheral dependent ones.
it also examined the
political implications of the power
structure in a class divided
society may have when discussing the
way public policies relate
to specific regime-types or mechanisms
of interest

representation.

This section presents some clues to
why state

interventions are preferentially performed
through state
enterprises showing how these are structurally
dual institutions
and how their autonomy can variate according
to different state
actions.
in the course of this section some
preliminary

hypotheses about state autonomy will be presented,
particularly
state enterprises autonomy and policy action, which will
be

investigated later.
Some authors concerned with the role of state

enterprises,

emphasize the question of autonomy to extremes,

considering all possibilities for state action, while others tend
to reduce the importance of autonomy placing emphasis on

objectives and financial environments.

33

This framework will

consider state objectives, i.e., programs, projects and financial
schemes, juxtaposed to the concept of autonomy, since objectives

and their financinq are cpntr^i 4-«
central to policy formation
9
and decision
Autonomy, then, is a central
variable

^

^^

analyzing development programs
and their projects/policy
output.
State enterprises are
instruments for intervening
directly in productive and
infrastructure

activities. As such
there are political and
economic determinants for
the state
choosing a specific form of
intervention.
Some of the economy
factors frequently cited are
the provision of basic
inputs,
maintaining the level of employment
and the importance of
occupying strategic sectors thus
replacing both local and foreign
capitalists who are risk averse or
financially
34
limited.

Although most reasons focus excessively
on production of
technical or economically vital
strategic supplies, state
enterprises have appeared under political
determinants as well.
For example, states launched numerous
projects under the
influence of development ideology and
motivations relating to a

particular political project on one hand, 35
or because
desire to set up a site for articulation

they

and compromise of

competing interests. 36
As different as these determinants may be,
they apply
to different patterns of creation and evolution
of state

enterprises, both within and across social formations.
However, in late capitalist social formation, the general

determinants are the objective requisites of capitalist
development.

Political or ideological considerations are less

crucial in late capitalism of
Latin America than they were
in
Gerschenkron's view for late-comers
in Europe.
Historical and
structural factors caused Latin
America's late industrialization
to impose requisites on the
economy that could only be
met by
state intervention. Only states
have the financial capacity
for
long-maturing, low-return activities
which private capital is
unwilling to undertake or to which
there have been determining
events, such as wars or internal
conflicts, that obligated the
state to fulfill. 37 Political or
ideological considerations are,
nevertheless, important when one considers
that state
enterprises are not merely separate
policy-making and decisionmaking arenas, each pursuing its own
goals according
to the

nature of the activity, but rather

a

coherent totality where

directions are given by governments and
"headed, and more or
less well coordinated, by an executive
authority." 38
As noted earlier, some of the Marxist theory
of the

state literature emphasizes the objective requisites
of

capitalist development

—

the interests of local and foreign

capital -- that force the state to provide basic inputs for
their

conditions of existence.

These Marxists theorists also stress

the fact that private capital has no interest in performing low
return,

long-maturation activities. Opposing this Marxist view,

non-Marxist literature draws attention to market failures and
comparative advantages that state enterprises have with respect
to their financial capacities. 39

In both cases the state is

response

for duties which serve

^

^

capitalist development.

Initially the state promotes
infrastructure and development
while protecting infant
industries.40 These policies

_

^

^

intervention in other industrial
and productive activities
as the
objective reguisites become
more complex, re gui rin
g greater sums
of investments for large-scale
projects.
However, this model of state
supported development does
not fully explain, nor does
it possess the interna!
consistency
necessary to understand state
ownership in late capitalist
social
formations of Latin American states
especially the most
advanced ones: Mexico and Brazil.
it also fails to explain why
the form and extent Brazil and
Mexico's late industrialization
included extended support of the state
by international
capitalist institutions.
fact, this has forced the state
to
act in accordance to exogenous
structural factors, turning the
state into a last resort of the dynamics
of international
capital. "1 Furthermore, viewing the
state as responsible for

-

m

objective requisites of capitalist development
alone does not
fully illuminate the constraints imposed on
the
state by the

process of internal class interaction.

And reversely, this also

avoids viewing the state as occasionally being "for
itself,"
i.e.

fully autonomous from class and class interests as if
no

other social group has power enough to control it and push
forward its own project. 42

31

Therefore, demonstrating need
for state enterprises
i
is
not enough to understand
the creation and growth
of state
enterprises and their actions
in late capitalism;
a more complete
analysis must look into capacities
to promote capitalist

accumulation while highlighting
historically constraints and
causal linkages. 43 Th is analysis
specifies the mechanisms by
which the capitalist imperatives
and political demands
of the

dominant classes are translated
into state enterprises
policies
and actions.
As seen earlier, by viewing
the state as a
reflection of dominant classes, the
Marxist instrumentalist
version fails to specify that link.
In other non-Marxist
analyses the state is viewed,
irrespective of

class struggle, as

rational response to problems in the
economy and efficiency
considerations. But this approach also
fails to specify the
mechanisms mentioned above inherent in policy
formation.
Both
a

versions do not provide an integrated approach
to investigating
the nature of the state.
An integrated approach, then, should try
to understand

the process of a state enterprise's appearance
and growth while

relating state-building to the capitalist development
processes,
and the state to society relationships.

These relationships must

be analyzed not only in the confines of national boundaries
but

also considering the

embeddedness of nations in changing transnational
relationship, such as wars and interstate alliances or
.

.

.
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This international dimension
highlights the vulnerability of
late
capitalist social formations with
respect to international
financial crises, the dependency
situation in a process of
capitalist accumulation, and the
lack of sovereignty with respect
external actors or crises that affect
domestic economies.

These state enterprises' actions
should also be
inserted into the broader political
process which translates the
struggle over objective requisites
into problems and policies to
be tackled by the state.
This sets the stage for examining
competing projects and interests. state
enterprises, not being
static entities performing routine tasks,
are rather
part of

a

political process that mediates interests and
demands of diverse
forces while at the same time defending their own
interests.

power struggle unfolds, the state enterprises

•

s

As

actions involve

attempts to enlarge their own jurisdiction, attempts to
mobilize
external and internal resources and allies and attempts to

coalesce with other agencies engaging in long-range commitments
and projects involving multi-actors.

Assuming this view is correct, it then supersedes the
solely entrequista logic or the "solidarity of interest" logic
by which the state enterprises set up programs and projects only
to provide crucial basic inputs for multinational firms. 45

it

also goes beyond the "state
for itself" log ic which
purports a
Plot to capture the state by
military or technical elites.
it
also contradicts the models
that view state enterprises
as
rational and pragmatic responses
to structural economic
problems. 46 An Qf these

^ ^ ^^.^ ^ ^

^

part of an essentially political
process of decision, embedded
in
historico-structural analysis of state
building and state action.

1

•

Structural Duality

The establishment of state enterprises
was closely
related to the initial economic and
political conditions of

capitalist development in early stages of
industrialization.
Subsequently, state enterprise actions bring

forth additional

analytical preoccupations.

state enterprises

•

s

actions occur

simultaneously in the context of market forces and
of microeconomic interests, and in the context of political

forces and

macro-economic interests.

Organized in this manner, state

enterprises are recurrently referred to in the debates over
their
role in capitalist economies as dual structural units: that
is,

both

a

distinctive form of state agency and at the same time,

special form of private enterprise.

a

This ambiguous identity

results from its double insertion on different spheres of social

relations that have

a

particular logic of action, and are at

«
times contradictory:
Y the StatS
economy. 47
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a PP^atus

and the market

~

It is important
to observe their
specific

organizational format ana
the particular
strategies o f
io
s market inserted
° rq
servrces.
::
obv.ously, the nature
Qf

::z::

^

eventration an d

t he spectrum o f

StatS entSrPriSeS
'

—

adulations

behaVi °-

—

^

—

within sectors

-ate d

external markets, submit
to pressure from tne
internationai
economy an d sector,
capital interests.
As

,

to

an iUustration of

«u.

phenomenon, take for example
the Bra Z i lian state
mining
sector which has been
historrcally de pen d ent,
in larg e part, on
foreign markets lo cate d
in the industri.l
economies. 48
Technic.! factors and in
dus trial dynamics ere
elements
constraining the micro-economic
level of state enterprise
operations because they face
the same social relations
of
Paction as private economic units.
So profit motive, market
competition, and pricing
policies are internalized
by state
enterprises that assume an
unlikelv
uniiKeiy role
™i c of
r,r an
entrepreneurial
organization within the state. 49
Vet,

exactly because they perform
a public function,
state enterprises face
macroeconomic and political
constraints by
reason of their involvement
in social/political
relationships
within society (i.e. classes,
clients, suppliers, employees,.

35

This implies that state
enterprise practices are
ambiguous. They sometime act
as private enterprises
involved in
competition for markets and
resources, profit maximization,
the
logic of capitalist accumulation
and an antagonistic social
relations of production with
their employees. But they
remain
state apparatuses:
their practices are political,
conforming to
a larger -.public interest",
dictated by centralized authority
and/or political demand from
society.

State enterprises

's

practices will be more market-

oriented or more public interest-oriented
depending on the nature
of the goods produced or services
performed.
if goods and
services are sensitive to political
factors (fuel,

electricity),
then state enterprises will have
dual behavior, oscillating
between preoccupation with efficiency
when procuring goods and
services to be delivered to society^
and preoccupation with
politics when pricing the same goods and
services.

The structural duality of state
enterprises allows them
access to resources not readily available
to private firms or
other state agencies, such as income from
the sale of goods and
services, access to internal and external
financial markets and

stock issuance in the country and abroad.

state enterprises

outcompete private enterprises in the labor market as
well,

attracting executives with competitive salaries other state
agencies cannot offer either.

Furthermore, as state agencies,

they have privileged political access which permits them to

maintain institutional
conditions
nditions foe
fostering their permanence
,
as
legitimate state units.

_

•

w hile state enterprises
contain a structurai
CUlatin5 betWee Pri
"
P-Aic interest behavior
this does not mean
that they operate solely

^

— "~» -

:

in

another.

By having dual logic
of actio

^

^

_

^
^^^^^^ ^
_^
manner

only see* to expand
their operations if
politically ju stifi ed or
ref lect the public
interest.
Project
and program expansions,
then, must he legitimized
und er a set o f
negotiated o bj ectives, defined
under the general political
direction of the central aunnonty.
authoritv
D legitimation
The
process
will depend on the regime,
which can tahe several
formsPlebiscites, legislative votes,
or negotiations under
the form o,
exclusionary or limited inclusionary
politics. 51 At the £ame
time when implementing
programs and projects, state
enterprises
fight to maintain autonomous
action unencumbered by other

™

i

forces 52
.

This leads to another question:
that of state autonomy
and its particular subcategory
of state enterprise autonomy.

2.

State Aut onomy

The variable "state autonomy- is
related to the state
polity, state-economy and intra-state
agencies relationships.
Whereas on the broader level, state
action is related to the

-

^^ ^ ^

.eneral political forces
guiding and
the game, that is the
,
scope and Umits of
poUticai transacUons
among social classes;
on . more specific
Power," or the "clesse
governance," organizes the
political
sidelines that sh a pe poUticai
practices that in torn
structure
the policy process.

^

^^

Understocking the policy- making
process, as an
essent ially political
process<

^

contexts in which policy
decisions are m a de.
C ° nteXtS 13

^ ^^t^t^

One of these

(state enterprises for

that Matter)

where all ac tors, classes,
and class interests
outside the state negotiate
and define policies.
The second

is

where intra-state riv a lry

or

^^^^^^im^mt^

competition within the same sector
are pl aye d out; this is
best
exemplified by highly centralized
Presidential decisionmaking
ccuncils.
Thirdly, the internatiom
1

l_nai^^

illuminates the relationships between
internal and external
forces. These relationships can
be both with a ctors in the
more
advanced industrial centers (banks,
clients) and with actors in
n a tions in the immediate
regional range.
Once policy-making as

a

political process is

established in one of these specific contexts,

a

few dimensions

of state autonomy in the policy-making
process can be examined.

State enterprise action, inserted into one
of the three contexts
mentioned above, will conseguently be more
autonomous or more

^pendent

in relation to class
and class

^
^^^ ^
^

agencies and institutions
that compete in the
state apparatus, or
to nationai interests.
should be noted
simply a conglomerate of
bureaucratic agencies „ her e
certain
sectorai interests are
piayed out. The state has
ditferent site£
for interest articulation
at various levels and
jurisdictions
which allow for intra-sector
and inter-sector negotiation
and
accommodation.

„

^

Having acknowledged the
existence of the many sites
for
interest mediation and conflict
resolution in the state apparatus
(agencies, state enterprises,
and other bureaucracies,,
state
policy-making and action is an outcome
of the effective
capacities to decide on policy
initiatives and pursue policy
objectives. As far as state autonomy
is concerned, the policy
process will be a function of
(a,
the^rimac^f_th^olicy
area or the sector within the
capitalist development and economy
measured by the weight and strategic
position of the sector with
respect to the overall economy;
(b)
the
or nr
Y
of the institution
i. e. the relative position
of the agency or
state enterprise in the state structure,
with an account of how
the institution gained or lost prominence
over time, due to
shifting importance on policy area or the
amount of resources
managed; and
(c)
the avail ab ility and management of resources
at the disposal of the state agency or
enterprise which should be
evaluated in terms of guantity and degree of control.
To further

W,n»

,

w

p^^^

^
^ ^

..^^
mnmsxi
ms;

clarify the autonomy variable,
the conoept Qf
to be refined into

and
of which cannot he
evaluated resorting only
to quantitative

evaluation.

Detailing resources, it can
be seen that power
resources involve both
political power ana institutional
power
Political power resources are
related to the privacy
position o £
an agency.
Their political power, existing
because of its
hegemonic position in the state
power and authority structure,
reflects the acquisition of
powers and capacities to
influence
the political process of state
action and policy-making. 53
As

state enterprises relate to the
dominant sectors of society
they
are capable of selecting
interests and groups for articulating,
aggregating and organizing interests
inside the state.
Political
power resources will provide the
capacity to allocate other
resources and decide on policies.
Political power resources are
revealed by determining state enterprise's
capacity to coerce or
induce other interests. The more
central agencies
are in control

of strategic information the more
political power they have.

The

political autonomy of an agency or state
enterprise then depends
on the agency's being an arbitrating sphere
where dynamic
interests are played out. By becoming the
center of mediation
among conflicting interests the agency becomes
more autonomous
from other power holding agencies and social classes.

institution po„ er resources
represent

—— —

4U

^

capacity to enlarge
an enterprise's
role in state d
decision-makinq
4..
aCtl
°n
is -flectrve o
f the institutional
to define an
approbate area o f po licy
including
coordrnatron o f ot h er
agencies and overseeing
allocation in I
particular sector.

"

cadres

,

fi

institutional power resources
are then another aspect
of political power
resources avail.hic
*
available to
an agency. The autonomy
or dependence of
institutions will be a
reflection of the
capacities described above.

Managerial resources are
probably the most critical
factors distinguishing
sectors and agencies from
one another
They can be classified
into financial resources,
and
into

administrative/technrcal capacities
intrinsically involved in the
process of decisionmaking
and state action.

Administrative or technical
resources will provide the
requisites of an agency to act
and decide.
So the ability to
co m pete in the labor
market for executive and
technical personnel
strengthens or diminishes
managerial autonomy. For example,
in

the communications and
telephone state sector enterprises,
Embratel ^presa Brasileira de
Tele^ ojunlcasoes § »
and
Tel6b S (Selecomuni cao oes Brasi
1 eiras_S^)
hav e amassed vast
amount of technical/administrative
expertise, which in effect
increased these state agencies
autonomy in the formulation and

"

)

4

decision of policy for one
the sectorun,.*
sector. Whatever
was decided by these
two companies was the
state policy for the sector.
Dependence on budgetary
appropriations hinders state
agency autonomy, state
agencies will seek financial
sources
which are negotiation-free
(for example, automatically
appropriated funds)
us; wniie
while* at
a f the same
~
time they will seek to
increase self-financing capability.
in addition,

state enterprises will avoid
to become
dependent on an exclusive source
of funding for its action.
Whe
lacking the capacity for
self-financing, state enterprises
will
procure diversified, flexible
sources in such a way that its
finances will not suffer if one
source is lost by being able to
compensate its budget from other
sources.
a

The state enterprises and state
banks have the
privilege to invest capital and
disregard pressures from the
institutions which provide the funds and
any other outside
interference, except those originating
from central decisionm aking agencies.
Effective long term control of financial
resources is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for

achieving

a

high degree of relative autonomy.

D.

Concluding R emarks With Some Hypotheses
About the Brazilian State Action

The above review of the literature on capitalist

development and political power provides a theoretical framework
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regimes.
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CHAPTER

AUTONOMOUS

in

nLwS&j™™ *™
1

AND

The central purpose
of the next two
chapters is to
present an historico-structnrai
structural account of
Brazilian state action
and policy-making process
curing the military regime
Thig
analysis is divi ded into
twQ

_

-re

^
.

^

insulate., authoritarian
period of policymaking
an d state
action (Chapter in,, and
another in

^

_

influenced by
nni if i^^i
Y the political
liberalization and economic
crises
(Chapter IV)
-i

•

!_

In the ensuing sections,
basic state action and the
basic structure of political
power are discussed and
analyzed.
These analyses are aimed
primarily at mapping out the
degree of
state autonomy by focusing
on directly associated
state actions
processes of state-building and
the dynamics of interest
competition in the overall political
and policy-making process.
We begin with a brief
description of state

interventionist state-building and
policy-making during the
period prior to 1964.
this

m

historical review we will

demonstrate that the role of the
Brazilian state as an
intervening agent was paramount in
the process of capitalist
development and was established long
before the military came to
power
63

;

razman

he

;

relation
onshlp between
. a e

^~
case is

Since the inception
of
"0, led by Get, lio vargas<

ing
fche

,

through productive
functions

of the

political power and the

nationalist/pQpuiist

a

as expanded its
intervention

mustrative

^

^
^
^
^

bureaucratized

^

^^

economy

_

under
especially after the
establlshment of
Ssx
m3 ^
b e=a Be the dynamic
center of ecQnomic
transformation>
the conditions for the
i m port-substit u
tion-industri a ii zation
which would continue
after
r Var
Vam^-c
9 as s removal from power
in 1945.
The period 1930-45
reorespntc; .the
hQ beginning
xepresents
of the
industr ia ii 2ation process
and the proce£s
consoUdation Qf a
new a i Iiance among th£
dominant sectQrs
sQciet
_

'

,

.

^

,

^

^

oligarchical syste m of interest
representation operative
the SsE ui2l i£
(1889 . 1930) saw

^mM

the

.

r

poUt

.

cai

reduced, but not extinguished,
with the emergenC£ Qf
the urban, industrial
bourgeoisie whioh establishe d
strong
connection with the central
govern m ent.l Industrial
capitalis.
was this bourgeoisie's
conscious project which in the
1930s
institutionalized new ways of participating
in the decisionmaking process, consolidated
during the authoritarian period
of
the.Estado_Jiovo (1937-45). 2 The
industrial bourgeois class

^

3

utilized the state-created
institutions
° f F° reign TradS
(CFCEX
'

««te.»34,.
(

CTEF

,

_

^^^^^^

'

the

the Technical CouncU
Qf EcQnomics

Conselhp Tecnim Ho

t?^

Nacional Council of Industrial
^
industrial and Commercial
Policy (CNPIC,
Conselho Nacinn^i
^,
Poll> a Tt

^^^-^^^^-^^
.

1944)

to

legitimize their direct
influence over tne
the policy-making
noli™
trprocess
w.tnin the bureaucracy.
This consultative and
corporative
structure, gea re d tc polic y ma]cing in the financial and
area, generalized the
practice of direct and ciosed
negotiation
between the state and the
private sector in order to
consoiidate
Brazilian capitalist
In fact such insulatgd
ample sectors of society an
H ,,
ac a
and
was
resilient trace of the
Brazilian policy-making process
throughout.

^

,

.

->

The consultative and corporative
decision-making
institutions were an ingredient
of the conscious project
of
modernizing the state bureaucracy
in such a way that some
sectors
of the bourgeoisie
the exporters, national
industrialist and
selected agrarian interests
had privileged access to
policy
formation and decision-making during
the first Vargas period.
Other such institutions were created
after the First
Vargas period.
In 1945 the Superintendency of
currency and
Credit
(SUMOC, Superintendent da Mn P d a e do rrpHitM
took up _
Central Bank functions.
Despite being a division of the powerful
Bank of Brazil (Banco do Brasil) its
action was influenced by

-

-

9

"
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nati ° nal
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Groups
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7

^
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med ate

c apita

interests rel a ted to
capital and consumer
ec
special treatment under
the
;
litated

"

the p rincipal

,
-a

•

;

capital

was

i—cgicl resistance to state
intervention in the economy
ana state entrepreneurship. *
The
plethora of administrative
ive and fin^i
financial mechanisms
created for
the imputation o f
the Target Pl an needed
coordination, which
was achieved through
the innovative
i

^

^

representatives or government
agencies and tne private
sector
deterging tne scale and volume
of production
incentives.* In addition
fcQ policy . making
-de decisions on tne utilization
of earned Ponds wh.ch
were
not subject Congressional
oversight and control. 7
Late r, in the
late 1960s, these policy-making
apparatus were institutionalized
into a single "non-decision-making,
bureaucratic agency
approve what dominant groups
wanted approved. "8 Between
1946
and 1964 sixteen agencies
or mechanises of
,

_

-

representation

-

^

J

^

interest

were created (or reorganized,,
fragmenting the
decision-making process among state
agencies, each possessing a
high degree of relative autonomy
from central state and were
highly instrumental in capitalist
modernization.

The literature analyzing
the political economy
of tb.e
Brazilian state productive
sectors
steel, min ing, petroleum
electric power
as well as the
political aspects of the
organization of the National
Economic Development Bank
(BNDE

67

-

-

*^^

,

'

£aDS£-M£iS

1953),

and the

efforts to initiate automobile
production discusses policy
formation and implementation
between 1930 and early
1960s
Luciano Martins explored
the concept cf "conservative
modernization., under the aegis
of an authoritarian
regime (1937 .
1945) when state steel sector
was implanted in 1941.10
In the

same work, he analyzed the
petroleum sector, the creation
of the
BNDE and the implantation
of the auto industry
all between
1950 and 1960.
Luciano Martins analyzed the
interaction between
public decision-makers and
entrepreneurs, both domestic and
foreign, concluding that,
despite changes at the political
level,
the entrepreneurs remained
highly dependent upon the state,
and
articulated their interest through
informal channels or
corporative mechanisms. Therefore,
a series of fragmented
relatively autonomous agencies emerged,
being at the same time
"apparatus of domination, an exclusive
arena for the elites and
arbiter of conflicts among them." 11

-

During the 1930s, as the implementation
of Vargas's
policies became entangled with the domestic
struggle between
Fascism and Communism," the military
leaders forced Vargas to
institutionalize an authoritarian, intervening state
which, as

,

stated by Goes Monteiro

,

vargas

,

s

chief Qf staff

Forces

a

^

^

68

™* regulate all
c;ilec?ive
f r:nd d?s
* he nation
creating the
organizations and apparatuses
?
p
adequate to organize our
economy. 13

n

<

in contrast with the
corporative mechanism of interest

representation,

second group of agencies and
state-owned
enterprises were organized soon
after the inception
a

of the

Est^

with the hl gh degree relative
state autonomy proposed by
the
military.
The National Council of
Petroleum (CNP, C^nselho
NP^P.

^^'

toliU
Z^nhl^^

1938 )>

Doce Valley Company (CVRD,
1942)/ National steel company (cs

^z^i^^

1941)

^

resulted from the act on Qf
.

the powerful groups within the
state who sought highly autonomous
policy-making and implementing mechanisms. 14
Several political
and social forces were unleashed,
imbued with an ideology of
national regeneration and a state-building
mission.

^

In the steel industry an intricate
decision-making

process took place involving foreign private
interests,
Brazilian private groups and the strong military
heavily inclined
to autarky, i.e. to achieve self-sufficiency
in steel supply as a
national policy.
Most proposals to the steel problem were

^

-suggestions involving the private domestic and foreign
interests

These were sidelined in favor of

a

statist solution, despite

.

~

con sultations with
u-s steei
other state-owned
steel
_

W

7

S

P

;:
13
;
Paulo

"

^"

ate G

^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^

The state mining
company
^ iy
UP as exporting firm

i7

estafciished

-

-"as

—

cvRn
CVRD

Ge r ais and sio

—

was initially set

and would later
consoUdate

,

producer and exporter firm
ln
percent of seaborne trade. 19

^

^

^^

With resp e ct to petroieum,
the international
example of
Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia
and Mexican

^

tM^

^

respective industries prompted
the Es
3 regime to
est abli sh a regulating
agency, the National
Petroleum Council

t™*-

OU

^U.^M^n^^t^,

1938)

.

The decision to

monopoly however would only
be made in 1953
CNp
Brazilian private refineries
from trovers, permitting
foreign
capital to invest only in
Sporting a nd
a

.

distributing, p lan ned the

petroleum industry as
decided

a

public utility overseeing

an

phases, and

unifor m price nationwide on
all oil products and also
Sole Tax on Liquid Fuels
(IUCL, tepost^irdc^obr^^
a

touidcs,

The decision to form the state
oil company pitted a
statist, nationalist solution
against a free-enterprise system
preferred by the foreign and domestic
private interests. This
confrontation lasted for almost a
decade (1943-49), delaying
Petrobris decision. The monopoly
campaign would resume later
.

a

under different

70
a

composition of rorces,
forces
including the middle
class, the non-Communists
nationalist and Leftist
military an d
Leftist civil alliance
including Socialist,
Communist and 1th er
Progressive sectors, b asicall
y a hodge-podge of politioal
each striving to control
the movement.
The monopoly solution
was
achieved in Vargas second
Administration (1951 . 54) through
a
"Petroleum is Ours!" popular
campaign. 20

^

State action in the electric
energy sector, dominated
by the much opposed
foreign-owned monopolies, 21 was
also
advanced under the tutelage
of the
une state.
state
Th„
y
The proposal for the
state monopoly Eletrobras
(Centrai^Eietrica^rasil^
'

presented in !953 to be

organic

along the same lines as

Petrobras) was effectively
stalled, by powerful associated
Brazilian and foreign interests,
in Congress until 1 962 .22
Nevertheless, state electric power
policies were conducted at
Vargas's Economic Advisory Board.
With increased electric power
bottlenecks posing problems for
industrialization, the states
took up the role of the foreign
companies by setting up a series
of state-owned enterprises.
Financing mechanisms were
established at the federal level for the
electric energy
sector. 23 credit for the construction
Qf generating pQwer
plants was available through the National
Bank for Economic
Development (BNDE)
This interested BNDE since delaying
the
inception of Eletrobras yielded windfall
political power to BNDE,
.

whose cont rol over
finances gave
distributed throughout

ifc

^

^

7

the country. 24

State action is
ultimately the result of
of the complex
political process of
h„ and
deciding how
where to use scarce
economic resources. As
the Brazilian productive
structure
transformed itself, beC
oming more heterogeneous,
new class
fragments became part of
the power pact
participating primarily
the internationalization
of the internal marKet,
in view of
dampened labors demands.
coularfs period (1961-1964,
was
by highly active policy
initiatives with dismal
outcomes.
State action attempted to
h>
resolve the structural
deficiencies of
the economy and society.
coularfs Triennal Plan,
incorporating
structural and institutional
reforms, ignited the
political
struggle over the type of
capitalism Brazil should pursue.
society and in the state
agencies endless debates over
land
reform, educational reform,
urban renewal, labor laws
reform and
*ore importantly, profit
remittance were fought, bringing
state
action to paralysis and impasse.
The political coalition that
worked together during the Target
Plan, was definitively

m

™

*.

m

shattered. 25

What ensued was

economic situation that led to

deteriorating political e

a
a

conspiracy by forces of the

opposition concentrated in the Institute
for Economic and Social
Research (IPES). 26
State intervention in the Brazilian
economy from Vargas
to Goulart was of a dialectical
nature, shifting from populist-

nationalist protectionism, to

a

ii beral and pro . foreign
capifcal

Policies.

capital accumulation was
thus concentrated in the
most
dynamic sectors
those dominated by
multinationals
bef ore
taking place in state
productive enterprises.
Economic factors
were certainly crucial to
the demise of Goularfs
power pactrecession, inflation, problems
of balance of payments,
foreign
debt, internal debt, all
combined to exacerbate institutiona!

-

-

inadequacies and structural economic
bottlenecks.
Nevertheless,
the breakdown of the
constitutional regime had clear
political
components. The constant tension
between populist-nationalist
policies and liberal orthodox,
pro-foreign policies are
represented in the brief description
above.
Public policies in
the Estado Novo the Vargas's
second term, and the Goulart
years
focussing on the welfare of the
working class clashed with those
implemented during the Eurico Dutra
(1946-1951) and Kubistchek
periods.
Dutra and Kubistchek pushed policies
that promoted the
internationalized associated-depedent mode of
development.
the
dialectical tension between these two poles
was temporarily
smothered with the authoritarian regime
after 1964, which for the
next twenty-one years was to promote a
paradoxically enlarged
state role while trying to foster a regime of
economic
'

,

liberalism.
The pattern of capitalist development had projected
new
and powerful actors into the political arena. The
multinational

durable consumer goods interests rapidly combined with the

-terests

»

o f other politioal
aotors

"ve« developmental^ pro
ject

.
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^
As this

rapid

^

between labor and capital
exarcebated by
popular seg m ents of society
and the increased
ability o f the
working class to articulate
effectively its de m ands.
In
addition, the political
alli ance failed to coopt
crucia!
fractions of foreign and
domestic capitalist ln terests
forcing
the basis of opposition
to Goulart'ss interv.nfi
ln terventionism.
Although
Popular uprising and turn to
a socialist regime
was highly
unlikely at the time, there
were real threats to capital

"

^

•

accumulation and to the pact of
domination.
As pressures from
the lower classes increased
the military clamped down.
The
military regime instituted a
"redemption project," whose
initial
task was the dismantling of
working class institutions and
parties, in order to demobilize
the working
classes,

in

particular industrial labor unions.

B.

The Military Coup and the First
MijJ^arx Rule;
The Period 1964-67

The regime established in the
aftermath of March 1964
was a rupture with the populist regime
of the past, it assumed a
different pattern of state institutionalization,
different
structures of power and of authority as well
as exclusionary

execution of public policies. 27

The new bloc-in-power

,

of which

a

the military represented
the most powerful
segment, had two
C
b ° nding
«- identification of Communist
threats with the mobilization
o f t h e worKing classes,
peasant£
students, lower ranKs o f
the military, and
2) the political
to
stave off these threats
«11
in order to maintain
donation
over society.
addition to these

"°"

*— *"

^

m

^^

power wanted to revert the
populist-nationalist economic model
and pursue a model of
growth that in effect would
exclude a
number of social sectors from
the benefits of

develops.

in order to succeed,

this project needed the
exclusion
of threatening political
actors, together with the
incorporation
of classes and class fractions
capable of promoting capitalist
development. After seizing power
in March 1964, pro-labor

organizations within the state
previously devoted to the
implementation of populist-inclusionary
policies were dismantled.
New economic policies promoting
orthodox liberal economic
programs were began, strengthening
and expanding the role which
international oligopolies would play
in the Brazilian economy in
the next years.
The military regime, controlling
the coercive
apparatus used the National Security
with Development Doctrine as
a blueprint for their new Brazil.
This doctrine had been taught
at the Superior School of War (ESG,
Escola Superior de Knerr. in
Rio de Janeiro for a decade, preparing
cadres of military
officers, tecnicos and entrepreneurs for this
long-term
political project. This time, military intervention
i

,

in Brazil was

to be different from
the previous t^n
temporary interventions.
The
traditional role of the
mil -54- =
hG millt
^y as a "moderating power"
returning political
control to civilians
civilian. soon after
crisis was
over 28
was now snelv d in favnr 0<! ,
tavor of long term
domination of all
aspects of society.

-

—

^

The winning coalition

-

the military, the
conservative

land-owners, the traditional
urban upper class, and
the
modernized urban middle class
which feared the economic
instability of Goulart regime
formed a contradictory
alliance
For them, the previous
regime showed the unpreparedness,
the
corruption, the weakness and
sheer incompetence of civilian
politicians in conveying the
stability needed for development.
This conservative coalition
was soon dominated by
hegemonic
military and technocratic factions
defining the political and
economic direction and state
action.
The modernization of the
state bureaucracy, the adaptation
of political institutions

-

to

the needs of the authoritarian
regime and the reorganization
of
the economy, displaced traditional
interests.
The landowners and
factory owners, fragments of the
domestic bourgeoisie, quickly
found themselves alienated from the
political project of

bureaucratic-authoritarianism.

The coalition of the
dominant classes began
fcQ
as soon as t h e
poiiticai groups o£ the
effectively controls,
the populist civilian
and military
leadership purged, and
their organizations
orqanizati „™ suppressed.
The
» industrial and financial class
fragments, expressions
of
the »odern capitalist
dominated the new coalition,
while the
Military occupied the
central positions in the
exercise of power
and authority.
The traditional land-owning
class who fought
against Communism in the
rural areas and against
agrarian refer,
also refined, albeit as
a „i„or partner, in
the new hloc-in29
power.

mist

^^

Furthermore, the Superior School
of War (ESG) was
convinced that the development
lopmenc or
of Bra,in=
^
Brazil's „
modern
industrial and
financial infrastructure could
not be accomplished by
the
politicians. 30 The ESG's Doctrine
of National Security
purported the ideology and strategy
of future Brazilian
development.
The doctrine related the
pursuit of permanent
Sbiectiyes that were to be achieved
by policy implementation
to
attain c urrent obj ectives. Among
the permanent obj ectives it
was established that the ESG was
solely responsible for defining
national security interests, such as
sovereignty, national
integration, social peace, international
recognition, and a
particular interpretation of democratic
values including limited
freedom of speech, limited personal
freedom, and control of the
right to form political parties and hold
elections.
However,

.

attainment of the permanent
objectives was p ossible
through the
implementation of policies

^o^^^,

^

conjuncture! problems, and
had emerged from the
an alyses and
suggestions of classes and
seminars at ESG. The ESQ
was in
essence a vehicie for
disseminating the dominant
national
security ideology. 31

The first military
government headed by Humberto
Castello Branco, the former
Chief of staff of the
Armed Forces
provided the military regime
with new institutions
such as the
National Informations Service
(SN1,

"

I

that

^

S^rvi^Nacion^

the State Pro-Pt access
to information and
intelligence for decisions in the
public and in the private
sphere. 32 Although
)

^

^

^

controlling the political activities
of labor unions and student
organizations they realized how hard

it was to avoid the interna!

politicization of the military.

Eager to prevent the suggestion

of any disunity, purges and
exclusionary policies helped the

dominant hard-line faction give the
appearance of
monolithic military establishment. At

a

ruling

the same time,

implementing these policies made the
hard-liners advance into
positions of command. 33 The increasing
self-sufficiency of the
military, in contrast with the relative
weakness and dependence
of the domestic bourgeoisie, consolidated
their hold over the
state

.
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The increased authoritarianism
of the military was
demonstrated in the deactivation
of the existing political
parties.
This took place after the 1965
Gubernatorial elections
in the states of Minas Gerais
and Guanabara resulted in victories
considered detrimental to the regime.
As a consequence political
activities were funnelled into two
parties, one supporting the
military regime
National Renovating Alliance

-

another opposing it

(ARENA)

-

-

and

the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB)

The Program of Economic Action of the
Government (PAEG)

contained diagnoses of the most pressing causes
of declining
growth rate.
GNP growth was the only statistic the military
thought necessary to legitimize their rule. The
PAEG proposed

policies to remedy the economic recession which were not

explicitly exclusionary but required increased use of
hand to obtain compliance.

a

strong

The economic policies, breaking away

from Furtado's Triennial Plan, diagnosed inflation as the

principal problem to be tackled since it endangered economic

growth
Additionally, the implementation of the military

development cum security project required adequate organization
of the state in the area of modern regulatory and financial

institutions. Fiscal policy aimed at increasing the extraction
of resources, and policies that curtailed the political use of

administrative and technical resources, were deemed essential to
stimulate economic growth and implement the "restorative

1'

development project.

The 1964 Monetary and
Financial

transformed the Currency and
Credit Superintendency (SUMOC)
into
the Central Bank of Brazil
BACEN
(

,

B^^t^^Bx^U)

and

C^^M^^

instituted the National Monetary
Council (CMN
Nacional)
The National Monetary Council
became the most
important site for mediation of
capitalist interests, classes and
actors sidelined in the previous
period, including domestic and
multinational industrial interests,
national and foreign banks,
export sectors, state agencies and
state enterprises were now
convoked to participate in the
decision-making
,

.

process.

labor unions were effectively controlled
and

a

Now that

new labor and wage

legislation were in effect, the decisions
of the National
Monetary Council dealt with the share of
capital accumulation
that each fragment of capital would receive,
banking

financial

gains, agricultural subsidies or industrial
fiscal incentives 34
.

The tax system was re-elaborated paying
attention to

the creation of non-inflationary means of getting
revenues.

The tax reforms were aimed at increasing the extractive
capacity
and included the creation of indexed bonds and bills of the

National Treasury (ORTN and LTN) used for indexing mortgages,

housing loans, construction industry, rents and debts. 35
Efforts were made to regain the confidence of foreign

lenders and investors
alike.

—

In that same year,

government, multilateral and private
1964,

the World Bank, the IMF, and

private foreign banks resumed financing to Brazil.
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in one of the first actions
of the military government,

Castello Branco changed the job
stability regulations introduced
in the 1943 Labor Code to
facilitate the capitalist relations
of
production. According to the old
rules, tenure was granted to
workers with ten years or more of
employment, which resulted in
numerous labor lawsuits against
multinationals and Brazilian
firms.

in 1966, the Time of Employment
Compensation Fund (FGTS,

de Garantia por To.^p n de Service)
was instituted,

eliminating job tenure and instituting
the amount of time on the job.

a

flat compensation over

The new attractiveness of the

Brazilian labor laws for the multinational firms
were directly
related to the depressed wages and unemcumbering
labor code.

2

'

State E nterprise Action in the Period 1964-67: Reform
and Institution-Building

The discussion above showed how reform of state

institutions or the installing of new ones has directly affected
the character of the regime.
in this period,

The action of the state enterprises

as shown below, was also marked by reform and

extended institutionalization, not only in sectors historically

established but also in new areas.

Some of the long-lasting

traits instilled in this period of reconstitution of the state
institutions were:

tiCiZati0n ° f the State
enterprises and
subordination of their objectives
to

^encS;
b)

C

055 ° f

Vsel

Yet,

^

*— ^

ity and

^lo^entlbjectives;
-de of

S ° Cial

funct ions it had before

cfadSption o? entre
,
'
operaSon?

these traits were contradictory.

The objetives of
state enterprises were subordinated
to National Security and
Development objectives but they
were implemented by state
enterprises managed as private
enterprises.
The central
decisions and objetives were taken
at the top-echelon levels of
the National Security Council and
the presidential level after
which they were carried out by state
enterprises.
This
form of

state action was established in the 1967
Administrative Reform
Act which mandated "centralization of
decision and

decentralization of decision execution" as

a rule. 36

Despite the initial efforts of the Program of
Economic

Action of the Government (PAEG)

,

inflation remained high and

economic recovery slow (see Table 3.1).

The military was willing

to combat inflation at any cost, no matter how detrimental
to the

society at large.

Reducing it involved

a

harsh package that

included recessive policies, emphasized modernizing institutional
reforms, enhanced financial capacities of the state and

controlled labor in order "to make capitalism work." 37

.
.
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1
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TABLE

3

.

MACRO ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Years

Real
GDP
growth
rate

inflation
rate
(%)
[
}

EXP ° rtS Imports T de Current
Gross
Net
R
Balance Accounts Foreign Foreign
Balance
Debt Debt

^

.

(3)

.

,

(a)

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
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1980
1981
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1984
1985
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Following the prescription of the
package of policies
with respect to state agencies
and state enterprises, the maxn
objective was to eliminate politics
in their daily operations and
to cover the deficits and losses
caused by the political use of
their funds. This was a particularly
Herculean task since many
state agencies lacked self-financing
capability. Those agencies
that had an income confronted three
main factors, among many,
contributing to their financial situation:
a) the rates of
public utilities were eroded by inflation;
b) public goods and
services together with industrial products
manufactured by the
state enterprises were priced extremely low to
maintain political
stability; and c) pricing policies contained heavy
subsidies to

industrial consumers

(See Table 3.2 - Price Indexes.

Public

Goods and Services, 1962-1974 below)
State enterprises and agencies, supposedly purged from

political clientelism by now, turned to the adoption of private

management practices in an effort to increase their efficiency.
One of the first measures taken was reviewing the tariffs and

prices for their goods and services so they could

reach

"realistic tariffs" which would free them from fiscal budgets. 38
However, steel prices remained partially frozen in order to

generate benefits to the private economy, particularly the auto
industry
Another measure was to have separate personnel policies
from those of the Civil Service.

While direct Civil Service

2

84

salaries were frozen, the salaries
of the state enterprises
employees were calculated on a
different scale: the

technical/managerial staff of the state
enterprises were paid

TABLE

3

.

PRICE INDEXES.
PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICES, 1962-1974.
(1965-67=100)

INFLATION

Years
(a)

1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967

51
81
92
34
39
24

1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

25
20
19
20
16
16
35

Sources:

PETROLEUM
Index
(b)

13
24

ELECTRICAL
ENERGY
Index

STEEL
Index

(b)

(b)

8

18
31
54
84

RAILROAD
FREIGHT
Index
(b)

15
22
45

PUBLIC
SERVICE TARIFFS
Index
(c)
8

45
80
99
120

15
30
68
98
134

99
117

70
108
123

101
133

155
195
225
276
350
401
641

156
202
257
305
366
405
512

152
190
253
319
360
432
653

119
196
260
322
322
360
477

159
197
254
315
392
443
526

15
33
66

a - Coniuntura Economica
from Table 3.1, p. 80.
b - Trebat, Brazil's State-Owned...
Table 7.1, p. 184.
c - utilities and urban transport aggregate prices
,

,

including gas, water, electricity, telephone, bus and train.

salaries that competed with the private sector, making them able
to attract better personnel. 39
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Before 1964 The Federal Railroad
Network (RFFSA

^^Uri^eaer^^)
extensively used as

a

and shipping

Um

^

CQmpanies

,

Rede

source of employment and
clientelistic,

patrimonial pattern of action,
resulting in political dividends
for the Goulart regime.
Their autonomy was most prejudiced
as a
result.
The overstaffing and political
price-setting
for

services before 1964 were drasticly
reversed in order to recoup
losses sustained before 1964.
However, these short run measures
together with stopping unprofitable hauls
were insufficient to
compete with transportation via highways,
in
addition, the

absence of secure sources of long term
financing was detrimental
for the financial autonomy of the sector.
Furthermore, the
decision process in the transportation sector
was necessarily
political: for example the RFFSA had to continue
running the

deficit-ridden suburban passenger service at low rates
to prevent
political unrest. 40
The electric power sector surmounted the anti-statist

campaign with its holding company Eletrobras.

After

a

decade of

"generation project-oriented" growth, the regional and state

companies of the electric power sector were directed

to implant realistic rate-setting procedures, to manage
Eletrobras and its subsidiaries like private firms,
and to respect public money as we respect private
money. 41
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Obsolete rate-setting mechanisms made
foreign companies, such as
the Brazilian Traction, Light and
Power of Canada, unwilling to
invest in their operations in Brazil,
what gave them high
political leverage. The lack of foreign
investment increased
number of shortages and the likelihood of
rationing, while
providing poor service to about 80 percent
of the Brazilian
market.
In 1964, just after coming into office,
the Minister of
Mines and Energy, Mauro Thibau, restructured the
rate
legislation,

indexing assets, and reintroducing the return on

investment on basic rates. 42

Raising electricity rates was not

so politically sensitive as increasing train fares but
it

indicated

a

clear pro-foreign-company stance which was resented.

This political opposition to favoritism toward foreign capital
was easy to control since public protest was effectively

suppressed under

a

harsh press censorship.

Whereas higher rates

benefited foreign companies it also generated financial and
economic leverage of the state electric utilities companies.

Eletrobras was also able to increase its sources of funds with
the compulsory loan collected from the regional and states

companies, and with directly collected and earmarked fiscal
resources, previously managed by the BNDE.
In the period 1964-67 Eletrobras struggled to

consolidate and to acquire the institutional resources that would
allow it increased managerial, financial and political autonomy.
Nevertheless, its regional subsidiaries and associated companies

owned by the states of the
federation were at that point
more
important than Eletrobras.
Furnas CHESF/ S , Q Paulo
generating companies
CELUSA, CHERP and USELPA which
merged
into CESP ~, and Minas Gerais's
CEMIG were all large influential
firms in their own right.
Despite the long distance from
the
location of the generating power
plants to the market, they were
able to strike advantageous
contracts for the sale of bulk
electric power with the foreign-owned
Light.
This alone changed
the relationship between the state
regulatory agency CNAEE and
the foreign-owned distributors, from
a bribery-ridden, corrupt
relationship to a concrete business venture. 43

^

,

-

In the petroleum sector,

Petrobras

•

s

new president,

General Ademar de Queiroz (appointed by
Castello Branco and a
participant on the 1964 coup)
attempted to insulate Petrobras
from political influence.
While expanding its refining
,

capabilities, Petrobras expropriated private refineries.

it also

went through an institution-building process, reorganizing

services and functions in

a

novel power-sharing system. 44

The

substitution of political appointees by technical personnel laid
the foundations for Petrobras

's

increased efficiency, market

share, and profitability in the future growth years.

Control

over the expropriated refineries lasted less than two years
(1964-65), at the end of which time they were returned to the

private sector.

Two of these refineries, however, reverted back

to Petrobras control in the early 1970s as a result of an
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expansion program.

This overall rational policy
targeted to put
Petrobras firmly in control of
a refining capacity
that by 1974
reached over 95 percent of all
crude oil in Brazil. 45
Before 1964 the policy decisions
taken by the high
management of Petrobras were
essentially welfare-leaning causing,
apprehension in the Armed Forces in
face of the national security
connotations of this industry. After
!967 entrepreneurial

autonomous decisions by the military
who controlled Petrobras
facilitated the expansion into distribution
and petrochemicals.
Both were compatible with national
security objectives

since they

continued an autarkic pattern established
earlier.
The deep crisis of the steel industry
in the mid-1960s

was caused by

a

decrease in the Gross Fixed Capital Formation
of

the sector of 55 percent in 1963 and 25.6
percent in 1964. 46

Managers of state-owned and private enterprises
resented the
price-freeze, the lack of control over power and managerial
resources, and the excellent conditions given to imported
steel.

The BNDE

,

by controlling the finances of the sector, essentially

dominated steel policy until 1965, diminishing the state steel
sector's autonomy.

Nevertheless, at the Brazilian Steel

Institute (IBS), an informal arena for the steel sector's
mediation, state and private entrepreneurs usually concurred

about appropriate measures needed to confront falling profit
rates and increasing financial costs, but they were at odds in

dividing up the market.
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To help organize the steel
sector, BNDE and the
international lending agencies (the
World Bank and the

international Finance Corporation

-

IFC)

proposed a jointly
sponsored study involving private
interests, public interests and
multilateral agencies. A commission
was formed by the National
Confederation of Industry (CNI, Confederacy
Naciona!
da

industria

the Ministry of Industry and Commerce,
the BNDE, the
IBS, the World Bank and the IFC.
They contracted Booz-Allen and
l

,

Hamilton to analyze and recommend alternative
solutions for the
decapitalization of the steel industry and its
future

developments. 47

A controversial August 1966 Report followed,

negating the political guidelines by recommending
no further
increase in Brazilian steel production.

Planning

's

The Minister of

defense of the Report, that it had been formulated on

"strictly technical grounds" based solely on market indicators
was disproved by future research.

It is now generally

accepted that international oligopolies were fiercely competing
for the potentially large and expanding Brazilian market and had

influenced the expert's recommendations. 49
touch, the Report was

a

Politically out of

major blunder that had the effect of

rallying private and state enterprises in the Brazilian steel
sector behind

a

revision of the Report recommendations, done by

the Consultative Group for the Steel Industry.

With respect to the mining sector, this period was

a

fundamental shift from the nationalist solution pre-1964, which

put limits to exploration of
Brazilian minerals by foreign firms.
The 1967 Constitution and the new
Mining Code reverted that
permitting foreign firms to explore
minerals in association with
Brazilian firms or individuals. As
an important source of
foreign exchange, the military
government facilitated the
operation of multinational firms in the
sector hoping that
increased exploration would expand exports.
In terms of the mining sector's
relative autonomy,

the

statist solutions of the past were criticized
and modified.
Instead stimuli to the participation of the
private sector were
introduced under the aegis of the newly reorganized
National

Department of Mineral Research (DNPM) and

a

revamped Mining Code

CVRD's continued autonomy was due to its high political,

managerial and financial autonomy, which were essential to the
proper functioning of export-oriented activities, which reguired
flexibility and decision-making power.

C.

1

•

Autonomous State Action in the
Growth Cum Repression Period

Economic Recovery and Political Repression in the Period
1967-74

This period comprises the consolidation of the pattern
of dependent-associated capitalist development which emerged in

the late 1950s and whose political, institutional, and economic
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foundations were laid in the
aftermath of the coup fro. 1964-67.
The military regime was
increasingly dominated by the "hardliners/, who were able to impose
their authoritarianexclusionary views after Castello
Branco's Minister of War, Costa
e Silva, gained the upper
hand in the succession and imposed the
hard-line supremacy within the military.
The Costa e Silva term
(1967-69) was marked by the institutionalization
of repression
and was cut short by his stroke in
August 1969. At that time,
his SNI Head, General Emilio Garrastazu
Medici (1969-74) came to
power. Medici presided over

a

period of accelerated growth

spurred by orthodox economic policies, the
so-called "miracle."
Unprecedented misery, documented by declines in every
indicator
of human welfare, however, necessitated
increasingly

authoritarian and repressive political conditions, to avoid
the

politicization of the widespreading marginalization of the
working poor. 50
This period corresponded to the institutional spread of
the "national security state apparatuses" 51 through the

strengthening of the Presidency and the strengthening of the
National Security Council and its executive arm, the National

Information Service (SNI).

The SNI became a pervasive network of

information and security offices in all state organizations,

enforcing ideological adherence to development and security
concerns.

The military executive arm was established at the

Internal Operations Divisions (DOI)

,

at the different Armies and
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Commands throughout the country.
count rv

t„
m

addition, military personnel

started occupying decision-making
positions in the state
enterprises continually created
in the 1967-74
period,

in

furtherance of the implementation
of the ideology of development
with security. 52
The Costa e Silva military
government (1967-69) was
marked by political protest and
opposition initiated by
politicians whose political rights had
been taken. The hard-line
military responded with increased
repression to working class and
student organizations. A defiant Congress
during 1968 was again
harshly repressed, culminating with the
issuance of Institutional
Act 5, which gave full dictatorial powers
to the Costa e Silva
regime.
Each resistance movement of workers and
students,

corresponded to harsher repressive acts.

Eventually these

resisting movements adopted urban and rural guerrilla
tactics -which in turn generated the uncontrollable mushrooming
of

repressive apparatuses, legal and paramilitary.
After Costa

e

Silva

Medici was elected in

a

"sui generis" poll taken among the top

's

disabling stroke and death,

brass ignoring the constitutional claims to the presidency of

civilian Vice-President Pedro Aleixo.

Despite Medici's ultimatum

to the military leaders that in order to accept the presidency

they would have "to accept any mission he gave them,"

Medici in

reality let the repressive apparatuses rampage about, in much the
same way as he gave a free rein to state agencies to implement
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autonomous policies. 53

During Medici's term (1969-74) the

repressive apparatuses were given full
support to combat the
guerrilla and labor movements. Opposition
was effectively
crushed during this period
the harshest dictatorial years of
the military regime. 54

-

Another undeniable characteristic of Medici's
term was

economic growth, constantly celebrated by
the Public Relations
Advisory Board (AERP, Assessoria de Relag oe
s Publicas da

Presidencia da Rep ublics) in an effort to legitimate
the
political regime.

However the political regime was repudiated by

the Brazilian society not only because of the events
involving

torture and disappearances, hushed under

a

veil of censorship,

but also because of the inequitable distribution of results.

Economic growth as an end in itself without distributive concerns
and as

a

source of legitimacy, gave impetus to the grandiose

projects that inebriated the military.

The Transamazonic

Highway, the Rio-Niteroi Bridge, the Itaipu Hydro-Power Plant and
the Angra

I

Nuclear Power Plant were intimately linked to the

long-term Doctrine of National Security and Development. The
"

Brasil-Potencia " (Brazil- Emerging Power) project continued

throughout the 1970s, reflecting the Superior School of War's
doctrine, which permeated the military and the technocracy in
"new entrepreneurial self-identity," in times of ineffectual

Congressional politics. 55

a

In the economic sphere the
Minister of Finance,
Delfim Netto, who remained in office
from 1967 to 1974,

Antonio

implemented large investment programs
in the state productive
sectors.
so doing the idle capacity
of the capital goods

m

manufacturing was preempted.

This production was predominantly

done by the multinational companies
operating in Brazil since the
Target Plan. The funds for such policy
came from the renewed

self-financing capacity, new investment
attracted through
subsidies and tax credits, and heavy reliance
on debtfinancing. 56 Embarking on expansionist
policies was therefore
not a product of a single decision but rather
it derived
from

combination of factors including

a

a

higher degree of relative

autonomy for the state due to increased insulation
from societal
demands.

Among these factors was the absence of political

challenge due to intense repression, the regime's increased

extractive capacities and the aggressiveness of the foreign
capital in offering loans and suppliers' credits.

For some

critics there was no miraculous economic growth in this period;
it could be explained by the cyclic nature of the Brazilian

economy coupled with
conditions. 57

a

special political and economic

The high growth rate of period 1967-74 averaged

10.4 percent per year (Table 3.1).

Even more impressive, the

industrial growth rate averaged 13.05 percent between 1968 and
1973 58

.
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However, the policy outcomes of
this -growth cum
repression- period can be better
understood when income

distribution figures are examined.

The process of income

concentration is inferred from the
declining share of income
received by the lower 80 percent of
the working population
between 1960 and 1970, from 45.5 to
59
36 percent.

conditions of welfare deteriorated with
slum dwellers

(

favelados

)

,

a

Social

surge in the number of

rising infant mortality rate, and

generally poor living conditions. 60
Even though the economy boomed in high levels
of

private consumption and export growth, it was the
state action
that was crucial in providing the incentives to
growth.

As Baer

states

A large proportion of Brazil's capital formation in the
late 1960s and the first half of the 1970s consisted of
public investment and investment activities in
government enterprises (in 1969 this amounted to as
much as 60 percent of total capital formation)
[I]ncreased steel production capacity, petrochemicals,
iron ore mining, power generating capacity, urban rapid
transit systems, and so on, would all be necessary
regardless of the income distribution. One may,
however, question the wisdom of the huge government
investment in road building, which supported the
capacity expansion of the automobile industry and made
country increasing dependent on the consumption of
petroleum, 80 percent of which is imported. 61
.

.

The consequences of the institutional and financial

reforms of the first years of the authoritarian regime were an

expanded and more powerful role of the state in regulating,
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financing and producing capacities.

Decree Law 200, the 1967

Administrative Reform Act, enhanced the
centralization of
decisions and the decentralization of
execution, while allowing
for an unprecedented expansion of
state activities
in the

productive sectors and facilitated the
creation and
transformation of public companies in the federal

states into

associated companies to holding federal companies.
below depicts

a

62

Figure 3.1

guideline for state entrepreneurial action in

the years that followed the Administrative Reform.
The regulating capacities of the state were increased

when the Interministerial Price Commission (CIP) was organized.
CIP controlled prices of basic products and had the power to

obstruct credit from official banks and agencies for those who
did not comply with its directives.

CIP's ability to control

prices resulted from the power to collect and to analyze the
costs of production thoroughly, thus enabling it to control

crucial sectors of the economy as well as wages and salaries.
CIP was therefore able to manipulate price-control mechanisms,

influencing the capacity of

se'l f -f inancing

or limiting the

profitability of entire sectors. 63
The financier role of the Brazilian state was modelled

after the National Bank for Economic Development (BNDE)
source of sectorial financing since the fifties.

,

the main

The National

Housing Bank (BNH, Banco Nacional da Habitacao) used the receipts
of the Time of Service Guaranteed Fund (FGTS) to finance the
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Political Direction

Coordinating Economic Councils

Financial Sources

Other Regulatory
agencies related

Sectoral Regulating Agency

HOLDING COMPANY

Associated and Subordinated Enterprises including Joint Ventures

FIGURE 3.1

-

GENERAL STATE ACTION.

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT

POLITICAL DIRECTION:

COORDINATING ECONOMIC COUNCILS:

National Security Council
Presidency
Ministry
other

National Monetary Council 1964+
Economic Development Council
(

(1974+)

National Energy Commission

(1979+)

SECTORAL REGULATING AGENCIES
National
National
National
National
National
National
Others

Department of Mineral Research (DNPM)
Department for Waters and Electric Energy (DNAEE)
Petroleum Council (CNP)
Co. for the Non-Ferrous and Steel Industry
(CONSIDER
Department of Telecommunications (DENTEL)
Nuclear Energy Council (CNEN)

HOLDING COMPANIES:
CVRD - Companhia Vale do Rio Doce S.A.
Eletrobras - Centrais Eletricas Brasileiras S.A.
Petrobras - Petroleo Brasileiro S.A.
Siderbras - Siderurgia Brasileira S.A.
Telebras - Telecomunicagoes Brasileiras S.A.
Nuclebras - Empresas Nucleares Brasileiras S.A.
Others

FINANCIAL SOURCES (foreign and domestic):
BNDE; IBRASA Investimentos Brasileiros)
FIBASE (Insumos Basicos
Financiamentos e Participates)
EMBRAMEC (Mecanica Brasileira)
Industrial Development Council (CDI)
FINAME (Agenda Especial de
Financiamento Industrial) World Bank; Inter-American Development
Bank, Private Commercial Banks, Self-Financing, others Development
and Investment agencies.
(

;

;

;

;

;

OTHER RELATED REGULATORY AGENCIES:

Interministerial Price Council (CIP)
Foreign Trade Department (CACEX)
Customs Policy Council (CPA)

FIGURE 3.2

-

LIST OF MOST IMPORTANT AGENCIES

housing industry.

BNH

'

s

original objectives were distorted from

financing low income housing to financing the
construction of
middle- and upper-income units, adapted after the
dynamics

of

interests of the housing industry, in addition, the
extensive use
of government-guaranteed consumer direct credit
helped finance

the acquisition of durable consumer goods

concentration of income.

adding to the

64

Moreover, the demand for industrial production was

reinforced by policies of export promotion based upon an

elaborate system of incentives and subsidies whose main objective
was to expand foreign exchange receipts.
8

percent

Calculations show that

of the increase in sales of manufactured products

during 1968-72 was due to increased exports of traditional
products: shoes, furniture, textile, foodstuff, clothing .[ 65

]

Most of the subsidies relating to the increase of exports were

politically controlled by the CDI and by CACEX where exportimport agreements were struck as

a

result of political

negotiations that weighed capital accumulation interests and the
market conditions. 66
The financing of investments, based on foreign debt,

was greatly facilitated by the Resolution 63 of the Central Bank

which allowed Brazilian banks to borrow abroad and to lend in
dollars domestically.

Another important instrument that

contributed to the expansion of foreign debt was Law 4131, which
allowed multinational firms to borrow from foreign financial
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institutions or other parent companies
to replenish working
capital with government guarantees.
The foreign debt grew
fourfold from 1967 to 1974 (see Table
3.1) with these
instruments.
Since the foreign debt began to change
from
primarily multilateral agencies loans
and suppliers' credits to a
greater predominance of loans from private
banks, the old notion
that the "miracle" years were a great
period to invest
in Brazil

needs to be re-evaluated. 67
Despite Medici's openness to foreign capital, his

policies were assertive of Brazilian state autonomy
permitting
foreign capital to invest only in sectors not already
occupied by
the state.
Increasingly aware of the policy of reliance
on

foreign capital, 68 the military viewed themselves as capable of

organizing and promoting the needed accelerated growth in all
fields.

To further that self-image retired military officers

occupied middle and upper management positions in most of the

state-owned enterprises, both old and new.

However even if the

"hard line" project had been partially "legitimized"

by high

rates of growth in the "miracle" years it could not be solely

sustained through widespread repression because neither the

military within the state nor the industrial bourgeoisie directly
benefitting from economic growth were ever able to gain hegemony
in the process of defining political direction and

institutionalization of the regime.

At the end of Medici's term
the lack of military
hegemony was sufficient argument
for the inception of the
"decompression-, project.
The successor of Medici was to be
chosen from among those candidates
acceptable, more or less, to
all factions within the military,
including the hard-liners

represented during the Medici term.
In summary, the analysis of the
patterns of political

and economic actions of the Brazilian
state in this period
suggest a group of characteristic traits that
were transferred to
the action of the state enterprises subsequently:
a)

internationalization

-

the state enterprises increasingly

procured goods and services with multinational enterprises
already implanted in Brazil, or looked for joint-ventures
in some
sectors in the expansion period;

b)

depoliticization coupled with

private business-like mentality, increased administrative

competence and search for financial autonomous capacity;

c)

increased centralization of high-level decision-making, and

execution through contracts awarded to specific fragment of the
private sector;

d)

approximation between the objectives of the

National Security state apparatuses and the objectives of the
state enterprises (Examples: Transamazon Highway

National Integration; Itaipu

-

Objectives of

Brazilian/Paraguayan/Argentinian

-

geopolitics and international security objectives; Angra

I

-

military hopes of nuclear technology transfer and Brazil's
entering in the "nuclear age'

1

;

and finally

e)

relaxation of the
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controls over state enterprises
s financial operations,
liberating the m to deal directly
with the private international
financial co^unity, what
contributed to the sharp increase
in
foreign debt.
•

2
'

SeSS!SS

The previous section has shown
how the Brazilian state
apparatus, influenced by the military's
concerns, promoted
exclusionary policies that accelerated
capitalist development.
Lacking political support from most of
the organized groups in
society (labor, press, professional, lawyers)
and thereby forced
to hold the regime together with repression
and propaganda, the
state sought legitimacy through economic
performance during the

presidential terms of Costa

e

Silva and Medici.

recovery of this period was the result of

The economic

the maturing of the

productive structure built in the 1950s and 1960s, was supported
by Castello Branco's institutional and political reforms,
and was

facilitated by an unprecedented increase in international trade
and credit availability in external financial markets.

Additionally, the recovery was spurred by

a set of conditions,

as

discussed before, that restructured internal demand during the
years 1968-73.

In short,

this growth cum repression and

further internationalization of the economy presupposed both the
change in the pattern of production and the change in the

.
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organization and structure of
political power and policymaking.
This section will discuss
the state action which took
place in
the period and its high degree
of political and financial
autonomy
The economic policies decided
in the central policymaking agencies (mainly in the
National Monetary Council,
directed by the powerful Finance
Minister, Delfim Netto) were
instrumental in the recovery but they were
not the main
determinant once the interest articulation
in the CMN was limited
in political power.
Each of the public productive sectors
gained
political importance in this dynamic cycle, yet
each sector
(electric power, petroleum mining, transportation,
steel,

telecommunication) had its own coupling with private
national and
international capitalist segments, ranging from cooperation
,

toleration to outright conflict.

to

state action was, therefore,

governed by the general distribution of political power.
The policy-makers were quick to tap availability of

foreign savings, channelling resource to the state

entrepreneurial sectors, now that the political appointees were
replaced by the technocratic or military-background managers.
The state combined strategies of resource allocation with

increased intervention aimed at the consolidation of

oligopolistic productive structure.

a

That resulted in the organic

association of the large national private firms, the large state
enterprises, and the multinational corporations in

a

"tripod"
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model which was consistently
stimulated through mergers, jointventures and a systematic policy
of concentrating investments
i,
the strategic sector of
petroleum/petrochemicals, mining, steelmaking, electric sector,
telecommunications and transportation 69
Notwithstanding the euphoria with
accelerated accumulation, the
state sectors competed with each
other for resources.
As the
productive structure became more heterogenous,
the competition
and the cleavages of interests became
more fierce
.

for the

definition of priorities within the state.

As seen from the

Table of Annual Growth Rate in the Investment
of State

Enterprises (Table 3.3) investment was unevenly
distributed among
the different state sectors.
The following discussion
of the

state enterprise action highlights the variable "relative
state

autonomy" in which we focus our analysis, by considering the

centrality of the policy and the articulation of interests
seeking to control and to manipulate economic, financial and
political resources.
As discussed in Chapter II political power resources

and financial resources are the underpinnings of state enterprise
action.

Each sector mobilizes resources and establishes special

relationships with the central state agencies and with its

particular network of private interests.

In addition,

these

patterns of interest articulation change over time, modifying the
patterns of resource mobilization.

s

3

.

105

TABLE

3

.

STATE ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS
ANNUAL GROWTH RATE IN INVESTMENT,

Years

Eletrobras
& Itaipu*

1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

1. 1

31. 3
13 8
17 8
14 4
.

9

22

9
9

Petrobras 1

10.
57
44
-2
19
.

.

.

3

5. 3

6
0
7

74 4
39 2
43 9
-6 .7

8

40 5
24

CVRD 2

3

-15
-24

.

.

State
steel 3

24 9
77 4

9
3

.

.

21.8
26.1

Source:
From tables 4,5,7,8 in Henri Philippe Reichstul and
Luciano Coutinho, " Invest imento Estatal 1974-1980: Ciclo
Cnse," in Luiz Gonzaga Belluzzo e Renata Coutinho (orqs.) e
^
op cit
From companies Reports.
2 _ Data
from Raw, op. cit.
table 32, p. 350. Investments on
the CVRD subsidiaries not available prior to 1972.
- Based on reports from state companies,
holding
Siderbras, and Consider.
'

.

,

The pattern of investment for the state enterprises

shown above demonstrates not only their performance with respect
to overall economic performance but also provides an idea of the

priority of each state sector to the central state.

The negative

values for the average growth rates in Gross Fixed Capital for
the period 1965-69 reflect the downturn in investment in state

enterprises as
reforms.

however,

a

result of the economic and institutional

Anticipating the cyclical rise in the growth rate,
investment in energy infrastructure was

higher than the

overall investment. In the following period 1970-73, coinciding

with a period of harsh repression, the state enterprises

'

4

.
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investment grew (Table 3.3);

the average growth rate in the

Gross Fixed Capital Formation for
the state enterprises (Table
3.5) was almost twice as much as the
Total Gross Fixed Capital
Formation (Table 3.4). Gross Fixed
Capital Formation followed
discontinuous pattern for the period in
question, reflecting
policy priorities negotiated at the
central state level.

TABLE

3

a

.

GOVERNMENT AND STATE ENTERPRISES
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION
(Selected years, by sectors)

GOVERNMENT
ST. ENTERP.

1965

1969

1970

1973

24

.

9

22

.

7

18

.

5

16 7

9

.

2

4

.

4

8

.

0

10 5

Steel
5.0
Mining
0.6
Elec. Power 1.4
Chemicals 2 2

0.7
0.9

2

4

.

1

0.9

.

Source:

0.8
0.6

.

8

1.6

1975

.

16 9
.

.

2

.

0

0.6
5.6
2

.

3

2

.

9

0.7
na
5.0

Sulamis Dain, "Aspectos do Investimento
Empresarial do Estado." (Table II) - Grupo de
Estudos do Setor Publico/ FINEP, 1978.
Obs.: negative due to decapital ization
na - not available.

The pronounced discontinuities found in the average

investment growth followed

a

pattern of large sectoral investment

done in "blocks," regardless of economic conditions.

Investment

was greater for the electric setor in the late 1960s, while the

9
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steel sector was the leading investment
block in the next two
periods combined, growing at 60 percent and 40
percent for the
years 1970-73 and 1973-75 respectively, increasing
its share in

the Gross Fixed Capital Stock from 0.8 percent
in 1969 to

percent in 1975.

2

.

in the third period, the leading block, the

petroleum/petrochemical sector, averaged a growth rate in the
Gross Fixed Capital Formation of 70.8 percent. Likewise, its
share in the Gross Fixed Capital Stock increased from 0.9 percent
in 1969 to 5.0 percent in 1975.

TABLE 3.5

AVERAGE GROWTH RATE
GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION
(Selected years)
1965-69

TOTAL

GOVERNMENT
ST. ENTERP.

Steel
Mining
Elec. Power
Chemicals

1970-73

1973-75

13 5

15. 0

16.7

11.2

12 2

17 .9

-5.5

27.7

na

-22 0
-11. 0
37.0
- 8.5

60.0

40.0

22 5
22 0

.

.

.

.

.

30.0

4

.

5

.2

70.8

Sulamis Dain, "Aspectos do Investimento
Source:
Empresarial do Estado." (Table II) - Grupo de
Estudos do Setor Publico/ FINEP, 1978.
na - not available.
The pattern of uses of resources refers to analysis of
the patterns of investments describing how each sector fared

s
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relative to the others, while
the analysis of the sources
of
financing sheds light on the
financial underpinnings of the
state
relative autono m y variable.
Relative state autonomy is often
achieved by control of the sources
^j. the
uie financial
^ of
iinanciai and economic
resources.
So, understanding how a
sector had more
or less

resources for their use depended on

a

number of things, including

their capacity of self-financing
through the sale of goods and
services, the role of internal
capitalization and the degree of
foreign indebtedness incurred by each
of the major productive
sectors.
Ideally the more the state enterprises
had control over
their own resources, the more they were
capable of deciding and
executing their policies. There were other
circumstances that
influenced the state autonomy, however, such as the
role
of the

national security doctrine or the influence of the
private
sector, both domestic and multinational.

Up until 1965, while the major source of financing

investments within Brazil were the BNDE and budgetary
appropriations, external financing came primarily from

multilateral agencies.

Shortly after, that changed with the

renewed capacity of state enterprises to generate funds from the
provisions, at realistic prices, of goods and services. As

resources increased they were used for state enterprises

expansion thus sustaining economic growth.

•

At the same time,

budget allocations were diminished in order to reduce the deficit
incurred during the 1962-67 crisis.
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The concern of creating
means of self-financing
investment affected the relative
autonomy of the state

enterprises in important ways.

while pricing policies did in

fact help the electric power,
the petroleum and the mining
sectors, the pricing of steel
products was kept depressed to keep
down the cost of production of
durable-consumer goods, a sector
dominated by multinational corporations.
The contradictions of
interests, pitting the executives of the
steel plants against the

executives of these multinational corporations
interested in
maintaining low prices, ended up hurting the

state steel sector.

Although prices of electricity, telephone and
urban transport
were readjusted (See Table 3.2) soon they were being
maintained

unrealistically low and used again as
the fight against inflation.

a

political instrument in

Despite this fact,

these resources were sufficient to guarantee

a

for a while

high aggregate

self-finance ratio in the period, as seen in Tables 3.6, 3.7 and
3.8 below.

The earmarked Sole Tax on Electric Energy (IUEE) and
the Sole Tax on Liquid Fuels (IUCL)

,

raised directly from the

consumers of electricity or petroleum products, are considered by

Eletrobras and Petrobras as their "own resources." 70

Although

not subsidies, these earmarked taxes can be better viewed as

government transfers to the state enterprises.

For the purposes

of this analysis, however, they will be considered as self-

generated resources since the actual transfers were not linked to
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annual budget appropriations
but rather done automatically,
shielded against political changes.
These funds, sales surpluses
and earmarked funds were relatively
stable during the period
1967-74, accounting for 45 percent
of resources benefitting
Eletrobras and the majority of the
funds allocated to Petrobras
(See Table 3.6), whose policies
were relatively independent from
the political direction of the central
state apparatus.
A second form of securing funds for
the sectoral

investments, was equity provision by the
government, made on an
irregular basis. These funds were allocated in
accordance with
the sector's needs on capacity for a self-generating
surplus from
the sale of products or services.

In addition to capital

infusions from the Treasury, under the form of retained
earnings
and depreciation funds, equity was also raised through
the sale
of shares in the stock market.

The total privately subscribed

voting and non-voting capital was never significant, even in the
joint ventures where the state capital has always remained in
control. However, the volume of sale of five of the most popular

state enterprises

1

s

stock represented more than 20 percent of

overall trading in the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange between 1971 and
1973. 71

The sale of stock to the public forced the state

enterprises to adopt profit-seeking behavior.

This in turn

constrained the government's ability to use in their public
roles.

The sale of stock competing for resources in the market

also contributed to the confrontation between the private sector

Ill

and the state during the anti-statist
campaign that was waged
later on.

The third major form of investment financing

term borrowing from international commercial
banks
was not as important as they later became.

—

—

long

initially

According to

Trebat,

their share increased from less than 15 percent in
1968 to 25.2
percent in 1974. 72 In terms of domestic loans, the Brazilian

private banks had

a

minimal role in the financing of investment.

The state enterprises historically relied on the state-owned
banks. In particular the BNDE

,

at least up to 1965, when the BNDE

decided to emphasize loans to the private sector. 73

As domestic

sources for long term loans dried up for the state enterprises,
foreign sources of long term financing became more available, as

illustrated in Table 3.6.

The state enterprises

—

particularly

—

those in the transportation and in the electric power sector

continued to receive project financing from the Inter American

Development Bank, the World Bank (International Bank for

Reconstruction and Development)

.

These agencies maintained

a

good relationship with the Brazilian state at the same that they
looked after economic interests in the First World.
of the Brazilian loans,

In the case

15 percent of the funds were used as

suppliers credit to purchase capital goods in the US, Japanese
and European market. 74

Special circumstances accelerated

Brazilian foreign indebtedness in the period 1967-74.

For one,

the situation of high liquidity in the so-called Euro-markets

1

.

6
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TABLE

3

.

SOURCES OF INVESTMENT FUNDS (Selected
Years)

Self-Financing
Optg.

Capital
Subscription

Earmarked

Gvt. Prvt

Long Term
Borrowing
Domst

.

Frgn

ELECTRICITY
1968
1971
1973

PETROLEUM
1968- 70
1969- 73
1973

27

.

25.5
34

.

66.

4

1

14.3
19.8
19.9

21.9

50.4/69.3

40.

70

30.6
19.6
20.0

1.7
2.7
0.3

2.1

i.o

1

13.9

12

13

18.9

.

5

6.5

3

.

0

na
na

21.6

STEEL
1969-73

22

16

MINING
1964-68
1969-74

70
65

10

8

1.5

.

18

.

4

9

5.9
na
na

10

30

na
1.5

12
22

Sources: Luciano Coutinho and Henri Philippe Reichstul "Tendencias Recentes do Investimento Empresarial do Estado."
Paper presented at the I Seminario Latino-Americano de
Politicas Publicas - FUNDAP/CLACSO - Sao Paulo, Dec. 1978,
Table 5, p. 20; Henri Philippe Reichstul, "Financiamento do
Setor Energetico" - Table 8A, p. 119; Wilson Dutra and
Vitoria Salles, Padroes de Financiamento em Empresas
Estatais (Rio: FINEP, 1978, mimeo) pp. 79ff; Trebat,
Brazil's State-Owned..
op. cit
p. 174.
Note: opto - operations generated; earmarked taxes; gvt government; pvt -private; domst - domestic; fqn - foreign;
na - not available.
,

.

,

coincided with the internal cycle of accelerated economic growth,

which stimulated the demand for large amounts of credit by the
private and the public sector.

Additionally, the institutions of
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the Brazilian financial system
were not yet mature enough for
that kind of rapid expansion,
forcing a considerable portion of
the demand for credit to be met by
operations involving the use
of foreign exchange.
The increase in foreign indebtedness
almost fivefold between 1967 and
1974, from US$ 3.2 to 17.9

-

billion

—

was predominantly financial in its
character,

according to Davidoff Cruz's analysis of
the loans, financing
contracts and the formation of international
reserves.
According
to this author, the contracts for financing
US$ 6.8 billion were
counteracted by interests costs amounting to US$
6.16 billion and
the creation of a reserve of US$ 6.16 billion,
that is, creating

purchasing power for capital goods and raw materials that
was
not used in the period and returned to the mainstream of
a

the

international financial market. 75
Long term borrowing in the international market rapidly

became the way in which state enterprises were quickly able to
implement the projects linked to their expansion programs.

Different sectors had different access to these foreign loans,

depending on several factors.

In general the share of investment

of the private sector remained stable at 65 percent of the Gross

Fixed Capital Formation.

However, the share of the public sector

investment through government budgets has gradually lost
importance in favor of investments through public enterprises as
indicated in Table 3.7.

.
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The important lessons behind the
shifts in investments
patterns in sectoral state enterprises
is the obvious commitment
to industrialization and infrastructure
projects capable of, in
the future, paying their own way,
while de-emphasizing the
policies.
Table 3.7 illustrates this shift
in the relative
autonomy of the state toward productive
sectors.

TABLE 3.7

INVESTMENT SHARES OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR

(as a Percentage of the Gross Fixed
Capital Formation)

Years

1947
1959
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973

Public Sector Investment
Government
Large State
Budget
Enterprises
31. 1

3

.

2

19 9
24 9

8

.

3

.

5
1
5

13
13
16
14
12
15
17
18
19

4

20

20 3
22 9
19
22
18
17
16
16

.

3

.7
5
.

.

.

1974

16

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

16.9
17.7
17.5
16.1
11.8

Sources:

.

.

.

5
8
7
6
8
5

.

3

.

6

.

1

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

.

2

100

62.5
57.2
57.0
60.5
66.3

100
100
100
100
100

1

60
66

4

64

.

9
2

.

3

65
65
65

.

3

64

.

3

63

3

20.5
25.1
25.4
23.3
21.8

TOTAL

(a)

65.
71.
61.
65.

6
9

.

Private Sector

7
8

Calculated from Table 5.2 - Estimated Breakdown of
Public and Private Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 19471979

(Cr$ 000 current)

-

Trebat, Brazil s.
'

.

,

p.

121.

.

8

.

.

:
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-distributive nature of the state
intervention.

Soc.al spending
education, health systems,
public housing, judicial systems
fell far behind spending on
infrastructure and basic
industries. 76 The shift fro,
government spending, including a
larger share of social spending,
to spending of the government
through large state enterprises
indicated increased capability of
the entrepreneurial sector of the
state to decide their own
Table 3.8 reflects the technical
indivisibilities and
the percent of total state enterprise
investment required to
either implant a whole new industry, as was
the case of

"

~

petrochemicals, or to expand existing state
productive sectors.

TABLE

3

.

SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF STATE ENTERPRISE INVESTMENT
SECTORS
Steel
Mining
Pet.+ Petrochem
Telecommunic
Electric Power
Railroad (a)
Not Classified

(%)

1947

1956

65

66-69

34
10

16

46

4

9

8

6

4

6

4

1

52

20

19

21

6

9

23
10

5

13

55

12

10

12

43
12

40
10

7

5

39
16

70-5

76-9
13

Sources:
Arnaldo Werneck "As atividades empresariais do Governo
Federal do Brasil" Revista Brasileira de Economia (1979)
105, for 1947-65;
Trebat, "An Evaluation..
op.cit.
Appendix C table 43. for 1966-75; Annual Reports of major
firms in each sector, for 1976-79; Trebat, Brazil 's.
,

.

.

p. 120

.
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Having analyzed the uses and
sources of financial and
econcic resources we now turn to
the political and institutional
resources controlled by the state
entrepreneurial sectors in the
period 1967-74.
The state enterprise action
in the electric energy
sector reflected the relative
importance of the production of
electricity for the industrial
development in this period. A
comprehensive consolidation took place,
affecting the more than
two dozen utilities at the state
and at the regional levels.
Unmatched by other state entrepreneurial
sector also was the
degree of financial autonomy, as it can
seen from the above
discussion

^

Jose Costa Cavalcanti, first Minister of
Mines and

Energy (1967-69) and later Minister of the
Interior (1969-74)78
was the central figure in the energy sector's
consolidation and
reorganization. As

a

retired general Costa Cavalcanti was

committed to the military pressures of "permanent occupation"
of
the state apparatus in name of the defense of strategic,
national

security interests. 79

He was the first president of Itaipu

Binational (1974-85) and was later given the presidency of

Eletrobras (1980-85).

Directors at the regional and state-level

subsidiaries and associated companies of Eletrobras were

designated from the regional political supporters of the military
regime and technocrats.

Brazil's abundant hydroelectric
potential militated
against using imported oil or coal
for domestic energy needs.
Prior experience and the prospects
for high profits attracted the
large private national construction
firms and the multinational
capital goods firms into the execution
of the sweeping
recommendations of the CANAMBRA studies, 80
accounting for a
program of construction of power plants
in the South-Central and
southern regions through the mid-1970s.
of the institutions
involved in the domestic projects the regional
utility Furnas was
central to the generation and transmission energy
to the

industrializing South-Central Region.

The CANAMBRA studies were

contracted by Furnas since Eletrobras, the electric
sector
holding, did not have the resources nor the institutional

strength to underwrite such

a

study.

Eletrobras importance as an

institution was given after its consolidation as the planning and
financial center for articulation of the interests linked to the

electric energy sector.

Expansion of the electric sector's

jurisdiction increased its political power and its capacity for
action as more than two dozen associated companies mobilized
federal,

regional and state political and economic resources. 81

The Sao Paulo Energy Company (CESP)

,

the most valuable in terms

of assets, was well accredited and trusted in the international

financial community, commercial banks and multilateral agencies,
and capital goods industries.

This capacity enabled CESP to
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pursue

vast program of generation
and distribution of electri c
energy to the state of Sao
Paulo. 82
a

Domestic projects were complemented
with international
projects as well. International
negotiations for the Itaipu
project were initiated with Paraguay
and Argentina, itaipu
reflected the interests of the
technobureaucrats of the electric
sector, based on technical demand
studies, but, more importantly,
Itaipu was a project of central
importance for the highest level
of planning and decision-making
apparatuses of the National
Security Council and the top military brass.
The decision to go
ahead with Itaipu was part of the overall
advancement
of the

national development scheme labelled Brazil Emerging
Power
(

Brasil-Potencia or Brasil-Grandf^

.

The Brazilian-Argentine

rivalry, more rhetorical in nature than it seems,
was at

with the 1972 imminent return of Peron to Argentina.

a

height

The

Brazilian military considered Peron another Goulart, but the

Paraguayan Generalissimo Stroessner viewed Peron as
ally, and this worried the Brazilian military. 83

a

possible

Although

Eletrobras role in the designing of Itaipu was minimal, it is the
Brazilian partner in the Itaipu Binational Entity providing the
US$ 50 million capital.

Eletrobras also loaned the Paraguayan

National Electricity Administration (ANDE, Administracion
Nacional de Electricidad
partnership.

)

its share of US$ 50 million in the

Eletrobras continued its role of procuring funds

for the Itaipu Project.
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The electric energy sector reconciled several

interests,

in particular those related with the Itaipu
project.

First the national security interest was addressed
with

a

strong

Brazilian presence in the important geopolitical
frontier of
Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil where Itaipu was going
to

the

built. Second, Itaipu and the expansion program of Eletrobras
and
its associated companies were congruent with the interests
of the

civil construction companies and capital goods industry.

Whereas military security reasons were also behind the

decision to build the Angra

I

Nuclear Power Plant, this project

also was an important component of the electric energy policy.

Costa e Silva gave the recently created National Commission for

Nuclear Energy (CNEN) and Eletrobras's subsidiary, Furnas, the

responsibility for planning and execution.

Medici inherited the

project and in 1971 international bids were made for
won by Westinghouse

.

a

project,

The planned four-year project (1972-76) --

which was budgeted at US$ 304 million
completed at

a

cost of US$

—

took until 1983 to be

billion, and is now operating at 30

2

percent capacity due to flaws in the equipment design. All cost
overruns were borne by the Brazilian Eletrobras.
The electric power sector and the telecommunications

sector became progressively included on the concerns of the hardliners in the central national security agencies.
was a case of concern since

a

Electric power

less than adequate supply would be

considered dangerous to national security, thus an impediment to
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development.

Accordingly, the Itaipu Hydroelectric
and Angra I
Nuclear Power Plants were decisions made
outside the sphere of
electric power sector. The political
autonomy of the
telecommunications sector guaranteed financial
support for
investment sometimes obstructed by other
investment decisions
with greater priority. 84
A similar pattern was followed for sources of
funds for

financing the expansion of electric power sector.

Only after

1972 could Eletrobras consolidate its position as the
electric

sector's financial holding company, when it expanded its
control
over resources previously controlled by its subsidiaries.

Unlike

the steel sector, the electric sector had access to earmarked

revenues and enjoyed the support from the multilateral agencies.
Furthermore, the nature of the electric power services, atomized

throughout different regions, justified prices high enough to

generate resources for investment.

The contribution of the funds

originated from operating surplus and the Sole Tax on Electric
Energy varied in the different years considered during this

period as it can be seen in the Table 3.6.
The telecommunication sector did not rank as high as

electric power as

a

priority for investment. Data for this sector

are unreliable for this period.

Nevertheless,

its

institutionalization process with the creation of the Ministry of

Communications and the subsequent modernization of small local
companies, most of which operating with antiquated eguipment,
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signalled the growing political support
for the modernization of
the communications sector and the
structural changes this
entailed.

The restructuring of the communications
sector in many
ways resembled the electric sector's
restructuring since it also
transformed local and regional utilities
into state-owned
enterprises.
This reorganization and upgrading
included systems
for interurban and international
communications, long-distance TV
broadcasting, as well as telex and data transmission
installed by
Embratel (Empresa Brasileira de Telecmnunicacoes
1965) and
.

Telebras

(

Telecomunicacoes Brasileiras

.

1972).

The political autonomy of the telecommunications

sector was never high despite security-conscious retired military

personnel occupying high level key-positions. 85

Incentives

provided by Embratel and Telebras to the domestic

telecommunication industry to do research and develop equipment
failed to stimulate local technical innovation. Contracts for

telephone systems invariably were given to multinational

telecommunications firms (ITT, Ericsson, Siemens), since they had
technical edge for the supply of the equipment needed.
In the telecommunication sector, between 1965 and 1974

the innumerable small, scattered companies were conglomerated

into twenty-two State companies, all under the umbrella of the

Telebras. Telebras, established in 1972,

participated in

mixed-economy type of capital ownership.

The long-distance

a

telecommunications company, Embratel, was initially established
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to implant a modern,
technology-intensive network linking
the
different regions of the country
with international

communications systems.
ciuc. Telebra^
^
*-v,« k
x
leieoras, »as= the
holding
company, was in
charge of funding and promoting
research and development of
telephony systems.
i

•

Of all state and regional companies,
the State of Sao

Paulo's TELESP

Telecomuni cac oes de Sao Paulo) became the
largest
one, rapidly expanding its services.
Due to its high
(

profitability TELESP became

a

major capital investor in other

state telephone companies alongside Telebras. 86
If the autonomy of the communication
utilities was low

that was not the case in the petroleum/petrochemical
sector. Its
autonomy can be traced to a systematic reduction of
Petrobras's

politicization, carried out from 1964 to 1968. Through this

depoliticization process, Petrobras could fully use its financial
resources on programs related to its entrepreneurial objectives,

totally unencumbered by political clientelism, while greatly

expanding into future growth areas, and thereby augmenting
Petrobras's political power.
1968,

The growth of the economy after

in particular the surge in the number of automobiles,

trucks and industrial equipment sold, forced the parallel

expansion of gasoline and other oil-derived products up,
affecting Petrobras's long range strategy.
The primacy and the political autonomy of the Petrobras

Group was enhanced by General Ernesto Geisel's nomination as its

,
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president. He presided over

period in which there was not
only
consolidation of the managerial and
finanoial functions, but also
an extension into new activities.
Geisel -s tenure as Chief of
the Military Household and as
Secretary-General of the National
Security Council (1964-1967) certainly
entitled him to implement
Brazilian "security with developmentinterests in the field of
petroleum and petrochemical policy.
Geisel, acting independently
from the political direction of the
Minister of Mines and Energy,
Antonio Dias Leite (1969-74), had the
political support of the
military and the political leadership to
launch Petrobras in

ventures abroad.

a

Petrobras soon became the largest single oil

buyer in the Western world. It also began prospecting
and

production in international ventures (Africa and Middle
East)
while simultaneously engaged in distribution. To generate

the

necessary capital for this expansion and diversification
Petrobras initiated the triple alliance with local and

multinational capital in the petrochemical industry. 87
So,

under the direction of Geisel (1969-1974),

Petrobras experienced growth and diversification while expanding
its more profitable activities: distribution, refining

and

petrochemicals. Distribution of petroleum products by Petrobras,

which was not part of the company's initial operating plans in
1953,

was permitted only for governmental organizations in 1962,

but was fully undertaken by 1968.

subsidiary for distribution

—

Petrobras Distribuidora

expanded its share in the

—

the
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Brazilian fuel market from 12.7
percent in 1967 to 27.5 percent
in 1973.88
Petrobr , s alsQ

^

^

repurchasing two of the private
refineries, as already mentioned.
Petrobras associated with a number
of multinational and Brazilian
capital in the building of a
petrochemical complex in the
Northeastern city of Camacari, state of
Bahia.
Petroauisa
Petrobras «s subsidiary for petrochemicals
controlled the
major firms taking up an investment of
more than US$ 600 million
between 1970 and 1974, accounting for more
than 50 percent of the
total investment in the Petrochemical Pole. 89
The petrochemical
sector was analyzed by Evans, emphasizing its
institutional
novelty: the particular tripod form of association

-

-

among state,

foreign and local capital. 90

Nine medium size firms, out of

total fifteen, were set up with an average investment
of US$ 51

million in roughly equal parts from the three sources of
capitals, none having

a

controlling majority and always with the

state capital being at least equal to foreign capital.

Three

smaller firms with an average investment of US$ 20 million were

predominantly of national private ownership.
As in the case of electric power sector, the Sole Tax
on Liquid Fuels (IUCL) was raised directly from the consumers of

petroleum products and this fact made Petrobras
"self-generated resources."

Petrobras

's

claim them as

policies were relatively

more independent from the political direction of the central
state apparatus, in particular because of the efforts in

.
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depoliticizing and turning the firm
more efficient.
This was
done in a period of with a high
degree of self-financing, what
made it easy to resume investment
by 1969, and continue investing
through 1973. Self-finance ratio
averaged 60 percent, with 40
percent of its resources made up by
earmarked taxes
and

government capital subscription.

Foreign loans were not

significant in this period, reflecting

a

high degree of relative

autonomy
While the Booz-Allen and Hamilton Report
restricted the
autonomy of the state steel and metallurgical
sector
by

recommending no increase in domestic production,
the managerial
leadership of the public and private firms were
working out the
details of Plan

I

of the National Steel Industry

(1968-1970),

calling for an expansion of productive facilities.

Since the

Brazilian firms were unable to supply the internal market
with

adequate amounts of steel, imports supplemented the shortfall
at

advantageously low prices, corroborating fears already set in
motion by the Booz-Allen and Hamilton Report that it was of all
interest to Japanese, American and European steel firms to delay
as much as possible the expansion of Brazilian productive

capacity.

Having enjoyed tremendous autonomy in the early years
and in spite of being historically managed by military officers
at the middle and higher strata of the managerial hierarchy, the

steel industry had trouble being recognized as

a

high priority
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sector by the central government.

The favored multinational auto

industry, of which steel products were

a

significant cost

component, pressured the state to maintain low
prices,

a

goal

that conflicted with the financial needs of
the steel sector.
The steel industry was not even provided with
a stable and

certain source of financing, such as earmarked
revenues, denoting
exactly how it was on the government's list of priorities.
Only

after Medici was empowered and his trusted technocrat, Marcus

Vinicius Pratini de Moraes, became Minister of Industry and
Commerce (the ministry controlling steel production and policymaking) would the steel sector regain the centrality it once had
at the beginning of the industrialization process in the 1940s. 91

The steel industry's process of overcoming its

difficulties imposed by the lack of financial soundness, either
via prices or earmarked tax revenues, led it to stress the

importance of institutionalizing

a

central agency for the steel

industry. Since the recommendations of the Booz-Allen and

Hamilton Report were difficult to follow, the BNDE formed, in
1967,

Consulting Group for the Steel Industry (GCIS, Grupo

a

Consultivo da Industria Siderurgica
sector

—

)

,

where all segments of the

the governmental agencies, the state enterprises, and

the private companies -- were represented for policy formation.
The Plan

I

for the Development of the Steel Industry was

assembled, but it still provided no mechanism to acquire autonomy
and to institutionalize

a

central agency for interest mediation.

,
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Not surprisingly it provided no way out of
the deep crisis since
it maintained the function of providing
cheap intermediate input
to auto and housing industry, booming at
the end of the 1960s. 92

The difficulty of state and private enterprises
in
accumulating enough capital prompted the managers
to propose

a

permanent site for interest representation in the state,
to
offset the threats of denationalization of the sector.

But its

adoption only occurred in the Medici term, when the segmented
interests were conglomerated in

a

corporative-like institution

National Council for the Non-Ferrous and Steel Industry

—

(CONSIDER)

for policy formation and planning.

notes, Consider's institutionalization was

a

As Abranches

process where

"institution-building and ideology blend in planning." 93
The establishment of Consider within the Ministry of

Industry and Commerce was followed by the creation of the holding

Siderbras

(

Siderurgia Brasileira

)

in 1973,

both instrumental in

the design of ambitious state steel-making plans. Despite

Siderbras being chartered to be the financial holding for the
steel sector,

it could not fully perform its functions since the

pricing and imports policy were subject to negotiations with
other private sector producing and users interests (especially
the auto and housing industries)
the price control board (CIP)

the tariff policy council

,

foreign exchange board (CACEX)

in other institutions such as

,

(CPA)

as well as negotiations with

domestic and foreign financial institutions.
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High levels of political resources were
also controlled
by the steel sector, and to a lesser
extent by the railroad
transportation. Nevertheless, both were unable
to readily
translate that political power into policy
outputs and into
effective flow of funds needed for investment.
The political
resources manipulated by the steel sector, although
not as high
as Petrobras's, were sufficient to press for
sectoral policies,
after CONSIDER was instituted. The investment in the
steel state
firms became subject to political criteria and competition
from

foreign companies rather than the usual demand criteria. At the
same time, the sector had to rely on foreign sources of finances

since the sector's sel f -generated resources were insufficient to

finance the Phase II of the Expansion of Steel Industry (197276)

.

As

a

result of forceful political negotiations conducted by

the Minister Pratini de Moraes the Inter-American Development
Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

made US$ 600 million available in supplier's credits and longterm loans to the Brazilian steel program, even before knowing

what processes or eguipment were needed for the expansion
program, or who was going to execute it. 94
In the case of state-owned steel mills

—

CSN,

Usiminas, Cosipa and Acesita -- pricing policies seriously

affected both sel f -f inancing ratio and capital accumulation, as
seen before.

Despite prices increases in steel products between

1968 and 1974 they were inadeguate to offset the losses.

Foreign

.
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loans were negotiated after
successive delays, enabling
the
completion of the Phase I!
of the Expansion Plan
only in 1976,
after an enormous growth
in imports of steel
occurred^ The
projected costs of the Phase
II, amounting to US
S 1.3 billion
47
percent of which were to be
provided by the International
Bank
for Reconstruction and
Development and the Inter American

Development Bank. However, the
poor financial record of the
steel
companies, coupled with its
impossibility of raising prices,
made
the multilateral agencies retreat
to 30 percent,

forcing BNDE and
the Brazilian government to step
in and cover the needed
resources 96
In the mining sector,

the centrality of CVRD and its

subsidiaries was due to capacity for
generating foreign exchange.
Its political utility as a barrier
to the encroachment
of the

multinational mining giants.

^

The CVRD conglomerate's polices

were endorsed by the central government
which subscribed to
CVRD's improvement program. This program,
consisting
of the

construction of the port and of the first pellet
mill at
Tubarao, State of Espirito Santo, of financing
CVRD's expansion
into the activities of shipping and bulk-carrier,
and
of the

improvement of the railroad used for iron ore transportation
into
the Port of Tubarao in the period 1964-67, provided the

conditions for CVRD's improved performance in the boom years.
CVRD interest in extending its markets into the U.S.

coincided with the discovery of Carajas by

a

U.S. Steel

subsidiary, u.s Steel had
been trying unsuccessfully
to get in
the Brazilian steel market
as evident

-

in

Booz-Allen and Hamilton Report^

^

now tried

Qf
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^

^

assooiate
itself with CVRD in the
exploration of minerals on the
Eastern
Amazon.
since Carajas was a project
linked to the foreign
market, us steel initially
controlled strategic decisions
of when
to invest. It was waiting
to see how technological
development
would affect it, deciding to
delay investment until when it
would
be more profitable.
cvrd's struggle to recover
decision-making
autonomy coincided with the culmination
of the seaborne iron ore
trade, which made the us Steel/CVRD
partnership increasingly
unstable as the U.S. company withdrew
looking for other markets,
to invest in."

Nevertheless, the CVRD obtained

a

competitive position

in the expanding international iron
ore market,

1973.

from 1968 to

In this period Brazil's share in iron
ore mining was 11

percent of world output. The CVRD alone accounted
for
of the world's output and 60 percent of
Brazil's.

7

percent

The increase

in iron ore production was attributable to
increased ocean-borne

trade, together with the emergence of Japanese modern
production.

Japanese demand for raw materials gave the CVRD an opportunity
to
emerge as a major world supplier. 100 The Minister of Mines
and
Energy, Dias Leite (1969-1974),

a

former CVRD president,

personally negotiated with the Japanese the initial exploration
Carajas's iron reserves and bauxite/alumina project on the

. .
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Eastern A maZ on.

Negotiations in the late 1970 s
would change the
nature of the Carajas Program,
what win be discussed in
the next
section
At par with the importance
of the mining sector in
generating foreign exchange, CVRD
also benefitted from the
designation of its former president,
Antonio Dias Leite,
as
Minister of Mines and Energy
(1969-1974), what gave CVRD prestige
and favored relationship with
central power. In the period 196473 CVRD institutionalized 43 associated
or subsidiary companies
in iron mining, pellet plant,
non-ferrous (aluminum and titanium)
mining, forestry/wood/pulp, phosphates,
engineering services,
shipping and marketing, 39 of them only
in 1969-73 period, when
Dias Leite was Minister.
CVRD consolidated its export-

orientation supplying ores or semi-processed

products to more

than twenty countries by 1974. Japan was
the largest single
country buying more than a third of the CVRD
exports, what
represented, for Japan, more than 12 percent of
total iron ore

imported
In the period 1967-74 among the major companies

established as subsidiaries and associated to CVRD was the
association with multinational and local capital to explore the
vast iron ore mines of the Greater Carajas Program (Serra dos
Carajas is located in the State of Para, in the Eastern Amazon).
In order to expand its markets abroad, CVRD formed joint-ventures

with Italy, Spain and Japan to implant pellet mills (Itabrasco,

9
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Hispanobrasco and Nibrasco) to export
intermediately processed
ore. in addition, CVRD diversified
its mineral activities,
starting to survey and to explore
non-ferrous minerals. It also
began projects in other non-mineral
activities such as pulp,
paper, fertilizers and phosphates.
With respect to political resources,

Petrobras and

CVRD were the state enterprises that
displayed highest levels of
political resources, measured by the high
degree of freedom in
defining goals and policies. Such political
autonomy helped
Petrobras and CVRD impose their decisions on
most other state
institutions and the private sector. They became
real "states
within the state" 101 in face of their substantial
ability
to

generate resources needed for their own expansion and
diversification, and their contribution to the economy, as

discussed earlier.
TABLE

3

.

STATE ENTERPRISE SELF-FINANCE RATIO
As Percent of Investment, 1966-79
Yrs.

1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

Self-Finance
Ratio
81
56
63
63
59
53

50

Yrs.

Self-Finance
Ratio

1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

54

46
35
35
39
37
34

Source: From SEST's State Productive Sector (electric power, oil
mining, telecommunications, steel) reports. Railroad
investments were almost totally financed by the multilateral
agencies, World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank.

.
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Unlike the state steel companies,
the mining sector
relied on a 65 percent self-financing
ratio for its expansion
during the boom of sea-borne trade
of iron ore.
Foreign loans
accounted for 22 percent of the
investment, while the remainder
was capital subscription. The mining
sector could therefore
count on both political and managerial
resources to pursue
autonomous policy-making.

—Implica tions

D.

and Conclusions

While in the initial years of the period the selffinancing ratio was impressive, complimentary funds
were required
when the rapid expansion of the state enterprises began

—

averaging an annual increase in investment of
for the period 1968-73.

23

percent 102

The share represented by self-financing

grew progressively smaller as a result of the greater demand for
resources obligating the firms to seek external sources.

TABLE 3.10

AVERAGES OF SELF-FINANCE RATIO, Selected Years
1966

1967-70

81.0

60.3

1970-74

52.4

1975-79

36.0

Source: Calculated from Trebat, Brazil State-Owned.
op. cit p. 206. Table of Investment and Surplus a
(profits and depreciation allowances) for public
enterprises, 1966-79.
.

,
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External sources of financing
for the state enterprises
programs included government
funds, private equity and
domestic
and foreign long tern, loans.
Government transfers from the
Treasury, which were estimated
at 38 percent in 1 969
by Luciano
Martins^ dropped to

^

Trebat.104

Although these

^

^
.^.^

^

^
^

diminishing dependence on Treasury
funds, the governmental
transfers took other forms, such
as earmarked taxes or capital
subscriptions
A similar pattern was followed
for sources of funds
financing the expansion of electric
power sector.
Eletrobras
consolidated its position as the financial
holding company for
the sector, expanding its control
even over resources previously
controlled by its subsidiaries after 1972.
Unlike the steel
sector, the electric sector had access
to earmarked revenues and

enjoyed support from the multilateral agencies.
The nature of the
electric power services, atomized throughout
different regions,

justified prices high enough to generate resources
for
investment.

The contribution of the funds originated from

operating surplus and the Sole Tax varied as it can be
seen in
Table 3.6.
In spite of differences among the mining,

steel,

electric power and petroleum sectors, the overall pattern of
finance was divided up between 50 percent self-generated funds
and 50 percent capital subscriptions and long term loans,

.

privily
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foreign loans.

This pattern continued through
the mid1970s until the economic crisis
of the 1980s, as it will
be seen
next

More importantly, the political
power of the state to
formulate policies and to expand
institutionally the state
sector isolated it from society
and made it impermeable to
political demands. This led to a
rapid growth of state
intervention and/or action in the
associated capitalist
development of Brazil during this
period.

*
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CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL POWER, STATE ACTION AND
THE LIMITS OF
AUTONOMOUS POLICY-MAKING UNDER

WI^CI^SS

A.

State Action and Political Pqwpt-

in the Growt h Under Duress Period

In this chapter we will analyze state
action in Brazil

initially from the political and economic
viewpoint, followed by
an analysis of the variable relative st ate
autonomy on selected
policy areas.
In this period, we will see how political
demands
for liberalization, which included industrial
entrepreneurs

demands for government spending policies favoring their
interest,
internal bureaucratic power struggles, and pressures from
labor

union for better salaries and better working conditions effected

reduction in relative state autonomy.

a

1

-

Gran deur Development. Political Liberalization and Economic
Crises. 1974-1985

The year 1974 represents a watershed in the

authoritarian-bureaucratic regime; at this time the first steps
towards liberalization and away from the previous harshly

repressive regime were taken.

At the outset of the period,

demarcated by the presidential terms of Generals Ernesto Geisel
(1974-79)

and Joao Baptista Figueiredo (1979-1985), it was clear
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that civil society had enough
of promises of economic
growth to
legitimize an authoritarian state.
The government's efforts at
sloganeering and propaganda P^_F^n^_Br^l! and Brazil
^glng^ower) fell on deaf ears. As stated by
stepan
(

...the authoritarian state had failed
in its
win ideological hegemony in civi!
sSciiSyt*

a

n^nf
P

^°

The lack of institutionalization of
the authoritarian regime, as
described by Samuel HuntingW, strengthened
the political
parties and the opposing civil society
organizations (The

Brazilian Press Association, the Brazilian
Bar Association, the
Church, the Base Ecclesiastical Communities
and independent

labor

unions).

These organizations gained in popularity by
continually

stressing the high social costs of the exclusionary
social and
economic policies implemented from 1964 to 1974. This
public
outcry forced the government to modify its electoral
politics.

Although more liberal rules for election, manipulations
of apportionments and of the rules regulating political

advertisement prevented the MDB, later joined by other opposition
parties,

from complete victories on the 1974,

1978 and 1982

Congressional and Gubernatorial elections making

difference in the liberalization process.
transition to

a

3

a

significant

In 1983-1984 the

civilian government was carefully orchestrated by

moderate politicians and military leaders.

150

Geisel presided over the first term of
the
liberalization process. As a former president
of Petrobras,

Secretary-General of the National Security Council
under Castello
Branco, he was, above all,

a

man acceptable to the bloc-in-power

made up of military hard-1 iners

.

Geisel

4

's

task of liberalizing

the political regime was considerably more
difficult since the

Brazilian state was emerging from

a

period in which it enjoyed

considerable capacity to mobilize political, institutional and
financial resources and to direct private investment.

Before

liberalization, the state was also able to consolidate its own

productive capacities, despite the fact that accelerated economic
growth benefitted the multinational durable-consumer goods and
the capital goods industries.

The consolidation of the state

enterprises as well as the state's ability to intervene directly
in the economy were sensibly weakened as the political and

economic crises unraveled in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Geisel'

s

"slow, gradual and secure"

decompression

project was actually designed by Golbery do Couto

e

Silva --

notable for his covert campaign to overthrow Goulart and his

creation of the SNI in the 1960s.

5

The political abertura

project was designed to lessen the influence of the Army hardliners in Brazilian politics and had the specific objective of

restricting the free-roaming repressive apparatuses, which were,
according to Luciano Martins
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a

g t0 C

r01 thS pities of the regime's
?^
including
the military hierarchy)
S ° Wn
thod
ideological criteria, as
sort of SS within
sorter
th
f
the regime. 6

;;;taaon^^
protagonists

.

-

^

-

But the objectives of the political
opening were not
only political. By 1974 the political
opening served the purpose
of making possible an economic
transformation.
It was clear that
to continue economic growth and to achieve
international power

status

—

as blueprinted by the military National
Security and

Development Doctrine

—

the Brazilian economy needed to

transform its productive structure of basic and intermediate
inputs, of capital goods, and address the energy question.
These

intertwined objectives were translated into the Second National

Development Plan (PND II), promulgated under an already oil-

troubled economy in 1974.
Having strengthened the decision-making power of the

presidency through the creation of the Economic Development
Council, authoritatively ruled by the chief -executive 7

,

Geisel's

response to the 1973-74 economic crisis was to pursue "a maximum
of development possible with

security." 8

a

minimum of indispensable

This was to be achieved with the execution of large

scale sectoral development projects of the PND II (1975-79)
(Itaipu Hydro-power Plant, Angra

Production, Ferrovia do Acq

Industry

-

,

I,

Nuclear Program, Petroleum

Acominas

,

Expansion of Steel

Stage III, Greater Carajas Mining and Industrial

Program, Tucurui Hydro-power Plant, Metro systems, Telephone
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Program).

These programs, according to the
Planning Minister
Joao Paulo dos Reis Velloso and
Finance Minister Mario Henrique
Simonsen, were perceived as the solution
to critical bottlenecks
hindering national development, and to
radically transform
Brazil's industrial profile. The objective
was to "cross the
threshold between underdevelopment and
development- «9
to become
a world power.
:

The policies for the period 1975-79 reflect
this

decision for global recognition.

The PND II projected large

increases in the installed capacity in the production
of

chemicals and non-metallic basic and intermediate goods.

The

installed capacity of the steel and metallurgical industry -in

particular flat-sheet and heavy profiles -- was to increase by
some 220 percent.

Heavy capital goods production was projected

to double in those years primarily in order to provide the

equipment and facilities necessary for exploration and production
of domestic oil

(a

projected increase of 115 percent on the

production of domestic oil after the imported oil-bill went up 45
percent) and for investments made in other energy related

projects. 10

Brazilian energy deficiencies were to be surmounted

with the energy from Itaipu and other regional power plants, as
well as with the energy provided by the power plants built under

the controversial Teuton-Brazilian Nuclear Accord signed in 1975.

Table 4.1 shows some specific PND II

's

targets.
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The PND II linked the needs of energy
policy to

industrial policy in order to achieve

a

fully, developed capital

goods sector, articulating the dynamics
of interest believed
indispensable to an industrial country by the
designers of the
Brasil-Grande7,a Project.
After all, if Brazil was
to be an

industrial economy it had to be self-sufficient
in energy, steel
products, non-ferrous metallurgical products,
petroleum
and

chemical products, cement, paper and pulp and minerals.
the PND II projects would only mature

a

Some of

decade or two later,

demanding huge amount of investment, not available with internal
savings alone.

The outcomes of the PND II policies and projects

varied: some of them became symbols of the unduly optimistic

Grandeza project while others were partially successful.

Still

others were frustrated by unforeseen contingencies as it will be

analyzed later in the section of state action and autonomy.
For the PND II designers, unduly optimistic about

Brazilian outlook, there was no need to opt between accelerated

capitalist expansion and containing inflation; incremental

adjustments would take care of changing circumstances. The
Finance Minister Simonsen stated, before 200 entrepreneurs of the

Federation of Industries of the State of Sao Paulo (FIESP) that
with inflation contained and with the relative abundance of
credit it would not be difficult to bypass adverse international

circumstances.

For him, the country was, as he stated,

island of progress in

a

world in economic crisis." 11

"an

1

154

TABLE

4

.

PRIORITY PROJECTS CONTAINED IN PND II

Sectors

1974

Forecast
1979

Increase
(%)

Capital Goods Industry
Total Production
(000 t)
Mech and Elt Eqpt (000 t)
Tractors (000 units)
Naval Construction (000 TPB)
Railroad material (000 t)
Steel

&

2000
898

3400
1603

44

84

410
122

1140
214

70
70
90
170
75

Metallurgical Industry

Installed capacity in 000

t

Steel

Heavy Profile
Special Steel
&

Aluminium
Copper

8600
4100
4600

22300
13100
8300

120

190
60

10
33

Zinc

58

150
220
80
50

500
76

Chemical industry

Installed capacity in 000

t

Sulfuric Acid
Soda Ash (Barrilha)
Chlorine
Fertilizers
Thermoplastic Resins
Artificial and Synthetics Fib
Elastomers Synthetic
Detergents
Ethane
Ammonia

986
273
212
585
408
176
144
27
343
268

3380
700
593
1199
891
253
239
75
710
577

(continued next page)

244
156
179
105
118
45
66
178
109
115

.
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TABLE 4.1

(cont.)

Intermediary Non-Metallic RnnHs

-j

n c^i

1M

capacity in 000 t

project up to 30.06.76)
Cement
FUip
Paper

17130
1547

26190
2860
2900

85
20

60
44

138
98

130
123

304

660

117

\_>

/

55

Minina
iron Ore Production (million t)
iron ore Export (million t)
Expenditures in Nuclear Minerals
Kesearcn (Cr$ million 1975)

Electric Eneray
Installed Capacity (million
Consumption (million GW/h)

KW)

17

.

6

61

78

n

107

75

1650

62

Petroleum

Refining Capacity (000 bbd)
Investment in Exploration and
Development of Production in
(Cr$ bn 1975)
Total Investment

1020

2

26

.

2

8

56

.

0

264
115

Source: From Seplan, II PND pp. 103-4 - Some of the targets
have changed after the issuance of the Plan, in order to increase
production
,

s
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The Emerging Power project that
stemmed out of the
economic policies could only accomplished
in tandem with the
implementation of the liberalization process
since it required
the acquiescence of society.
The liberalization process,
however, included both "systolic" and
"diastolic" movements
using Golbery's analogy between cardiac
rhythmic contractions and

—

dilations and the opening up of the authoritarian
regime.
is,

That

for each political "concession" by the regime
or conquest by

the opposition

a

correspondent and equally significant

authoritarian move on the part of the hard-line would take
place.
Below,

in Figure 4.1,

some examples, chronologically arranged,

depict the style of implementation of the liberalization policy

during Geisel and Figueiredo terms.
The maintenance of political power by the

"

Geiselista "

group was so paramount for the liberalization process that the

challenge of the hard-liner Sylvio Frota, Army Minister, met with
Geisel' s firmness:

Frota was fired, keeping the reins of the

process firmly in Geisel"

s

grip. 12

The challenge of the hard-

line to Geisel reappeared when Figueiredo was named Geisel'

successor, since the hard-line felt Figueiredo could not control

civil society and its increasingly bold demands.

The Geisel-

Golbery strategy placated military opposition to abertura by
putting special emergency safeguards measures in place of the
outgoing Institutional Act

5,

in January 1979.
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TERM

DIASTOLES 1

SYSTOLES 1

* Suspension of censorship
prior to
printing of
newspapers, 1974.

1974 Senate elections: won
by MDB in 16 out 22 states;
MDB made 44% of the Chamber,
and controlled Rio de Janeiro,
Sao Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul
Parana, Acre and Amazonas
*

State Assemblies.

* Opposition strategy: no
automatic Decree-Laws in view
of government loss of 2/3 of
Chamber, 1975.
* Geisel dismisses General
Ednardo D'Avila Melo,
Commander of II Army, Sao

Paulo,

1976.

* Resurgence of labor and
student movements, 1977.

Dismissal of Minister of the
Army, General Sylvio Frota,
*

Oct.

1977.

1978 Elections: MDB
increased 4 chairs and won in
a number of State Assemblies.
*

* Organizations of civil
society - " Estado de Direito "campaign (Rule of Law), 1977+.

1/ Minister Golbery's analogy
to cardiac rhythmic
contractions and dilations.

FIGURE 4.1

-

* Imprisonment of the
journalists Lourenco Diaferia,
Carlos Garcia, and US Consul
Recife, PE, 1974-5.

m

* Deprivation of
political
mandates of members of
Congress, using the
Institutional Act 5, 1974-78.
* Lei Falcao 2 controlling
electoral and political party
propaganda on radio and on TV
for the 1976 municipal
elections, following the 1974
MDB s victories.
1

* Imprisonment and death of
Wladimir Herzog and Manuel
Fiel Filho in the confines of
the DOI - Second Army, Sao
Paulo, November 1975 and March

1976.
* Regrouping of hard-line
behind Sylvio Frota, Army
Minister for succession of
Geisel, 1976-77.

Closing of Congress and
issuance of the Electoral
Package keeping indirect
gubernatorial elections, 1/3
Senators appointed by
government and changing
criterium of proportionality,
April 1977.
*

2/ Named after Minister of
Justice, Armando Falcao.

SELECTED EXAMPLES OF "SYSTOLES" AND
"DIASTOLES", 1974-85.

..

.

1

.

)
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FIGUEIREDO TERM
* End of Institutional Act
January 1979.

* Institution of Emergency
Measures and Safeguards in the
Constitution, 1979.

5,

* Amnesty to exiles, political
prisoners and cassados 1979.

* Amnesty was also given to
torturers but it did not
reinstate civil and military
personnel, 1979.

,

* Reorganization of the
political parties, 1979-80.
* Conversations with the
moderates of the Popular Party

begin,

* Provocateurs acts in strikes
and demonstrations,
firebombing of newsstands and
letter bomb to Brazilian Bar
Association, 1980-81.

1979-80.

* Strikes and stoppages
tolerated, 1979.

* Crack down on the 200.000strike; imprisonment of union
leaders and charge under the
National Security Code, 1980.

Chaves, civilian vicepresident, substituted
Figueiredo while he was
undergoing heart-treatment,
1981
*

* Attentat to a MayDay
Festival resulting the death
of the bomb planters, agents
of the Army's Secret Service,
April 1981.

* Realignment of the Popular
Party with the PMDB, 1982.
* 1982 elections with the
opposition parties (PMDB, PDT)
winning in 10 States,
including the most important.

Golbery's resignation in
protest of covering up wrong
doings of hard-liners in the
Riocentro case, August 1981.
*

* Increased politicization of
macroeconomic issues (foreign
debt and IMF's adjustment
policies)
1983

Successive Decree-laws
following the IMF adjustment
policies against the wishes of
the congress, with the Federal
District surrounded by troops
under Emergency measures,
*

,

* Presidential elections
articulations. Opposition
working on direct elections or
a moderate candidate for
indirect elections, 1983-84.

1983

* Brasilia put under state of
Emergency during vote on the
Dante de Oliveira Amendment
calling for direct
presidential elections in
1984; TV and radio coverage
was censored, and telephone
communications were cut off,
April 1984.

"Diretas-Ja " campaign with
mobilization of civil society,
*

!

1984
* Indirect election of
Tancredo Neves, with the help
of government party
dissidents
FIGURE

.

4

.

(cont

.

.
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While the soft-line (blandos) military
performed the
double strategy of political opening
and economic transformation
called for in PND II, Brazilian macroeconomic
variables showed
huge trade account deficits, averaging US$
5.3 billion annually
from 1974 to 1978, largely due to imports
on basic inputs, oil
and fuels and capital goods.
Brazil was forced to borrow
heavily, not only to finance development projects,
but also to
pay for the burgeoning trade deficits.
The Brazilian government
accepted the funds aggressively proffered by international

financial capitalist institutions, 13 disregarding future
risks.

These risks were soon apparent, despite the decline in
trade deficit and the relative stabilization of inflation at

plateau of 40 percent annually.
debt from US$

6

a

A sharp increase in the external

billion in December 1973 to US$ 32 billion in

1978 while terms of trade deteriorated and interest payments

soared (See Table 4.2), placed Brazil's balance of payments in

crisis
By 1977 the economic "miracle" of the early 1970s had

ended.

Investment policies of PND II projects were reassessed.

Planning Minister Reis Velloso, who had the upper hand in

development policies, lost control of policy-making to Finance

Minister Simonsen.

Simonsen implemented an austerity drive --

attempting to curb inflation, cutting investment by Cr$ 40

billion (US$ 2.83 billion), and restricting credit.

He kept the
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currency overvalued, stimulating the
flow of foreign loans to
improve the debt profile and to rebuild
the exhausted
reserves. 14 The austerity drive failed
politically and caused
labor strikes and student protests to
reappear after 10 years of
repression.
Society began to feel uneasy about the impact
of the
austerity program. 15
In 1977 Geisel announced the "April Package"
calling

off direct gubernatorial elections and specifying
further

limitations for the November 1978 elections.

The restrictions

were part of restructuring and reorganizing political power
since
the most industrial states consistently voted for the opposition
party.

The package effected changes in the electoral rules that

guaranteed

a

pro-government majority in the Senate (by nominating

1/3 of the Senators)

and by changing the criteria of

apportionment to favor the peripheral and less industrial states,
more dependent on central government hand-outs.
Workers
years 1977-78.

's

demands were not the only ones voiced in the

As the balance of payments crisis and high rates

of inflation cut in to the level of investment, PND II projects

were cut back.

This set in motion complaints from the private

sector, orchestrated in a campaign condemning the estatizacao of

the economy.

Luciano Martins analyzed the campaign revealing its

inherent contradictions.

He argues that the private sector

enjoyed the state's demand for goods and services, without which
it would be worse off.

The private sector was particularly
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dependent on the state during
downturns on the business cycle.
Peter Evans, using a slightly
different argu men t, contends
that
it was a clear case of
mutua i needs and reassurances
to m aintain
the syste, going. 16 Therefore
against
state intervention was a fallacy

^

^

In spite of some improvement
in inflation and the

balance of payment deficit by
1978, during the following years
the Brazilian foreign debt
soared, the public deficit grew
and
the macroeconomic variables of
interest rate, exchange rate and
inflation rate fluctuated.
Foreign credit inflow increased
inflation, which went from a plateau
of 30-40 percent yearly to
110 percent in 1980 and to a 220-250 percent
plateau in 1984.
The public deficit rose from 2.5 percent
in 1978 to 6.2 percent
of the GDP in 1982. 17
When Figueiredo came to power for
1979,

six-year term in

a

he had to confront political liberalization
(abertura)

which included an amnesty law, return of exiles,
reorganization
of political parties,

and an increasingly active labor movement.

At the same time Figueiredo maintained the hard-line
as an ally,

obtaining the support of the sistema by appointing his Military

Academy colleague, General Walter Pires, as his Army Minister.
The implementation of abertura however proved to be no easy
matter.

Golbery, maintained by Figueiredo as his main political

advisor, devised

a

strategy of dialogue with

opposition political party.

a

"trustworthy"

This "trustworthy" interlocutor of

the regi.e

-
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the Popular Party (PP

P^idp^p^)

composed
of moderates from the MDB
together with ARENA dissidents
was,
however, only one of a fragmented
six-political party system that
emerged from the state sponsored
bi-party system after 1979.18
,

,

-

Additional troubles to abertura came
from the rise of
interest rates and oil prices in
1979,
hitting hard the
vulnerable Brazilian economy, as shown
on Table 4.2.
First, the
tripling of oil prices in 1979-80 made
Brazilian annual
expenditures on oil imports jump from US$
4 billion in 1978 to
US$ 10 billion in 1980-82.
The imported oil represented more
than 1/3 of total imports supplying 80
percent of Brazilian
consumption.
Second, as the interest rate soared,
3/4 of the

Brazilian foreign debt were directly affected
since it had been
contracted at floating interest rates. As a consequence,

the debt

soared from US$ 40.2 in 1979 to US$ 65.6 billion in
1982 and to
US$ 100 billion in 1984.
Once again jolted by external
events,

Brazil's net interest paid abroad increased from US$ 2.7
billion
in 1978 to US$ 12 billion in 1982.

(See Table 4.2).

One of the effects of the disequilibria in the external

accounts was increased demands from the private national firms
for participating in policy-making and decision-making.

Despite

the rhetoric that the PND II would strengthen the private

national firms, the plan favored the state firms and the

multinationals.

By 1978, the combined forces of the political
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opposition and of the entrepreneurs
clamored against government
economic policies and demanded a
return to democracy.
a group
of Sao Paulo's leading
entrepreneurs signed the Manif
J^of_the
light, formally breaking an alliance
that existed since the
inception of the military regime. 19
That defied state autonomy
as new policies would increasingly
be debated openly in contrast
to an insulated system of decision
making.
The monopoly
of

economic policy making at the National
Monetary Council and at
the Economic Development Council was
shattered as policy matters
were discussed on news media. 20

—

Other challenges to the state's political
power
the
new independent labor union's strikes, the
remaking political
parties and of meeting social demands
were tolerated

—

as part

of the political liberalization agenda of
the first year of the

Figueiredo's government.

In April 1980, however, when the

economic conditions were rapidly deteriorating, a strike
of.
200, 000-metal workers proved to be too much for the
military

regime.
(Lula)

,

Leaders of the strike, including Luiz Ignacio da Silva
who had already been demoted from the presidency of the

Sao Bernardo Metal Worker's Union by an act of the Minister of
Labor, were imprisoned under the National Security Law.

Following the crackdown on the labor unions, the opponents of
abertura

.

whom Figueiredo had tried to placate in 1979, waged

terrorist campaign sending

Association killing

a

letter-bomb to the Brazilian Bar

a secretary,

and fire-bombing newsstands

a
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TABLE 4.2

BRAZIL
EXTERNAL ACCOUNTS

,

1972-84
(in current US$ million)

.

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

95

78

76

85

Index of
Terms of Trade
Prices Export/
Imports
Base 1977 = 100

Exports
Imports
Fuels & Lub.
Capital Goods
Basic Inputs

TOTAL IMPORTS

3,991
469
1,734
1,291

4,232

6,

199

769
142
1,993

2

,

6, 192

Net Interests
Payments

7

,

2

,

3

,

4

,

951

962
119
664

1977

100

87

8,

670 10, 128 12 120 12 659

3

,

3

,

3

,

100
934
595

,

3

,

3

,

3

,

841
619
140

4

,

3

,

3

,

,

081
101
202

12,641 12 ,210 12 383 12 023
,

,

4
3
3

13

,483
552
286
,

,

,

683

-652 -1, 498 -1, 810 -2 104 -2 696
,

Net Foreign Debt
5,283
Avg. Interest Rate
na

Deficit in Current
Accounts

1978

-241

6,

156
na

7

11, 897

na

17

,

131 19, 492 24 782 31 616
na
na
na
na
,

-7, 123 -6,701 -6, 017 -4

,

,

,

037 -6,015

(continued next page)

.
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TABLE 4.2 (cont.)

Avg
1973/78

1979

87

79

1980

1981

1982

1983

53 7

53

1984

Index of Terms
of Trade Prices

Export/Imports
Exports

9,

Imports
Fuels

& Lub.
Cap. Goods

Basic Ipts

3
3
3

621

,206
244
,313
,

TOTAL IMPORTS 11,522
Net Interests
Payments

1,976

Net Frgn.Debt 18,503
Avg. Int. Rate 15.2

Deficit in
Cur Acts

-5 276
,

15, 244

6,
3,
4,

773
775
160

17, 961

-5, 347
40, 215
16 .9

10, 741

65.

55.

3

20, 132

23

10, 200

22

4,
3,

,

,

955

-7,457

680

11, 339

381
5, 010
4

,

22

-

,

023
796

086

3

.

20, 182

8

,

272
048

2

,

3

,

46, 934

53, 904

18.5

21 .9

65, 659
23 3
.

-12 807 -11 ,717 -16, 310
,

27

607
505
2, 141

19, 396

10, 305 - 12,550

58

6

21,900

10, 457
3,

.

-10,263

2

,

2

,

200
059

13,937

-

-10

76,756
15. 6

-6,837

Coniuntura Economic^ January 1986, p. 112; Boletim
Banco Central do Brasil.
a) Avg. interest rate =
Net interest paid/net foreign debt, year before;
c) Exchange rate does not consider incentives
to
export and import tariffs (what would be the
effective rate)
d) Base 1977 = 100.
na - not available.
In current US$ million.
;

005

7,330

15, 428

-

,

,

076

76, 673
13 1
.
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which sold Progressive/Radical
publications.
The hard-line
realized that the political process
escaped their control,
therefore their tactic was to
frighten the most outspoken
organizations pushing for abertura
the lawyers association and
the media.

-

30,

The ultimate hard-line terrorist
act occurred on April
Two Army Information Center (CIEx,
1981.
Centre
de

Informacoes do Exercito

)

agents

-

were presumably preparing to plant
the next days s Festival.

the Army Secret Service
a

-

bomb set to go off during

Inadvertently, the bomb exploded,

•

killing one of the two Army agents.

The mass panic, stampeding,

and inevitable deaths that would certainly
have occurred during
the festival were averted.
But even so, the Army quickly

released

a

condemnation of the "leftist terrorist attack

[against the Army]. "21

The cover _ up was so sweeping tnat even

top military brass attended the sergeant's funeral.

Despite all

the public relations maneuvering most Brazilian were
convinced

that this was

a

hard-liners' last desperate attempt to stop the

political liberalization.
The intensity of the provocations and terrorism of the

hard-line was contained but the abertura process was once more in
jeopardy.

Golbery wanted

a

thorough investigation, with well-

publicized prosecution against the officers involved.

To prevent

exposure of the military officers ultimately responsible for

planing the terrorist act, the hard-liners, represented by the
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Head of the SNI, General
Octavxo Aguiar de Medeiros,
pressured
Figueiredo to disregard Golbery's
advise.
Figueiredo -s
reluctance to prosecute those
responsible, regardless of who
they
were, led to Golbery-s
resignation as the main political

coordinator of the Figueiredo
government in August 1981.
Nevertheless, Golbery's liberalization
strategy was
absorbed, transformed, and advanced
by society
so,

in reality,

Golbery-s resignation had the effect
of putting the hard-liners
on the defensive.
Another loss of political power for
the hardliners was their inability to prevent
the civilian Vice-president
Chaves from replacing Figueiredo in
September and October 1981,
when the President underwent heart
surgery.
The
times had

certainly changed since 1969 when the
civilian Vice-president
Pedro Aleixo's claims to the presidency
were
ignored on the

occasion of Costa
In 1981,

e

Silva's stroke and death.

economic recession hit Brazil after 15 years

of continuous growth.

As important as both oil crises may have

been, at that time debt servicing was more damaging
than oil

outlays.

As Brazilian exports -- aided by export incentives

—

grew by more than 50 percent in the 1979-80 period, oil
imports
rose more than 70 percent due to the deterioration of the
terms
of trade.

The trade deficit reached US$ 2.8 billion in 1980.

Oil imports represented more than 55 percent of total imports by
1983,

but they declined thereafter, partly due to the increase in

domestic production and partly to increased use of sugar-cane

alcohol as
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a

fuel,

replacing 20 percent of
domestic oil
consumption,
interest parents were
combined with the high
service rates on new short
term loans, taken to avoid
stopping
development projects. Resources
were draining away, including
the seemingly high reserves
at the end of l 978
(US$

u

billion)

which were quickly dissipated
in oil payments and debt
servicing.
The economic team in the
Figueiredo Administration,
with Simonsen as the Secretary
of Planning, recommended
deceleration of the economy.
1974, simonsen and Velloso had
chosen not to deactivate the economy
because it was important to
maintain the entrepreneurs' drive
and engage them

m

in the

restructuring of the basic, intermediate
and capital goods
industries. 22 The 1974 plan had been
to "attack the problem of
capitalist development at the root with
a

long lasting solution,

not just a transitory solution to the
petroleum crisis. "23
1979, however,

In

the economy was already growing slowly,
and those

investment programs which continued after 1977
were going to be
continued as priority projects. The second oil
shock, however,

prompted Simonsen's call, in July 1979, for
"wartime economy. "24

recession and

a

a

A wave Qf worker s str ikes and criticisms
,

from the Sao Paulo entrepreneurs ensued.

As

a

demonstration of

the growing weakness of the central state, with respect
to the

private entrepreneurs demands, Simonsen was replaced by Delfim
Netto soon thereafter.
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Deifies resumption

of control over economic
policy for
the second time was cheered
by the
entrepreneurs. He
refused to accept recession,
extinguished a few of the
heterodox
instruments of foreign trade
such as prior depQsits

P^t,

~

^

restrictive similarity criteria
for imports
and then
maxidevalued the currency. De l
fim s expansionary policies
tried
to maintain the public support
needed for the ongoing
liberalization process. 25 Nevertheless,
one year later they
resulted in inflation of over 100
percent

-

,

(1980),

dilapidation of reserves and

a

the

surge in short term debt. 26

Delfim was not living up to the
entrepreneur's expectations and
he was forced to retreat.
He then introduced orthodox
measures
interrupting 15 years of continued
expansion and growth dating to
1966.
The man who began the "miracle,"
ended it by setting a
deep recession in motion.
Investment dwindled as the credibility
of the government collapsed and the
outward transfer of resources
(the excess of the trade balance plus
nonfactor services)

increased from 0.4 percent of the GDP in 1980
to

5

percent of GDP

in 1983. As stated by Batista Junior

The outward transfer of resources effected in 1981-83
was much more significant as a proportion of domestic
output than the inward transfer in the 1960s and
1970s.
Thus in contrast to what had happened up to 1978, the
rate of gross fixed capital formation fell continuously
from 27.9 percent in 1974-78 to 16.4 percent in
1984 27
.
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The high degree of
relative state autonomy of
ten years
earlier had turned into
dependence on the private
banks and
IMF-mandated adjustment program
that sgueezed salaries
and wages
As these new forces occupied
the political arena,
adjustment
Policies put into effect by
decree-laws worsened the social
and
economic conditions of the
working classes.

The 1981-83 economic recession
was a dramatic
experience to Brazilian society,
which was used to a growth
economy.
For the government Ministers,
though, it was different.
Delfim claimed that going to the
IMF in early 1983 and adopting
the IMF monitoring of the economy
was responsible for the 8
percent growth in GNP and the US$
13 billion export surplus
in
the Brazilian recovery of 1984,
thus ignoring the deep social
and
political consequences of the adjustment
program.
As Delfim said

n ces
to do this economic adjustment.
"! aS and
It was
^ with
^ r ysuccess.
proudly claim that for
n
WaS d ° ne the Productive system
^ unemployment
°S and
was put /
to work
rapidly returned to

done

I

S

S

'

former levels, showing that the economy does
reallvy
respond to commands. 2 «

The social costs of the adjustment were evident
by 1984
and the political system had been responding
accordingly.

Although the 1982 elections were one of the cleanest ever,
they
were subject to manipulations, much as happened in 1978.
In

October 1981, the government created the sub-leaenda artifice, by
which

a

party could have more than one candidate for governor and

their votes would be

coined

in the benefit of the
front-runner

This proposal was defeated
in Congress with the
help of 10
dissident PDS-Deputies. According
to a National Information
Service (SNI) report, there
were strong possibilities
for a

sweeping opposition victory
in most gubernatorial
races. 29 This
information coupled with the
defeat of the
prompted
another governmental "November
1981 Package,- which included
mandatory straight-ticket voting
and prohibited party
coalitions.
Geisel
although out of power

s^^

authoritative figure

-

still an

made statements during an interview

indicative of the limits placed upon
the liberalization process,
and the limited opposition tolerated
by the military.
He stated,

The opposition is not obligated to
oppose [sic].
The
first role of the politician is to
negotiate and the
opposition was intransigent as if it dominated
the
government, with a power that it does not
have.
That
is why the government, using its
majority, reacted.
in
clear Portuguese: they have exposed themselves
to the
principle of Physics: to each action corresponds
an
equal and opposite reaction. 30

The Popular Party (PP) responded to this last
"package"
by rejoining the PMDB, setting in motion

a

series of alliances

between PP moderates and PMDB "authentic" (historic MDB
opposition politicians).

The PDS regained the ability to push

recessive economic policies through Congress by coopting the new
PTB

a

party dominated by the Planning Minister Delfim Netto

and his Paulista supporters. 31

The quorum for Constitutional
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agents

was again raised to 2/3
of the Congress and the
1985
Presidential Electoral College
was reshaped to favor the
PDS
candidate.
These were precautionary
measures taken in view of
the prospect of a sweeping
victory of the opposition
candidates
in the November 1982
elections for governor.
As the 1981-83 recession
evolved, civil society reacted
with demonstrations, strikes and
looting.
Business leaders

produced manifestos attacking
government policies.
This
discontent was dampened by the
expectations created by the
upcoming 1982 gubernatorial and
general elections.
While the
1982 elections were a decisive test of
the process of political
liberalization, the economic recession
provided the backdrop for
increased demands on the state from
organized groups. 32
The turnout confirmed the opposition's
voting strength
but it was not matched by actual seats
occupied in Congress.
While the opposition parties received a combined
70 percent of
the total vote, the PDS maintained its majority
in the Senate and
in the electoral college,

due in large part to the senators

appointed in 1978 and to tampering with apportionments.

In the

Chamber, the PDS lost its majority but it could still
win crucial

votes with the help of PTB
races,

.

In the mayoral and gubernatorial

the government hopes of making elections more "localized"

and getting voters to support local PDS candidates proved to be

a

success: the PDS recorded nine victories in the Northeast, a

region accustomed to patronage.

Altogether, the PDS won thirteen

.
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gubernatorial races.

In the other regions
the strength of the

candidates emerging from the
fusion of the PP and PMDB
forced the
"located" strategy to f ail since
lt
was

,

that pulled the vote.
from the elections.

^^ ^
Qf

^

A new political power
distribution emerged

The opposition had gained

a

political base,

in the three states won by
the PMDB ticket (Sao Paulo,
Minas
Gerais and Parana), the number
of mayors grew from 91 to
740.

Among the nine PMDB elected
governors, three were from the
most
important states. 33 The change in
poliUcal power
the 1982 election, when even PCS
governors, supposedly government
supporters, turned against Figueiredo's
policies.
In two very
important cases, the governors of
Pernambuco and Santa Catarina
supported direct presidential elections
in 1984 and a Constituent
Assembly

^^

Delfim's economic adjustment, scheduled to
begin right
after the elections in order to avoid greater
political
losses,

was responsible for an increase in unemployment
and
real salaries and wages throughout 1983.

fall in

a

Adopting the IMF

prescription and monitoring of the economy, Delfim cut
investments, postponed programs

while adopting
turn,

a

—

such as the Nuclear Program

maxi-devaluation to spur exports.

This,

—

in

caused the capital goods industry to squirm under the

prospects of continued losses.

it was a break of the political

commitment to sustained growth which caused the state to lose the
support of the entrepreneurial classes, especially the industrial
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and Paulista coalition,
who turned their
11 back
oacK on the
th. governinent
and its recessive policies,
with the uncertainty about
the
future of direct elections
or who the opposition
candidate would
be, the entrepreneurial
classes pressed more demands
on the state
at the end of 1983
However, as Bresser Pereira
points out
.

V

th
utOT,OT>y of the economic
pu_L_Lcy or the state was
piiiw'of
stronqlv reduced
Th 0 e a L
4.

.

The new political reality meant
that the government
would not be able simply to impose its
will on the states.
The

strengthening of the local and state level
executives forced
negotiations at the federal level, especially
concerning the
policies needed to implement the IMF
stabilization plan in
December 1982.

As a consequence,

Figueiredo's political power

and decision-making capacity diminished after
the 1981-83

recession, the elections and the cresting of the
debt crisis.

Figueiredo's inability to lead and Delfim's discredit as
an
economic policy-maker fomented disunity and contradictions,
among high officials.

even

The question of succession reflected this:

Figueiredo's lukewarm support for his Minister of the Interior

Mario Andreazza was paralleled by plans to make the then head of
the SNI, General Octavio Medeiros, the PDS candidate. 35
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F.gueiredo even toyed with

a

strategy to prolong his
government

for one year with the
promise of
in

1 986

.

a

direot presidential eleotion

None of these options wQrked

.

s

nce

Minister Mario Andreazza, and
vioe-president Aureliano Chaves
stubbornly maintained their
oandidaoies. This disunity was
bluntly rebuffed by the Minister
of Sooial Welfare, Helio
Beltrao, who resigned in protest
at government

policies. The
crisis of governance of the last
two years of the military regime
was deepened by adherence to
IMF-recommended recessive economic
policies, while the transition to
civilian government was being
negotiated. 36

The political power of the hard-line
subsequently

diminished with exposures of corruption,
together with
Congressional investigations and press reports

of illicit

activities by the top-echelon military security
apparatus of the
state
including an alleged assassination. 37

—

Moreover, state

political inability was clear when

a

demonstration staged by

50,000 middle-echelon state enterprise employees marched
against
the IMF and government wage policies in June 1983,
in the first

Brazilian public service strike ever.

38

By the end of 1983, Minas Gerais Governor Tancredo

Neves (PMDB) made

a

political accord with the Mineiro Vice-

president Aureliano Chaves in which they promised support for the
man who could get the nomination of his party.

Tancredo made

second deal with Deputy Ulysses Guimaraes, PMDB National

a
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president and historic opponent
oDDonpnt of the military
regime, that if
the Dante de Oliveira Amendment
calling for direct
presidential election
was ratified, Tancredo would
support
Ulysses's candidacy for President.
But if it was not, then
Ulysses would support Tancredo in
the indirect election in

-

-

the

electoral College.

Tancredo was also seen by the military
as the
civilian capable of making the
transition without major
ruptures.

That is, of avoiding the risks of

unpalatable candidates had

a

direct election in which

a

major chance of winning and of

avoiding lawsuits against the military
involved in the
repression, as in Argentina. 39
During the first four months of 1984, the
Brazilian

political scene was dominated by

movement
(

—

Diretas-Ja

a

civil society-centered

the "Direct Presidential Election, Now!
--campaign
)

.

state capitals.

Hundreds of thousands took to the streets of most
Despite its massive popularity, the Dante de

Oliveira Amendment failed to achieve
votes.

This was due in part to

a

a

two thirds majority by 22

government campaign against the

amendment, which included placing Brasilia and the vicinity under
a

State of Military Emergency, prohibiting the PDS dissident

mayors and local representatives from lobbying PDS Deputies,

censorship of live radio and television coverage of the voting in
Congress, and economic pressure on PDS dissidents by the Minister
of Planning, who threatened to cut off funds to the states and

regions of those voting against the government. 40

In June,

soon

.

1
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after the defeat,

in June,

negotiations began with the dissident
top-echelon of the PDS: the former
president of the PDS, Jose
Sarney, and the PDS leader in the
Senate, Marco Maciel, together
with Vice-president Aureliano Chaves.
The dissidents formed the
Democratic Alliance between the Liberal
Front (a "party" formed
by PDS dissidents) and the PMDB and
formalized the Tancredo
Neves-Jose Sarney presidential ticket.
Paulo Maluf,
the PDS s
•

choice as presidential candidate, was
defeated in the Electoral
College in January 1985.
The first phase of the transition process
was thus

complete. The second phase

administration, however,

—

—

represented by the incoming

was troubled from the start. Tancredo

Neves fell ill on the eve of his inauguration, and
died six weeks
later,

on April 21,

1985.

Although these political events represented the end of
an era of

a

centralized authoritarian military regime they did

not mean the military's complete withdrawal from Brazilian

politics, nor the end of the centralized authoritarian mode of

policy-making.

Tancredo Neves'

s

moderation and his pact with the

regime's party dissidents and with moderate military leaders

assured the transition to civilian government but not the

economic and social transformations promised in the Diretas-Ja
campaign
The themes we have covered in this section can now be

brought together to reveal the role of state autonomy during the
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abertura process.

Geisel's coming to the presidency coincided

with the end of the favorable economic
conditions during which
the "miracle" occurred.
His decision to proceed further with
development projects was an option that raised
criticisms and
limited state autonomy from industrial and
financial fragments of
national and foreign capital. The absence of
a cogent economic
policy at the beginning of Figueiredo's term,
Simonsen's stop,

—

Delfim's go and stop again) left Brazil on the verge
of

a

balance

of payments crisis in September 1982, provoking
IMF demands and

negotiations with private Japanese, North American and European
banks.

As

a

result of that process of recessive adjustment,

terms of trade deteriorated, new loans were cut off, domestic
industrial production dropped with capital goods production

plunging more than 40 percent in 1982 41
a

,

unemployment soared and

series of economic indicators began to signal

a

deep recession

in the Brazilian economy.

The entrepreneurial class

—

progressively more

sympathetic to opposition ideas in the period 1977-78

—

were in

dismay by 1984, protesting against corrupt government officials
and policies that impoverished Brazilian society, resulting in

violence, unemployment and criminality. 42

More importantly the

promises of abertura could only be kept within

a

context of

legitimacy which, with Tancredo's death, lingered even more
ominously.

Early in 1984, Cristovam Buarque stated,
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employment in
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sections will

We have seen how political power
shifted from the
centralized, repressive, authoritarian
regime, with exclusionary
policies of the Medici era to a dictabland,
during the Figueiredo
term, despite all attempts by the
hard-liners to control and
direct the elections and political liberalization.
We have seen
how the relative autonomy of the state to
formulate and adopt

economic development policies diminished in view
of political
power shifts. The form of the Brazilian transition,
with few
ruptures between a civilian government and the military
continued
tutelage of the political system. Nevertheless, its effect
over
specific policy areas are worth analyzing.

This is our next

task.

2

•

State Action a nd Autonomy in the Growth cum Debt Period:
Grandiose Projects and the Crisis

Having presented the political and economic background,
we will now analyze state action and autonomy in this period.
The bulk of state action with respect to the production of

electric power, oil, steel, iron-ore and other products and
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services ttok place within the
state enterprises, which
decided
upon and implemented a number
of large sectoral programs.
The
institutional arenas of the state
enterprises, their regulatory
agencies and the sectoral councils
(Figures 3.1, 3.2)
became the
centers of policy mediation within
the state.
The dynamics of interests and
the patterns of state
enterprise action observed in this
period differ significantly
from those observed in the "growth
cum repression- period.
In
general, government objectives were
constrained by increased
demands consequent upon political liberalization
and the

deterioration of economic conditions.

while in the growth cum

repression, period the state enterprises strived
for autonomous
growth and for a role as providers of the low-cost
inputs needed
for the good performance of the durable
consumer goods
industry,

in the 1974-85 decade state enterprises were
called upon to

implement the sectoral programs of the Second National

Development Plan (PND II, 1974-79).

This modified strategy

turned the state enterprises into real policy instruments,

despite the fact that, by 1977, some PND II sectoral programs had
been discontinued, or their objectives re-evaluated.

Yet some of

the state-owned enterprises sectoral programs -- whose policies

could have made

a

substantial difference in development plans and

whose decision-makers were in

political support

—

a

position to mobilize strong

continued their role as promoters of long

term development strategies.

Notwithstanding these efforts, all

181

state-owned enterprises were
unable to prevent the growing
use of
their flexible entrepreneurial
structures and economic strength
to accomplish the short
term macroeconomic objectives
of the
Brazilian state, such as borrowing
foreign currency to solve
balance of payment problems or
keeping demand high for capital
and intermediate goods, therefore
loosing state autonomy.
State enterprises also functioned
as political escapevalves, providing at least
8,000 highly-paid positions to retired
military and to other Brazilian
elites.
Clientelism in stateowned enterprises created a political
Gordian knot for the post1985 transition period
that is, how to defuse a powerful
state
enterprise bureaucratic machinery dominated
by privilege,
corruption and inefficiency. Different
trends influenced the
pattern of state enterprise action during

^

-

the PND II period.

First,

clientelistic relationships were exacerbated
as Brazilian
and foreign suppliers, contractors and
other groups, were favored
with special contract clauses, special market
reserves,
subsidies, exemptions and fiscal incentives, as the
case of

Tucurui illustrates.

Secondly, some of the initial objectives of

the PND II proved untenable and unrealistic as the
situation

required the use of financially healthy state enterprises to

borrow abroad in order to solve short-term macroeconomic
problems.

Consequently, by 1985, state enterprises found

themselves in

a

position of economic disarray, financial

indebtedness and political distress, mistrusted by both Brazilian

.
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society and the private sector,
former beneficiary of its
actions
The state enterprises relative
autonomy was frequently
hampered by government objective
of curbing inflation.
To do
that, the government maintained
public prices and rates down to
avoid inflationary pressures, as
shown in Table 4.7, that
influenced negatively the financial
autonomy and profitability of
the state enterprises.
Government made efforts to control

unchecked state-owned enterprise spending

-

especially with the

creation of the Secretariat of state
Enterprises Control (SEST,
Secretaria de Control e d a^_Estatais in 1979.
)

However, these

efforts were not sufficient to hold the pressures
from the
private sector to continue grandiose projects.
Unending project

cost-overruns forced the government to allocate
capital
investment beyond the limits imposed by the central
planning
agencies, thus increasing the public debt.

At the same time, the

state enterprises decision-makers continued having enough

discretion to define investments in development projects, thus

defending their own interests regardless of the availability of
resources or the real need for the project.

On the one hand,

the private sector demanded increased spending but, on the other
hand,

it furthered demands towards a more democratic rule.

The year of 1974 witnessed important policy shifts,

when Geisel adopted

a

set of specific policies designed to

tackle the incipient state of the basic input and capital goods

.

industries, and the need to
meet national energy
reguirements in
both the electrio power and
transportation fuel, pressing
problems which demanded "an
imperious and unavoidable
resolution," as stated by the
principal architect of the PND
II,
Planning Minister Reis Velloso. 45
,

The PND II- s objective of
transforming the Brazilian
economy was aimed at legitimizing
Brazil's claim as a world
power, what was in conformity
with the principles of National
Security Doctrine.
Policy-makers wanted the PND II's
"second
import-substitution industrialization phase"
to implant capital
goods industries, stimulating the
national private sector in an
all-out effort to cross the threshold
between development and

underdevelopment
But there were problems.

Not conforming to the state's

efforts to adapt the Brazilian economy to
the new world reality,
the durable consumer goods industry still
believed that it

deserved incentives and credits of the so-called
"miracle years."
Therefore, it barely complied with the reorganization
of the

economy, and countered the new policies with much
foot-dragging.

Conversely, the BNDE strengthened its institutional
structure to

meet the new requirements of Brazilian basic industries,
of the

mechanical industry and of participating in the stock of

Brazilian firms that took part in the execution of the PND II
goals.

—

BNDE

'

s

new subsidiaries -- FIBASE, EMBRAMEC, and IBRASA

became the major financial sources for the firms executing the

objectives of the PND 11.46

^

Jn

^ .^.^.^
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change, a major decision-making
arena was formed, centralizing
decisions in the President's office,
through the Economic
Development Council (CDE,

C^hoje^^

Presided over by Geisel, the CDE was
the central decision-making
agency, coordinating policies already
discussed by the National
Monetary Council, the Industrial
Development
Council, and other

specific sectoral policy councils.

CDE worked in tandem with the

high-level strategic and tactical
decision-making process of the
National Security Council.
In most cases, the CDE
was the

central locus of decision-making, being

formally what the CMN had informally been in
the 1969the supreme decision-making site for
economic deliberation. 47
74 period,

The CDE's decisions were aimed at changing the
thrust
of the industrialization process and providing the
huge

investments required.

However, those decisions were taken in the

context of worldwide recession and the resulting cyclical

reversion of internal growth.

These decisions involved new

policies aimed at increasing the production of capital goods,
basic and intermediate inputs

—

steel and non-ferrous metals,

petroleum/petrochemicals, fertilizers and phosphates, and
minerals, while reducing imports on these items which accounted
for 61.6 percent of total imports for the year 1974. 48

The

i
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production increase in those
items was highly energy-intensive
which increased the electric
power demand.
These pressures
forced decisions about the
implementation of large-scale energy
programs, both hydroelectric
and
nuclear.

The PND II decision also
involved other related
aspects: industrial deconcentrat
ion
integration of peripheral
regions to the core of Brazil's
more developed states, and
international relations, specifically
trade.
,

The PND II 8 energy, mining and
industrial projects
were accompanied by a decision to
deconcentrate regionally, in
order to achieve one of the critical
goals of the National
integration Program (PIN): the integration
of the Eastern Amazon
and Western Frontiers, which is a
National Security Doctrine's
objective.
Asserting control over the vast, sparsely
populated
Brazilian territories was the way the military
found to confront
the attraction that the Amazon's profit
potential exerted on

international interests.

it is not surprising that PND II

included large-scale regional infrastructure (electric
power
plants, railroads, urban development projects)

industrial projects, as

a

in addition to

way of simultaneously achieving

development, national integration and security objectives.

Policy-makers sought industrial deconcentrat ion to
avoid the political consequences of having

a

concentrated and

powerful industrial labor force in the State of Sao Paulo and
other Southeastern industrial states.

These states were

a
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stronghold for MDB votes in th
iq 7 ^ election,
theP 1974
and would continue
to be in other elections as
well. 49
The PND II policies were also
directly linked to
international relations.
Domestic development policy
industrial, energy and mineral
policies -, overlapped with
foreign policy.
Brazilian-Paraguayan-Argentine regional economic
and geopolitical concerns guided
the Itaipu decision, while
international investment and the export
of mineral and
industrialized products were instrumental
in the Tucurui decision
-- the largest state infrastructure
project within the regional

-

development framework of the Greater Carajas
Program.
These two
projects will be discussed in detail on
chapters V and VI.

m

the case of nuclear policy, Brazil's Accord
with West Germany had
international repercussions which pitted the Geisel
government
against the Carter Administration.
In the case
of oil supply,

Brazil strived to maintain good relations with
the Arab and OPECmember countries by engaging in a foreign policy of
"responsible

pragmatism."

This included an anti-Zionist vote in the United

Nations in 1975, Petrobras's exploration in oil-producing
countries, Brazilian construction firms executing extensive civil

works in Arab and other oil-producing countries, and selling arms
to Arab countries

—

all of which was aimed at guaranteeing the

supply of oil for internal Brazilian consumption.
Yet the majority of the funds needed to finance the

projects had to be borrowed, thus contributing significantly to

"
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the debt crisis of the 1980s.

Foreign sources of funding

-

private commercial banks, multilateral
agencies
by far
outweighed the internal sources of
development financing. 50
As
a consequence, most of the
economic and social policies after
the 1982 debt crisis were conditioned
by decisions made

-

by the

IMF,

multilateral agencies and foreign private
banks.
Therefore
large investment pursued to further
national security and
development objectives paradoxically have
undermined

sovereignty

.

One of Geisel's objectives was to shift
away from the

relatively large participation by multinational
corporations in
the economy to a greater involvement of the state
and of the

domestic private sector in national development in
furtherance of
the historical autarkic trends.
Severe Gomes, a nationalist
Paulista entrepreneur, was named Minister of Industry and
Commerce, signalling that the Brazilian private sector's time
had
arrived.

He strived to implement policies encouraging the

domestic private sector to participate in large scale development
projects, 51 later corroborated by Velloso,
the government directed its entire incentive system to
the sectors considered of highest priority, thus
utilizing the entire range of available BNDE incentive
mechanisms, in addition to other exceptional measures.
52

This strategy entailed not only accumulating favors and
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incentives but also pressuring
entrepreneurs for more ambitious
expansion.
As Velloso said

SSrt

10n

?

Council of Non-Ferrous Metals and
ER 9aVe thS EC0n ° mic development
Council
1St ° lf P ro ^cts, we realized that
sSc£
lIS }was incapable of giving Brazil
such I
a list
self1
Und6r my advice CONSIDER had to go
ba^ ?^!?' G l^'
re P reneurs
ask them to design larger
crow?*
S "'
We were g 01
P
°}
back
to talk to Ermirio
*°l Alcoa, with
with
Alcan, to see if they would go beyond
the expansion already programmed.
And, likewise
in
many sectors, we convoked [sic] the
entrepreneurs to
enlarge a few projects. This was the case in
the paper
and pulp industries. 53
^ p

%lt7X°^

^
^

f

<

Nevertheless the call for private sector participation
was soon offset by the government's use of its own
state

enterprises to implement the Plan.
1974 and 1975,

In the short period between

54 new state enterprises were created,

diversifying and expanding state-owned enterprise.

54

As Lessa

pointed out, "the PND II put large state enterprises at the
center stage of industrialization" 55

since the gargantuan

investments of the state enterprise systems (Eletrobras

Electric Power Companies

+

Itaipu Binational,

+

state

Nuclebras,

Petrobras, Siderbras, Telebras, CVRD, and others) were strategic
in generating enough demand to the private sectors to compensate

for the cyclical downturn of the economy.

In reality, after the

1977 cuts and re-evaluations of PND II's policies, only such

large scale long maturation projects as Carajas, Itaipu and

Tucurui were maintained at full scale, not only for their long

.
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maturation period into the 1990s
iyyus, hn+p
but also for
the interests they
56
mobilized
Intense negotiations between
the state and private
sector re-evaluated most of the
PND II projects, particularly
after the effects of the US$ 30
billion-hiatus of resources in
the period 1974-78 (See Table 4.2 External Accounts) aggravated
inflation, interest rates and other
macroeconomic variables.
Notwithstanding cuts and these negotiations,
most investment were
channelled to electric and nuclear energy,
to selected industrial
sectors, and to mining; the capital goods
demanded by these
development projects prevented an earlier deep
recession. The
continued interventionist role of the Brazilian
state was
candidly expressed by Velloso:

If you want to act entirely within the market
system
the present conditions of the Brazilian economy...
y
will not have the private sector in steel-making,
in
fertilizers, in petrochemicals, in non-ferrous
metallurgy, etc... 57

For Velloso the core of the problem was to apply existing

resources to sectors that were vital to Brazilian economic

development and at the same time resolve the balance of payments
deficit.

Yet the government response was more government

incentives to low direct return and long maturation sectors. 58
A sector by sector analysis shows that the energy

sector had the most consistent flow of financing and the most
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consistent political power support,
although that was not readily
translated into autonomous policy
action.
Table 4.3 depicts the
trends of state enterprise investment.
Petrobras investment were
initially directed to petrochemicals,
and in the early 1980s to
producing off-shore petroleum. Eletrobras
investments

(including

Itaipu Binacional and State Concessionaires)
sustained investment
in the late 1970s but these crumbled
with the 1982 debt crisis.
Likewise the state steel sector invested
heavily in the late
1970s, but suffered the consequences when it
had to repay without
an internal or external market to absorb
productive capacity.

The mining sector (CVRD) sustained its growth
throughout the
period largely by diversifying activities (pulp and
paper,

fertilizers, non-ferrous metallurgy) and by the political
support

given to the Greater Carajas Program for its export component.

,
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TABLE

4

.

3

STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL GROUP INVESTMENTS
(Cr$ billion
1974

Petrobras
E

S an<3

ItaIpu"

197 5

8 0.4

101.6

142 8

18 °- 5

-

1976

1977

97.6
201

-

4

99.6
225 -*

-

base 1980)

1978

1979

101.1

102.3

"4

253.3

.

4

State Utilities

Nuclebras
14

Siderbras

46.2

59.4

46.9

58.6

88.2

21.7

18.0

28.7

23.7

3.2

.

3

134.7

Transportation
DNER, RFF
Portobras, Metro
Ferrovia do Ago

Telecommunications
Telebras- Embratel
& state concesionaries
CVRD Group
holding, Docenave
Cenibra, Valesul
Albras, Alunorte
Sources:

Reports from the companies 1974-79.
SEST, Relatorios 1980-84. Deflated by igp-di,
Coniuntura Economica 1980.
average exchange rate: Cr$/US$ 52.70
.

(continued next page)
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TABLE
1 Q d r\
x
you

Petrobras
Eletrobras
Itaipu
State Utilities

Nuclebras
Siderbras

117
107

.

.

6
1
Q
o

48

48 9
.

7

113

.

.

6
2

4

.

3

(cont.

1981

1982

150.9

180.
94

1983

1984

2

133 6

110

8

67 8
51 9
53 7

10. 0
24 6

78 6

65.9
85.1

19 8

25.7

21

4

18

.

7

94

.

2

68

.

3

37

4

16
X
\J

*

fi
o

101.2
"7 1
/

±

.

c;
D

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

6

.

56.9

Transportation
DNER RFF,
Portobras, Metro
Ferrovia do Ago

87 6

80

.

2

64

.

2

55. 9

41.8

Telecommunications
Telebras- Embratel
& state concesionaries

55

3

57

.

5

65.

2

50

.

1

46.3

CVRD Group
holding, Docenave
Cenibra, Valesul
Albras, Alunorte

26.

2

45.0

54

1

31.

3

36.9

.

,

.

.

Sources: Reports
from the companies 1974-84.
SEST,
1980-84
Deflated by igp-di, Conjuntura Economica
1980 average exchange rate:
Cr$/US$ 52.70
.
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TABLE 4.4

GROWTH RATE IN STATE ENTERPRISE
INVESTMENT, 1975-1984, %

Petrobras

Eletrobras and
Itaipu
State Utilities

1975

1976

1977

1978

26.4

-3 9

2

1.5

.

.

1

26.4

11.6

11.8

13

28.6

-20.9

24 8

50. 5

59.2

-17.3

-17.3

.

0

1979

1

.

2

-0.4

Nuclebras
Siderbras

.

52

.

7

Transportation

Telecommunications
CVRD Group

-17

.

0

-35.7

Source: Calculated from State Entrepreneurial
Group Investment, Table 4.3.
(continued next page)
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TABLE 4.4

Petrobras

Eletrobras and
Itaipu
State Utilities
Nuclebras
Siderbras

1980

1981

1982

14

28 3

19

-19

-49

.

.

.

-15

9

.

-5. 5
46. 5
60. 7

1

9

.

9

Calculated
Investment
Table 4.3.

from

.

-6.

4

-25. 8

-17

3

-85
-52

2

2

3

-28
-21
-36

9

5

9

-7 8
.

8

1984

5

2

.

6

.

5

29 8

-16

7

-12

6

-16

.

8

-27 5

-45

2

-55

6

-25

2

Telecommunications
107

.

1983

160

Transportation

CVRD Group

(cont.)

9

State

-8

.

4

-19

9

-12

9

3

.

9

13

4

-23

1

-7 6

71

.

7

20

2

-65

3

17

.

Entrepreneurial

Group

.

9
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—

ine case * of-Electri cal
Energy and Petroleum

In this section we will
analyze how the 1974
quadrupling of oil prices induced
policy-makers to pay renewed
attention to energy policy.
so doing we will evaluate the

m

relative political and financial
autonomy of the state
enterprises involved in the hydroelectric
and nuclear power
projects and petroleum and transportation
sectors.

1

"

EleGtrica] ^ nPrrTY

'

Hydro electric and Nucle ar Power Policy

The Eletrobras system (regional and state
level firms
plus Itaipu) was coming out of a period of
high relative state
autonomy (1967-73).
In the 1974-79 period, Eletrobras was
in the
thick of energy politics:
Itaipu Binational involved

historically troublesome relations with Argentina and
Paraguay,
in addition to highly politicized relations with
particular

fractions of capitalist interests and political power centers.
The decision to invest in the Northeast during Geisel's term

stemmed politically from the fact that two former Northeastern

Governors were the Eletrobras

's

President, Antonio Carlos

Magalhaes, of Bahia, and the Director of Coordination, Colonel

Cesar Cals (retired), of Ceara.

Both were powerful and gained

Geisel's trust with respect to projects and priorities.
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As an illustration of the
high-powered politics of the
electric power sector, when
Figueiredo was chosen to succeed
Geisel, he wanted to guarantee
that the upcoming 1982

gubernatorial elections would be
controlled by trustworthy
regional state leaders. Anton.o
Carlos Magalhaes emerged as his
choice to be State Governor of
Bahia in the 1978 indirect
election.
Cesar Cals was elected Senator
indirectly, under the
April 1977 Package, and was
subsequently appointed Minister of
Mines and Energy (1979-85).
Figueiredo also kept General Costa
Cavalcanti (retired) as the powerful
General-director of Itaipu
Binational, by then entering its critical
phase.

As part of

a

regional political compromise, Mauricio
Schulman was nominated
president of Eletrobras at the indication
of the new Governor of
Parana, Ney Braga (1979-1983)
who had been Geisel "a Minister
of Education, a critical area in those
years of political
opening.
Despite Geisel's support to Braga and Schulman,
in a

-

mere 18 months Cals and Schulman were at odds with
each other.
Schulman's priorities (development of coal-fired power
plants

favoring his Southern regional interests) collided with
central

government priorities.

The President, the National Security

Council and the Ministry of Mines and Energy (Cesar Cals) were
only interested in maintaining highly visible and political
projects.

Eletrobras, pressed by financial difficulties, was

ordered to make an additional 15 percent cut in its budget for

Fiscal-Year 1980, shifting investment to Itaipu, Tucurui and to
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the Nuclear Program.

Schulman challenged Cals's
decision and
also confronted the powerful
Planning Minister, Delfim Netto.
Schulman succumbed to pressures
and was replaced by Costa
Cavalcanti, who held both offices
during the remaining five years
of Figueiredo's term.
According to government logic, Costa

Cavalcanti

appointment was only natural since Itaipu
investments had the highest priority,
given its international
(Paraguayan partners, equipment purchases,
loans) and national
commitments, 5 9 as will be analyzed in Chapter
-s

V.

The change in command at Eletrobras was
not entirely

accepted by Nuclebras and nuclear energy
supporters. Costa
Cavalcanti 'a defense of hydro-projects coupled
with the serious
political, financial and technical difficulties
the Nuclear
Program as a whole faced, were enough to entice a
heated defense
of the Program by the president of the National
Nuclear Energy
Council, Rex Nazareth and by the president of Nuclebras,
Paulo

Nogueira Batista. 60
Although Eletrobras"

s

political autonomy vis-a-vis

central government was maintained by Costa Cavalcanti' s efforts,
as the 1981-83 economic crisis deepened, Eletrobras

autonomy suffered severely.

's

financial

While self-generated resources were

most important in the 1970-74 period, loans supplied the major

portion of the investments done in this sector for the 1974-85
period, reaching 93.7 percent in 1984, as shown in Table 4.5.

Electricity rates were constantly used to curb inflation, sharply

.
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reducing the volume of self-generated
resources, according to
Table 4.7.
As resources from the Treasury
also diminished,
Eletrobras. economic potential was
exploited in getting foreign
loans that were also used for other
expenditures and for
amortization and servicing of previously
incurred debt. 61

Beginning in 1981, self-generated resources
were
insufficient to pay for current expenditures,
therefore other
resources from government allocations, reserves
and plain
emissions were made in order to compensate for
the lack of
resources even to pay personnel and financial
obligations.
On
the other tables of Sources and Uses of Funds,
negative numbers
also show this fact.
Sel f -generated funds accounting

for 34.7 in

1980 had to be covered by Other Resources from Government

Allocation to offset the lack of Net Sel f -Generated resources to
pay for current personnel and supplies expenditures. The most
troublesome year was 1983 when 45.5 percent of expenditures were
covered by Government Allocation.
Eletrobras action dwindled as loans dried up,

reflecting the deep-rooted crisis of the economy.

The most

important state sector during the 1970s diminished its

investments reaching

a

crucial low point in the 1980s.

As an

Eletrobras official stated

From the financial point of view the present situation
of the electric energy sector is that of a firm going

out-of -business 62

.
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TABLE 4.5
BRAZIL

ELETROBRAS

SOURCES

SELF-GRTD
NSG
OtRes
GVT TRSRY

CRDT OPTS

1980
38 9
34 7
4

2

6

9

54

1

Int
Ext

1981
39.

3

-16.
56

9
3

14

1982
33 0
-25. 2
58 2
.

.

4

46

3

3

9

5

1983
37

6
5

.

-45.
83

.

2

0

1

4

.

61. 8

58

.

4

42

4

57

0

100

0

100

2

60

1

.

5. 2

-42 6
47 8

2

.

1984

1985
15. 7

-22
38

1

0

.

.

29

7
2

3

-11
40

9

16

2

5

.

1986

9

4

93

.

7

83

3

54

0

1

10. 2

2

.

3

5

1

4

7

48 2

91

4

77

7
6

52

6

100 0

100

0

100

0

47 3
31 9

34

0

45

2

9

5

USES
CAP EXPTS
*invst
*amtzn
Int
Ext
*other

100

.

64
14

21

1

.

7

0

100

0

58 4
15 .4

57
27

57
22

6
8

6

.

5
6
5

21

.

1

20

2

14 .9

17

.

14

3

6
8

0

2

.

3

12

.

6

26

25

.

.

.

.

3
2

1 .9
.

3

.

5

5

4

26
20

5
.

8

35 7
20 8

Source: SEST, Relatorio various years
Eletrobras, Relatorio various years
Percentage from Total Resources.
.

.

GLOSSARY:

SELF-GRTD
NSG
OtRes
GVT TRSRY
CRDT OPTS
Int
Ext
CAP EXPTS
*invst
*amtzn
Int
Ext

Self-Generated Resources = NSG+OtRes
Net Self-Generated/Total Resources
Other Resources (Reserves, Govt allocation)/Total Resource
Funds allocated from Federal, State or Municipal
Government/Total Resources
Funds allocated from Credit Operations/Total Resources
Credit institutions within Brazil
Credit institutions abroad
Capital Expenditures = invst+amtzn
Investments as percentage of Capital Expenditures
Amortization as percentage of Capital Expenditures
To credit institutions within Brazil
To Credit institutions abroad

.
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OBSERVATION
from SEST and Scate^ntrprlsfReports 63
from where it was calculated is:

minus
equal
plus
equal
plus
plus
equal

Resources Self-Generated
Current Expenditures
Net Self-Generated Resources
Other Resources
Own Resources for Investment
Treasury Resources
Credit Operations
TOTAL RESOURCES

minus

Capital Expenditures

investments
equal

*amortization
*other
Variation of the Available
Resources

Calculated
HTcT
accounting equation

+
+

RSG
CE
NSG
OtRes
ORFI
Trsy
CrOp
TOTRES

CapExp
*inv
*amtz
*oth
VarAva

The negative percentage appearing in all tables
refer
to u e of Other Resources to offset the lack of own
resources
to
pay lfor current expenses (personnel, interests, etc.)
The values above 100 percent reflect amounts over and
above Total Resources taken to offset lack of financial

resources
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Although investment made during
the 1960s and 1970s doubled
generating capacity every five
years, in the absence of new
investment severe electric power
shortages
in the 1990s

areexpected.

No new foreign loans were
obtained since 1983 and
even a World Bank loan has been
consistently denied in view of

environmental non-compliance on the part
of Eletrobras projects,
contributing to the demise of the political
and financial

autonomy it once enjoyed.

63

The political and financial autonomy
of the nuclear
power sector varied along this decade.
it enjoyed high degrees
of autonomy since most decisions were
not subject to scrutiny and
the implementation process could count on
vast resources, both
accountable and unaccountable. As political
liberalization and

financial crisis hit, the nuclear policy lost much
of its
autonomy.

We will examine how this process took place.

Brazilian nuclear policy, which began in the 1950s,

64

gained momentum only in 1967 when the hard-line military regime
was in power.

This regime freely maneuvered unaccountable funds,

in view of a silenced Congress.

that only through building

reach nuclear capacity.

a

The military became convinced

nuclear power plant could Brazil

By abstaining from signing the 1968 Non-

Proliferation Treaty, Brazil, together with twenty other
countries, signaled their intention of developing nuclear

technology free from abiding legislation, what coincided with
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hard-line military interests in
purchasing
from Westinghouse (Angra-I), to

a

.'turn-key.,

reactor

be built near Angra dos Reis,

miles south of Rio de Janeiro.

This was

a

100

decision taken

independent from Eletrobras, essentially
formed at the National
Nuclear Energy Council (CNEN) and
the CBTA (Companhia Bj^sjleira
de Tecnologia Atomica
precursor of Nuclebras. 65
)

,

Despite this independent decision,
the actual

autonomous development of nuclear capacity
was endangered by the
United States •» reluctance in supplying
enriched uranium.
Brazilian scientists warned that dependence
on the U.S. uranium
supply would make the whole nuclear
development program

vulnerable to U.S. interests. 66

m

1971,

a

Brazil-U.S. agreement

on fuel supply was reached; after that,
Westinghouse was awarded

the international bidding for Angra-I,

a

625-MW plant budgeted at

US$ 304 million and to be built between 1972 and
1976, but only

finished in 1983.

Furnas, the Eletrobras subsidiary, can only

operate it at 30 percent capacity due to technical flaws,
making
the final cost of US$ 1.8 billion

a

very expensive US$ 10,000 per

kilowatt. 67

Brazil's definitive commitment to nuclear energy came

with the adoption of the Nuclear Program.

Nucleares Brasi leiras
of CBTA in 1974

—

)

—

Nuclebras

(

Empresas

which resulted from the transformation

implemented the Nuclear Program based on the

Brazil-West Germany Accord.

The Nuclear Program is seen as one

of the most typical examples of the grandiose PND II

's

projects,
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since by m astering the nuclear
cycle Brazil-s authoritarian
pclicy m akers intended achieving
the prestigious E m erging Power
status for the country.

Nuclebras was created as an
autonomous jurisdiction,
separate from the energy bureaucracy
of the Ministry of Mines and
Energy and Eletrobras, which opposed
development of the nuclear
energy program. within the Brazilian
government, the supporters
of the Nuclear Program were the
National Security
Council, the

President Geisel, the military, the
Minister of Mines and Energy,
Shigeaki Ueki and the diplomatic community.
The diplomat Paulo
Nogueira Batista who had served in Bonn
previously
,

and was later

appointed the president of Nuclebras, was
that Accord's main
negotiator. 68 The signing of the Teuton-Brazilian
Accord in
June 1975 initiated this controversial program,
whose original
cost was US$ 10 billion, and proposed the construction
of eight
nuclear power plants generating 10,000 MW. Two of
these
Angra

—

II and III

—

were expected to operate by 1982 and 1983,

respectively, while the others were to be phased in throughout
the 1990s. 69

This program spent several billion dollars over

the years but has not generated

a

single kilowatt. 70

Brazilian military nuclear supporters envisioned

dominating the full cycle of nuclear technology, from mining and
"yellow cake" conversion to enrichment and reprocessing

of

irradiated fuel, from manufacturing eguipment to building nuclear

power plants.

In 1975,

the U.S.

refused to supply

a

joint
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Brazilian-Argentine uranium reprocessing
plant, even under
international supervision, thus raising
Brazilian expectations
with respect to autonomous reprocessing 7 1
Even though the
strategy of the Nuclear Program was
formulated by the
.

General

Secretariat of the National Security
Council viewing electric
power and military applications 72
Nuclebras officials and the
military believed that its implementation
would provide enough
,

kn ° W h ° W for Brazil to

sound reactor and

a

^ve

the capacity to build

technically

commercially competitive power plants for

domestic and foreign markets.
was crucial:

a

This is why the military spillover

the military gave their political support to
the

nuclear program in exchange for development of their
own military
capacity.
That was the nexus and the power blood-line
that

continued allocating resources to the Program.
The euphoric climate at the signing of the Accord

overwhelmed criticism voiced by the Brazilian nuclear physicists
and researchers, concerned with the unproven "jet-nozzle" uranium

enrichment technology 73 and with the per kilowatt cost of

generating nuclear energy.

Compared to Itaipu's cost (US$ 1,400

per kilowatt), the nuclear kilowatt would cost more than double
this,

at US$ 2, 900. 74

Notwithstanding criticisms, resources allocations to
the Nuclear Program endured with

errors and decoys.

a

series of intentional and

They were repeatedly made by the central

government -- which forced Eletrobras to modify its studies of
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potential energy developments

~,

to justify nuclear policy,
thus

reflecting the power and cohesion
behind Brazilian nuclear
policy.
Both when the Accord was signed
and when the Piano 3 990
was drawn up by Eletrobras in
!978 75., hydroelectric potential
was underestimated at lis million
KW (Nuclear
Accnr-H

150 million KW (PJLano_JJ)90,

180-200 million KW.76

(

'

1982

and

while demand was bloated to

This demand forecast was re _ evaluated
tQ

115 million KW 77 with

Plan ° 2000

1978)

IP..,

a

hydropower potential Qf 213 minion

^

considering the potential of the Amazon

)'

Region, once the Nuclear Program and Nuclebras
had lost primacy.
This manipulation of forecasts was noted and
the whole program

came under fire at

a

1978 Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry

which had no power to enforce its recommendations.
Furthermore, the tense dispute between American and

German nuclear manufacturers and the debate between U.S.
President, Jimmy Carter, and West Germany's Chancellor,
Helmut
Schmidt, reflected the importance of the matter to the profits
and security interests of central countries.

The Germans were

willing to carry Brazil to the "El Dorado of Nuclear
Sufficiency," provided Brazil guaranteed the supply of 20 percent
of the enriched uranium coming out of the Resende enrichment

plant to West German power plants. 78

In order to implement that

part of the program, West Germany transferred uranium mining

technology 79
.

Besides Kraftwerk Union (KWU) and others in the

nuclear industry, West Germany's banks and financial firms were
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-

fond of Brazil as a client
of the Atomic Club

-,

a

country eager to grow and be part

and thus provided generous loans
and

financing.

That political autonomy vis-a-vis U.S.
interests
developed into tense relations between
Brazil and the U.S. 80

During the years 1976-79 period, the Nuclear
Program's
announced autonomy effectively decreased.
URENCO

—

a Dutch,

British, and German consortium supplying
uranium enrichment

technology

—

acceded to the Carter Administration demands of
not

transferring it without safeguards.

in addition,

Germans and

Brazilians struggled to control decisions and substantive
policy
at NUCLEN
the engineering subsidiary --, and at NUCLEP --

—

the

heavy equipment manufacturing plant.

Germans severely limited

Brazilian power to decide the program's direction. 81
In addition to German hindrance on Nuclebras's

autonomy, the Brazilian private contractor, Construtora Norberto

Odebrecht
Program.

,

also influenced the implementation of the Nuclear
First,

Construtora Odebrecht

,

already on the site

constructing the Angra

I

construction without

formal bidding process with the argument

a

for Furnas, was awarded the civil

that its experience could not be matched.

Second, this company

grew when Antonio Carlos Magalhaes was sequentially Mayor of
Salvador, Bahia (1966-70) and Governor of Bahia (1970-74);

therefore the company had

a

powerfull ally while A.C. Magalhaes

was Eletrobras's president, despite the rivalry between Nuclebras
and Eletrobras.

An example of the low autonomy of the nuclear
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sector with respect to this private
contractor is that despite
geological problems
a shifting bed-rock at
the Itaorna Beach,
-- construction continued unabated.
Construtora od*hr^h*

-

added

240-additional foundation pilings to the
construction, at
of US$ 90 million dollars and a
two year time overrun. 82

a

cost

Nevertheless, in 1979 the Nuclear Program's
autonomy
regained momentum when Figueiredo established
the Parallel
Nuclear Program under the responsibility of
the military.
This
program, developed basically at the Technological
Aerospace
Center (CTA, Centro Tecnoloaico Aer oes^acial
at the Nuclear
Energy and Research Institute (IPEN, Instituto de
Pesguisag
Energeticas e Nucleares in Sao Paulo, and the Navy
facility in
)

,

)

Ipero, SP,

involved enrichment of uranium with

ultracentrifuge technology

,

83

a

proven, economic

in contras t to the unproven

technology of the Accord.
As of 1979, nuclear cooperation with Argentina was

included as part of the Brazil-Argentina treaty on the different

heights of the hydro-power plants on the Parana River (see

chapter V). 84

For the first time, the two countries

participated amicably in the development of sensitive technology,
after mutual mistrust had marked relations between the two Armed
Forces.

In November 1983 right before Raul Alfonsin came to

power, Argentina announced that enriched uranium at percentages

high enough to manufacture the bomb had been achieved, prompting
the Brazilian military to make

a

concerted effort to rush the
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Parallel Program forward.

Although the Nuclear Program for

electric power generation was
de-emphasized after 1982,
unaccountable expenditures continued
to be made.B5 Nogueira
Batista's strong defense of the
Program at the Superior School of
War, where the program could
receive political support, further
revealed the military character of
the Program.
Clearly the
military, the National Security Council
and the SNI exerted
hegemonic control over decisions concerning
the nuclear area.
Nogueira Batista was so conscious of this
hegemony that, when
asked in an interview at the end of a ESG
conference whether or
not the bomb was going to be built, he
replied

I am a civilian, a diplomat, and
I work for Nuclebras
with peaceful ends.
I cannot define whether the bomb
is going to be made.
This is a military problem 86

As military hegemony over the program prevailed, the

"community of information," the hard-liners part of the

information systems in the Armed Forces and at SNI,

became

involved in the administration of the SNI and the Parallel

Nuclear program.

General Octavio Medeiros, the powerful head of

the SNI, appointed Colonel Francisco Araripe,

a

hard-liner linked

to the repressive apparatuses of the 1960s and 1970s, as the

"czar of the Parallel Nuclear Program," in

a

demonstration of the

political power played by the military in order to conduct the
secretive, militarized program.

,
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Despite all secrets, the results
of the Parallel
Program seeded dismal to Brazilian
physicists.
Even though the
military announced that it was
possible to make the bomb poor
results in enriching uranium were
obtained.
As stated by Borisas
CTimberis

C e

rouna
found

SS
nUClSar fUSi ° n and Brazil
A way
lVito T'
the atom: nuclear fiction. 87

has

a
i\Ti
third

By 1984 the Brazilian nuclear
endeavor was fully

committed to the mastery of nuclear
technology while the
construction of Angra II and III power
plants were temporarily
paralyzed for lack of resources. 88 with the
improvement

of long

distance transmission technology, transporting
the Amazon hydropower potential became increasingly less
expensive, thus denying
justification to the expensive Nuclear Program. 89
Demonstrating how premature any evaluation of Brazilian

nuclear policy was, despite the increasing scarcity of
resources,
the Parallel Program continued untouched and the Armed
Forces

announcement,

in August 1987,

that Brazilian could make the bomb

demonstrated the high political autonomy of the military in
respect to nuclear policy for military applications.
other hand, the Goiania cesium-accident only

a

On the

month later,

showed Brazil's unreadiness in dealing with radioactive
materials.

's

This concern was voiced by the president of the

Brazilian Society for the Progress of Science, Enio Candotti,

210

^"
\f

"

would be
tttrZt megalomania"^
A
^J*™*'
omic
bomb "nnot be
launched with slingshots
of submarines, rockets a nil pr u PP° ses the existence
attack and of response'
"
°? ° £ dete =tion, of
expenditures in'S^ange
an

SWfflxSS'aSSW

We have seen how the military
exerted their political
power to direct the Nuclear Program
to fulfill military needs
in
a higher degree than
civilian uses of nuclear energy.
We have

TABLE 4.6
BRAZIL

NUCLEBRAS
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS,

SOURCES

1980

SELF-GRTD
NSG
OtRes
GVT TRSRY

CRDT OPTS

-57
-57

54

103

.

.

.

.

9
9

7
1

Int
Ext

1981

1982

-20.2
-20.3
0.1

-24
-37

67 7
.

52

.

5

0.8
51

.

7

13

1983

1984

1985

1986

-71.1
-71.7
0.5

-86.9

-73
-75

21.9

10 7

.

7

-43.9

.

8

-44 3
0.4

.

0

47 6
.

77

.

1

.

1

4

75.7

(%)

.

32.4
111

.

5

149

1

.

2

0.7
148 6

110.3

.

3

.

-87 6
0.7
.

.

176.

2

.

3

.

6

.

2

22 9
.

3

150.4

1.0
175. 3

0.1
150. 3

USES
CAP EXPTS
*invst
*amtzn
Int
Ext
Source:

87 6
12 4
.

86.4

.

13

.

9

.

9

5.2
1.3

3

.

5

3

4

94

.

.

5

9

93

.

4

6.5
0.7
5.8

82
17

.

7

75.8

51.9

.

1

24

48

0.3
16 8
.

.

2

0.4

23.8

.

48

.

SEST, Relatorio various years. Nuclebras, Relatorio various
years. Percentage from Total Resources. See Glossary, p. 199
and Observation, p. 200 for explanation on negative numbers.
,

.

1

0. 1
0
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seen how

Nucleus's

capacity to formulate and
implement nuclear
policy was hindered by international
and national private
interests.

Future research on the Brazilian
nuclear policy might
indicate .ore detailed policy
outco.es and the implications of
the political power surrounding
the policy.
with respect to the
available financial information we
can conclude from Table 4.6
above that the great majority of
the funds used by the Nuclear
Program came from borrowing abroad.

2

•

Petroleum and Alcohol

During the 1974-85 decade, the Brazilian
petroleum

sector was twice faced with oil price and supply
problems.

The

1974 and 1979 increases of oil prices caused a
severe oil import

crisis which prompted Petrobras into shifting
investments from
profitable petrochemicals, refining and distribution
activities
to oil production.

Petrobras

's

share of investments in oil

production gradually rose to 70 percent in 1980 and reached 95
percent in 1984. 91
Petrobras financial autonomy continued high, mainly

because its prices were kept in line with reality, as shown in
Table

4. 7. 92

Despite capacity to generate surplus funding for

investment, Petrobras only committed itself to oil production

after oil prices caused panic and prompted Geisel to go on
national TV to announce the signing of risk contracts with
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foreign oil companies.

in addition
addition,

u
Petrobras

needed knowledge
about potential off-shore fields,"
and, at the same time,
Petrobras could organize exploration
abroad in oil-rich
countries.
The Brazilian oil state
enterprise also exchanged oil
production for development services
and arms sales in the Middle
East countries through its trading
subsidiary, Interbras.
with
this action, Petrobras recognized
that low cost oil was a thing
of the past and the fact that
Brazil's transportation system

relied on petroleum by-products demanded
new alternatives to
avoid the collapse of supply. 94

Petrobras political autonomy to decide
its own policies
diminished as the second oil shock (1979-80)
forced
the

Figueiredo government to consider oil production
among its
highest priorities.
Diminishing the dependence

on imported

was as crucial as exploring abroad.

experience of Braspetro

production activities

—

—

Petrobras

However, the negative
's

subsidiary for foreign

in Iraq provided enough incentive to

step-up domestic production.

Braspetro began exploring for oil

in Iraq in 1976 and discovered Majnoon,

shortly thereafter.

oil

a

gigantic oil field,

Under the contract, Brazil could exchange

Majnoon oil at discount prices for development projects executed
there.

However, Iraq unilaterally changed the contract to favor

its nationalist interest of guaranteeing oil revenue. In

addition, Iraq forced the exchange of oil for Brazilian weapons
and light armored vehicles.

This arrangement worked out until

:

213

TABLE 4.7

PRICE INDEXES

Petroleum
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985*

Source

-

EVO LUTION OF REAL PRICES,

Eletrical
Energy
Steel

100
115
112
138
138
143
137
128

100
90
80
75

100
78
69
74
72
63
71

72
61
61
48

epla ?' Proieto do
f
November
T

1985, p.

26

P^Sffi^^
'

Seplan

Ratals

100
95
73
55
52
40
38
45

93
95
77
69
75

98

100
90
77
79
81
60
44

na

pnd d* N o Va

Eletrobras, Siderbras

^^
B^UU^o
^

sLt
S
-

na
na
100

Postal
Services

Rep ublica pQp*- 1QpfM
7~ l^TcIIc^ted
with data rf^' the
I

3

Railroad
Services Telephone

1978-1985

^!^ 031

f?

,

Zebras

,

OT Ind6X ° f Real ^ices/GDP
do Desemp.nho da,

fi

na - not available.

the Iran-Iraq war broke out after which the oil
supply became

problematic.

Iraq's oil supply to Brazil became even more

troublesome after the January 1980 Iraqi-Brazilian agreement
for
the supply of natural and enriched uranium from Brazilian
nuclear
facility to the French-supplied Iraqi nuclear power plant, in

return for an oil supply of 400,000-bbd during

13 years.

When

the Iraq-Iran war broke out in September 1980 and the nuclear

plant was bombed by an Israeli raid, the commercial agreement

between Brazil-Iraq was broken.

.

.

214

The oil crisis forced Brazil
to adopt risk contracts,
commercial relationship between the
state and multinational

a

companies different from the old
concession system that offered
few guarantees, was inefficient
and violated sovereignty
Caught between maintaining a monopoly
or producing enough oil
domestically, Petrobras invited the
multinational companies
reluctant to invest in Arab and other
oil-rich nationalist
countries to sign risk contracts.
Petrobras only granted risk
contracts to multinationals in potential
areas where Petrobras
could not technologically explore.
Petrobras made

^

use of the

greater technological capacity of the
multinationals in order to
learn more about Brazilian geology and triple
production after
heavily investing in off-shore fields. 96
When Brazil spent US$ 10 billion importing oil
in the
previous four years (Table 4.2), Figueiredo gave top
priority

to

oil production.

importing

1

When he entered office in 1979, Petrobras was

million bbd and was was producing 171,000 bbd

domestically.

In two years prices increased from US$ 18 to US$

31 per barrel,

forcing Petrobras to invest in domestic oil

production 97
Petrobras autonomy contrasted with that of the Alcohol
Program.

Petrobras kept the prices of oil and its by-products at

realistic levels, thus generating enough resources to maintain
its investment program in off-shore drilling and production, as

:
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shown in Table 4.8.

Most of Petrobras policy
decisions were

taken with political autoncy
vis-a-vis private interests.

TABLE 4.8

BRAZIL
PETROBRAS
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS

SOURCES

SELF-GRTD
NSG
OtRes
GVT TRSRY

CRDT OPTS
Int
Ext

1980

1981

81.1

71.1

80 5
0.6

68

.

2

.

8

16. 1
3

12

.

.

2

5
6

2

.

.

.

5

6

1982

1983

97 9
79 2
.

41.1

.

37

18

.

8

0.4

1

26.8
5.6
21.1

4

.

.

(*)

1984

0

103
101

1

2

0.3

5

.

1

99 1
79 0

.

4

20.0

109 2
100 4
8.8

0.1

0.1

0.4

0.8
0.1
0.7

-9 6

1.6

58

.

6

-3.5

7

.

1

-1 0
-2 5

.

5

51.5

1986

.

0. 1
1

1985

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

-0.4
-9

USES
CAP EXPTS
* invst
*amtzn
Int
Ext
*other

Source

100
88
3

8

.

0

100

.

0

.

1

88

.

9

.

.

9

4

0

100. 0
88 8
5.3
.

100

.

0

83

.

2

100

.

0

100

.

0

77 0

76.6

11.2

.

100
76

17

17

1.

1

.

2

2

.

9

3

3

3

3

.

4

.

1

8

.

3

13

14

6

11

.

5

.

9

5.6

6

6

9

.

SEST, Relatorio various years. Petrobras,
Relat6rio various years.
Percentage from Total
Resources, excluded current expenses. See Glossary,
p. 199 and Observation, p. 200 for explanation on
negative numbers.
.
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Quite the opposite occurred with alcohol policy: the

interests of the Brazilian sugar cane industry were influential
in proposing sugar cane-based alcohol as a substitute for

14

.

2
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gasoline, despite increased
internal oil production.
The AJconol
Program (Pro^alcool)
a program run by several
institutions
instead of a single state enterprise
seemed an innovative
approach to a pressing problem. The
political interests of the
sugar/alcohol sector were more important
in the definition of the
program than just the technical
decisions taken to substitute
gasoline for alcohol as fuel. 98

-

-

With changes in the international
structure of sugar
production and of sugar consumption, prices
plummeted, trapping
the Brazilian sugar cane planters and
sugar and alcohol producers
in the middle of a crisis, after a
two-year bonanza
in 1974-5.

The first phase (1976-80) contained many
intra-agency disputes
for preeminence on the Alcohol Program.
The private interests,
clustered around the Sugar and Alcohol Institute
(IAA) pressed
demands (subsidies and preferential tax treatment)
in an old-

fashioned corporatist-like mechanism of interest
representation.
In this manner,

the channels of communication between the

centralized state and the agrarian interests began to operate
on
the basis of electoral politics.

The economic power of the sugar

cane growers ands their vote potential, especially those in the

Northeast, became

a

factor in the then upcoming elections.

Castro Santos identified the Ministries of Industry and

Commerce (MIC)

,

Mines and Energy (MME)

Planning (Seplan)

,

,

Finance, the Secretary of

the National Energy Commission (CNE)

,

the

Industrial Development Council, the Central Bank, the Bank of

,

217

Brazil, the Secretariat for Industrial
Technology (STI) as the
public agents involved in the
intrabureaucratic struggle for
dominance over the Alcohol Program.
The MME/Petrobras disputed
territory against the MIC/IAA; the
MIC faced off with the
National Petroleum Council over price
control and fuel
distribution. These disputes forced
Geisel to create a

centralized agency, the National Alcohol
Commission (CENAL)
within the MIC. The creation of CENAL was
a

formal loss for

Petrobras and IAA, which wanted the program
decentralized in
order to meet the interest of their specific
clienteles,
the

distributors and planters.

Informally, real power in Pro-alcool

remained with IAA since it was
to the 1930s,

a

representation.

a

long-standing bureaucracy dating

resilient corporatist mechanism of interest
One example of the internal struggle for control

of the program can be seen in Petrobras successful
attempt to

control half of distribution in the State of Sao Paulo, which

accounted for

a

40 percent share of the country's consumption in

1980."
In the first phase

(1976-79), the decision-making

process was fragmented, though there was the single objective of

producing anhydrous ethanol to substitute for 20 percent of
gasoline.

With no single hegemonic center in alcohol policy, the

Program's autonomy was curtailed:

a)

decisions about alcohol

production were made at MIC, the IAA, and the STI;

b)

the

National Petroleum Council centralized distribution policy;

c)
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the National Monetary Council/Central
Bank centralized financing
decisions.
That multiplicity of decision
sites contributed to
the lack of political autonomy.

This phase was superseded by

a

process of accommodation

when the objective turned to the
production of 100 percent
hydrated alcohol running on modified
engines.
Distilleries,
automotive industry, distributors played
crucial roles in the
growing Alcohol Program. 100 Nevertheless,
was plagued with
technical, economic, and political problems.

Technically the problems concerned the resistance
of
the auto-industry in finding adequate solutions
for
feeding

systems and materials, in view of alcohol volatility
and the

adaptation of gasoline engines to the alcohol system.

Only after

the Technological Aerospace Center (CTA) researched and
developed

new intake systems in 1980 did auto-makers became involved
in the
projects.

Despite technological advances in the materials used,

the engines using alcohol consume 30-35 percent more than

gasoline engines.

To offset this differential in consumption,

the price of alcohol was established at 35 percent less than the

price of gasoline.

Costs of production were not covered by this

price, thus leading to an additional subsidy.

While technical problems were overcome, political

problems were not.

When the CENAL was created in 1979, political

conflicts caused the National Energy Commission and the MME to
abandon the Program. Pro-alcool

1

s

conflicts between CENAL and IAA

.
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were mediated by the new Minister of
Industry and Commerce, Joao
Camilo Penna, supported by Vice-president
Chaves.

Sugar cane producers,

historical corporative

a

clientele linked to the state, depended on
subsidies and
incentives handed down through the IhhA 01

in this case,

the

producers of alcohol were subsidized by IAA which
also provided
incentives and export tax exemptions.
Northeast political interests were strongly linked to
the program.
Northeast usineiros dominating local political
.

systems, especially in the States of Alagoas and Pernambuco,
were

powerful enough to influence alcohol policy.

Though sugar cane

4

planters of the States of Rio de Janeiro and of Sao Paulo had

a

strong influence over alcohol policy, they had limited influence
over local politics.

Other alliances and interest articulation existed in
the Alcohol Program.

Common interests were shared by the

Secretariat for Industrial Technology and the auto-makers in

developing the alcohol-powered engine.
Council of Industrial Development (CDI)

Another MIC agency, the
,

became responsible for

the financing of the distilleries, while overall financing was

done through the Energy Commission within the Secretary of

Planning
In 1985,

six years after from the inception of the

Second Phase of the Program, Brazilian society is paying the

burden of the program. 102

Gasoline consumers are paying

a
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higher price in order to subsidize
the Pro-alcool
The
alternative of raising the price
differential from 65 to 75
percent (or more) of the price of
gasoline could reduce
subsidies, but it would decimate the
program politically.
Consumers would feel frustrated and most
of the distilleries
could not repay their debts with the
Government.
,

By 1985,

the

Program, though an apparent success, did
not solve the fuel

bottleneck of Brazil's transportation system.

It has not solved

the producers dilemma, that is their income
and profits.

Although the Program was economically and socially

unfeasible even before the decrease in oil prices in
1985, its
feasibility dropped even more when that occurred. Ronaldo

Seroa

da Motta found the equivalent cost per barrel to be
US$ 35 for

the efficient Sao Paulo production. In areas where the
Program

expanded later (Center West states) these costs were calculated
to be US$ 50 per barrel of equivalent petroleum, while in

Pernambuco -- the traditional Northeastern sugar-cane state
costs reached US$ 60 per barrel equivalent. 103

—

All three costs

were higher than the 1985 prices of oil.
In 1985, the decision-makers faced high fuel cost,

burdensome subsidies, and the disappearance of subsistence
agricultural land, as

result of the Program.

a

However, the

program continued due to the high level political power of the
interest groups involved, which "are now the strongest lobby in

governmental programs."-

1-

04

These groups postponed crucial
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decisions therefore limiting state
autonomy in the Alcohol
Program.
The 1975 crisis-management program,
an optimistic
program by 1979-80, was left with few
viable alternatives in
1985:

i) - continue inefficient
production via expanding'
consumption;
ii) - alcohol industry will be made
obsolete via
consumption to gasoline consequent upon expandinq reversal of
y
*
production.

3

.

-

Transportation

In the field of transportation,

PND's objectives were

concentrated on navigation with the creation of Portobras

.

on

railroads and on implementation of the Rio and Sao Paulo Subway

Metro Systems.

The Railroad Development Plan proposed to more

than double the sector's participation in cargo transport. 105

Symbolic of the megalomania of the PND II
was the Steel Railroad

(

Ferrovia

do Acq

)

's

—

development projects
an electrified

railroad through Belo Horizonte-Sao Paulo-Barra Mansa-Jeceaba

designed to link steel plants and iron ore mines.

—

Minas Gerais

Governor Aureliano Chaves (1974-1978) devised this project to be
finished in 1,000 days.

For Governor Chaves

—

a

Geisel

protege, spokesman for the influential Minas Gerais's mining and
steel industry interests, and an example of the military regime's

fascination with technocrat-politician 106 -- the Steel Railway

,

)
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would decrease dependence on
imported oil for
both iron ore from the mines to

transport ion

of

the steel pUnts, and finished

products from the steel plants to
the consumer centers in that
quadrilateral, passing by the new
Acominas
(

Acos_Min^s_Gerai^A

and private mills in Minas Gerais.

Despite the euphoria with which the
1,000 dayconstruction was announced, technical
and financial problems
delayed the project. FerroviaJ^o
was difficult to finance,
since its economic unsoundness and
lack of technical feasibility
far outweighed the political strength
Governor Aureliano had in
presenting the project to multilateral
agencies. 107 Despite the
PND II objective of augmenting the role
of railroads
in

Brazilian infrastructure, the multinational
automotive truck
industry was bullish in lobbying for their
continuation

as the

primary mean of transportation.
The sector's low political and financial autonomy
was
clear.

The construction of Ferrovia do Ac q was paralysed
in 1984

for lack of resources, after US$ 1.68 billion had been
spent.

The project was restudied by the Federal Railway Network (RFFSA

Rede Fe rroviaria Federal S.A.

I

and was scaled down to a single-

track system for diesel-operated trains, and combined use with

existing railways in the triangle Rio-Sao Paulo-Belo Horizonte.

Construction restarted in 1987 with about half of the US$ 136

million to be invested in the project coming from the private
sector.

Mineracoes Brasileiras Reunidas anticipated US$ 70

1

1

9

1

.
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million in freights of iron ore
and steel product
transportation. 108 The financial
autonomy of the sector was
never high, as shown in Table 4.9.
The combined Portobras-RFFSA
sources and uses of funds shows the
decrease in self-generated
resources originating from low rates.
Treasury allocation and
loans, especially from multilateral
agencies continued to be the
main source of funds for the sector.

TABLE

4

.

BRAZIL

TRANSPORTATION SECTOR

SOURCES

SELF-GRTD
NSG
OtRes
GVT TRSRY

CRDT OPTS
Int
Ext

1980

1981

-32 0
-33 7
1.7

-45.0
-47.8

86.7

.

.

45.3

1982

1983

1984

1985

-55. 7
-57 3
1.7

-48 4
-56.0

-61. 8
-62 0
0.2

-48
-50.

8

-78.7
15.9

106.2

126. 6

120. 6

121. 6

131.

124

36.5

48 0

12
24

17

26.9
20.0
7.0

30.4
10.0
20.0

24 2
11 0
13 0

50. 9
49.

41.6

.

.

34.0

43
55.
36.
20.

2

.

-62

39 1
16. 0
22 8
.

.

.

.

.

7

0
0

.

.

.

0

31.0

.

7

.

5

.

5

198 6
.

1

9
4
4

.

7

.

.

USES
CAP EXPTS
*invst
*amtzn
Int
Ext
Source:

74 2
22 9
.

.

80.3
19.7
3

.

17

.

81.8

0

18

.

3

.

0

15. 0

62 4
37 6
27 0
11. 0
.

15. 0

57 7
40. 0
18 0
.

.

SEST, Relatorio various years. Portobras, RFFSA,
Relatorios
various years.
Percentage from Total
Resources, excluded current expenses.
See
Glossary, p. 199 and Observation, p. 200 for
explanation on negative numbers.
.

.

.

9
7
0
0

.
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C

Industrial Policy and State

Ani- on omy

The PND contained numerous policy decisions
relating to
the new industrialization pattern designed by
PND II.
Although
it called for the participation of the
private sector,

the

government continued its direct action in the provision
of basic
inputs.

These policy must be analyzed from the point of view of

state autonomy with respect to the private sector in order
to

comprehend the participation and influence of private interests
in the policy-making process. 109

In view of the private sector's unwillingness to invest
in non-ferrous metallurgy,

specialty steel-making, fertilizers,

pulp and paper, petrochemicals and chemicals industries

which are basic and intermediary inputs

—

—

all of

most of these

activities were undertaken by expansion and diversification of
existing state industrial enterprises, such as Petrobras, CVRD,
and the state steel companies under the holding Siderbras 110

The changing pattern of the Brazilian industrial

economy demanded

a

strongly modified supply of basic inputs.

Although this policy focused on implanting large-scale projects
under the responsibility of the state enterprises, their
political and financial autonomy did not correspond to that task.
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The objectives of the National
Steel Plan, II stage,
designed in 1972, initially targeted
production of 20 million'
tons by 1980.
The National Steel Plan was
upgraded by

the CDE in

(beginning of the III stage), targeting
20 million tons by
1978, and 32 million by 1980.
That objective contrasted with
total gross steel production for 1984
of 18.4 million tons, 111
indicating that problems influenced the
autonomy of the sector,
both politically and financially.
1975

In addition to increased output
oriented to the

internal market, Siderbras engaged in export-led
joint ventures,
such as Tubarao Steel Company (CST, Companhia
sideruraica

Tubarao

)

—

in association with Kawasaki Steel of Japan
and with

Finsider (Societa Finanzia ria Siderurg irM of Italy

produce and export

3

million tons of flat steel.

—

to

CST's

implementation was plagued with financial and political
difficulties.

The favorable international market for steel

production when the decision to build Tubarao was made in

.1975

did not persist, resulting in the foreign partners re-evaluation
of the project.

A cut-down in state purchases, in accordance

with the re-evaluation of the Steel Plan, made the private

Brazilian capital goods manufacturers to squirm and contest the
"megalomaniac political projects. 112
1'

When the scaled-down

Tubarao project began in 1979 its completion was expected for

H
1983.

By

1 982

,

US$

2

.

12

billion had

^^^^^
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still US $ 1.53 billion to be
spent at the outset of the debt
crisis, what delayed beginning
of operations to 1984.1"

Tubarao's initial operations in
1984 coincided with
import quotas imposed by the
U.S. on Brazilian steel,
spoiling
CST's intentions of primarily
targeting U.S. market. What was
originally seen as an advantage
turned to a nightmare since new
markets increased the volume exported
but yielded fewer
dollars. H4 C ST transferred
financial burden to Siderbras as it
was unable to repay its debts.
As regards the non-flat products,
Minas Gerais

Governor, Aureliano Chaves, planned
filling in the voids of the
private sectors in 1974 by investing in
that field, entirely

endorsed by Geisel's 1975 Message to Congress.

H5

Continuing

yet another grandiose project Acominas was
formed in 1975

—

a

partnership with ownership divided among Siderbras
(40%), CVRD
(20%), the Minas Gerais State Government (20%), and foreign
groups (20%).

Siderbras's industrial policy was caught between

the need to substitute imported inputs and the private
sector's

outcry about the state entering their domain of production.
Paulo Villares, a leading capital goods and basic inputs

entrepreneur, it was necessary that "the government urgently

define the rules of the game," circumscribing where the state

enterprises and the private sector would function.

6

For
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Despite private sector
complaints, the construction of
Acominas began in 1978, when
Governor Aureliano was already
VicePresident-elect on the Figueiredo
ticket.
As Vice-president,
Aureliano could more effectively
maintain Minas Gerais interests
pressuring politically the project.
it was only due to his
political force combined with that
of the Minister of Industry
and Commerce, Joao Camilo Penna,
equally from Minas
Gerais, that

investment resources were allocated
to Acominas, despite the
world slump in non-flat steel demand.
its construction suffered
numerous setbacks postponing projected
1985 completion by two and
half years.
The Acominas was contested by the
World Bank, whose
experts did not have confidence in the
financial plans
presented.

And they were partially correct, since
the US$ 300 million
Acominas had in its 1979 budget were sidetracked
to two

transportation agencies being returned only years
later.
Acominas attempted to reduce imports with its
non-flats products,
but that not achieved, since the unit cost of
production was more
than two and half times that of imported products. 117

Briefly examining other basic inputs policies, CONSIDER
wa s changed to deal also with non-ferrous metals, since
these

we re an important component of the PND II.

(Institutionally

CONSIDER became Conselho Nacional de Sideruraia

e

Nao Ferrosos .)

Of the goals stated in the National Program for the Development
of the Non-Ferrous Industry (PNDIMNF, Programa Nacional da

Industria de Minerals Nao Ferrosos

)

.

only a few were attained.

m
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Most of the objeotives were net
partially, aocording to the
oo.parison between goals and real
output in 1985, as shown in the
Table 4.10 below.

TABLE 4.10

PNDIMNF

1

s

objectives

for 1983
(a)

Aluminum
Copper
Lead
Zinc
Tin
Nickel
Sources:

(b)

1,315,
400
172
300,

000
000
000
000
21 000
24 000
,

,

,

,

a -

b -

Primary Metal
Production 1985
517 ,734
92 ,319

29,497
114 841
23 046
13 ,210
,

,

Programa Nacional de Desenvol yj ento da
Industrie~
de Metais Nao Ferrosos.
CDE II (Brasilia:
Servicos Graficos do IBGE, 1978), p. 27.
CONSIDER, calculated from January-August 1985
figures, by extrapolation.

Aluminum policy deserved the greatest attention since
international interests had their eyes on the Brazilian bauxite
reserves, unveiled in 1972.

At the same time, large scale

manufacturers were keen on tapping Brazilian cheap inputs of
electric energy, which accounts for more than 50 percent of the

production cost of aluminum.

Incentives and investment resources

were provided by Greater Carajas Program to mining projects on
the Eastern Amazon, and to hydroelectric power projects, both

needed to feed the industrial smelters of the region.

An

.
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analysis of the aluminum policy in
the Eastern Amazon will be
extended in conjunction with Tucurui
case-study (Chapter VI).

Reflecting the chaotic situation of
the state steel
sector and its use as gatherer of
foreign currency to solve
balance of payments problems, Siderbras
owed foreign creditors
US$ 7 billion and an additional US$
5 billion to Brazilian
creditors by 1985. Just in interest and
amortization payments on
the debt Siderbras annually disbursed
US$ 5.5 billion
recently,

contrasting with

a

sales revenues of US$ 3.7 billion.

As the

president of Siderbras, Amaro Lanari Junior, stated

Only 9 percent of Siderbras 's investment were
funded
out of the group's own resources in the 1970s.
The rest
is borrowed money. The government did not put
any money
into its steel industry. The companies just went out
and borrowed 11 °

Table 4.11 below shows how the sector used borrowing to

finance its projects, and how low steel prices effected poor

self-generated funds from sales of products.

In addition to the

financial question, the Brazilian state steel sector relinquished
its political autonomy when it was forced to agree an US-

established, US$ 700 million per year-limit of imported Brazilian
steel.

As a result of the accord, struck by the Minister of

Finance, Ernane Galveas, in 1984, the presidents of COSIPA,

Plinio Assmann, and of Acominas, Moacelio Mendes, were dismissed
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because they frankly opposed those
limits.

As Plinio Ass m ann

stated,

kT^

° f the 9 ove rmnent is not
limited to
rltrii
COSIPA, but also to the
suppliers, clients, creditors
G
and
c
mUnity
We have bothered tiose
who do nnV ant 9 S
and independent Brazilian
v
119
steel-making
sector.H?59

^

Si?

r

'

TABLE 4.11
BRAZIL

SIDERBRAS
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS,

SOURCES

SELF-GRTD
NSG
OtRes
GVT TRSRY
CRDT OPTS
Int
Ext

1980
-10
-10

1981
.

.

6
6

-26.
-31.

.

95 5%
.

2

1

-38
-57

1983
2

8

-18
-49

.

.

1

-51.

2

.

8

-43
-60

2

-54

17

1

3

.

6

17

1

3

6

1

133 8
28 .7
105 1

145
78
66

0
9
1

19 6
78 9
35 4
43 5

18
72
17

3

27

3

12

109. 9
21. 2
88 7

110

9

16.

.

36 2
74 7

1986

2

31. 5

9

1985

-43
-60

5

.

1984

3
8

19

4

15 0

1982

(%)

5

105. 8
48 7
57 1

9

.

.

2

9 .3

133

8

38
95

4
4

USES

CAP EXPTS
*invst
*amtzn
Int
Ext

Source:

87 8%
11. 3%
.

79

.

3

18.2
6.2
12

.

0

71. 8
26. 3
13 0
13 3
.

.

38
60
37
23

4
4
.

.

3
1

,

.

4
3

55. 1

SEST, Relatorio various
years. Siderbras, Relatorio various
years. Percentage from Total
Resources, excluded current
expenses. See Glossary, p. 199 and
Observation, p. 200 for explanation
on negative numbers.
,

4
.

19 6
78 9
34 5
44 4
.

.

'
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To resolve the question of
insolvency, the steel sector
has carefully considered debt/equity
swaps and privatization of
state steel-making firms as a way out
of its financial quandary.
The concept of national security
utilized in the 1940s to justify
production of steel by state-owned enterprises
no longer holds
for this sector, but turning to
privatization "can also mean its
demise. "120

D

.

Mining Policy and State Autonomy

Still other policy decisions worth analyzing in
light
of the state autonomy variable are those relating
to the mining

area.

The new 1967 Mining Code had the effect of attracting

firms to explore for minerals in the Amazon and to make

multinational and Brazilian firms alike disclose the existence of
vast mineral deposits in the Amazon.

decade (1974-79) the PND II

's

In the first part of the

mining policy emphasized mineral

development of the Amazon combined with the implementation of
other sectoral program such as cattle raising, wood
industrialization, energy and energy-intensive metallurgy.
Specifically, the PND II projected the development of the Eastern

Amazon Minero-Metallurgical Complex, the Serra do Carajas-Port of
Itaqui railroad, steel-making in the vicinities of the Port of
Itaqui (pellets plants)

,

and the bauxite-alumina-aluminum Complex

of the Trombetas and Belem areas.
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Up to the mid-1980s there was
an concentration of
multinational firms in the mining
sector in Brazil.
six

entrepreneurial groups (Shell-Billiton,
Nippon Amazon, Alcan,
Alcoa, Bethlehem, US Steel) which,
together with two state-owned
and two national private companies,
dominated more than 40
percent of the total value of mineral
production 12 1 Mineral
rights were concentrated too: only
fifteen large entrepreneurial
groups (six state-owned, four Brazilian
private and
.

five

multinational firms) controlled 38 percent
of the total
prospection and research areas. 122 Fifty
six percent of the
mining activity is geographically
concentrated

in the State of

Para. 123

In terms Qf capital and size

^

the economic power Qf

the companies is demonstrated by the fact
that 89 percent of the
mining firms registered have capital smaller
than US$ 173,500
and only 3.8 percent had capital higher than
US$ 1.73 million.

Only with the Figueiredo sexenio (1979-85), did
mining

policy achieve the highest priority among the governmental
policies and state enterprises action, as

a

result of the high

political cleavage in the development of Eastern Amazon.

Mining

policy primarily involved CVRD extraction activities on the

Trombetas Region and in the Serra dos Carajas bauxite deposits in

association with national and multinational firms.

The bauxite

mining policy is thoroughly discussed on Chapter VI.
But targeting the Trombetas bauxite component of the

mining policy was not nearly as important as privileging the

.
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Greater Carajas Program, in which
the Figueiredo government
placed great expectations for solving
the balance of payments
problems through exports of raw minerals
and semi-processed
metallurgical products. More than just
a chance to ameliorate
pressing macroeconomic problems, the
Figueiredo government saw in
Greater Carajas a grandiose development
project with high
political visibility and vast, manipulable
resources
that could

help Figueiredo sail through the longest
presidential period
since Vargas's Estado Novo (1937-45).
CVRD participated in the
major Carajas iron program in addition to ongoing
iron-ore
mining projects in the South Central Region, totalling
an output
of 63 million tons-year by 1980. 124

These CVRD's actions seemed minuscule in view of the

grandeur numbers of the Greater Carajas Program, shown below.
Its
analysis helps understanding the process of loss of autonomy in
most of the development projects in the Amazon region.

This

Program encompasses an area partially covered by the States of
Para, Goias, and Maranhao,

limited by the Amazon, the Xingu and

the Parnaiba Rivers, an area rich in iron-ore, manganese, nickel,
copper, bauxite, gold, cassiterite, silicium, as shown in Map 6.1

(Chapter VI)
In 1980, the Greater Carajas Program grew out of the

original Iron-Carajas Project

(

Proieto Ferro-Caraias

ore mining project under sole CVRD responsibility.

)

,

an iron-

As it can be

)
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TABLE

4

.

12

THE GREATER CARAJAS PROGRAM
Proi ects

Value (US$ billion)

Mining and Metallurgy
Agriculture
Cattle raising

28 1
.

8.1
1.7
1.3

Sub-total
Housing
Other Infrastructure Systems (railroad,
highways, ports.
.

.

Total

39.2
14

.

6

7.9
61.7

CVRD Amazonia Oriental - \j m Proneto Nacional
de Exportacao
(Rio de Janeiro, 1980) and
CVRD A mazonia Oriental - Piano Preliminar Hp
Desenvolvimento
(Rio de Janeiro, 1981)
Note:
it does not include Tucurui constructi
transmission and distribution costs.
,

'

r

observed in the chart above, the iron-ore program turned
into

a

full-scale regional development program with a specific
purpose
of exporting primary mineral and processed metallurgical

products.

According to Delfim Netto, the greatest national

chance to alleviate the problem of the external debt was Caraja

Program since,

When Carajas comes on line at full capacity, it will
represent an export value of US$ 9-10 billion per year.
It is a plus over normal export.
This means that the
export curve is going to be moved upward and make up a
space between the imports and the exports, thus
contributing to the trade balance. It is this surplus
that will allow us to diminish our deficit in current
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tne relative importance of the
external debt. 12 ^

Delfim's predictions were too optimistic.
The original
Iron-Carajas project under CVRD aegis
aimed at extracting
15/25/35 million tons-year by the years
1985/86/87 respectively,
and was valued at US$ 5.365 billion. 12 6
By 1985, US$ 1.9
billion had been spent in the project which
began exporting in 12
million tons in 1985. This iron-ore project
originated from the
discovery of iron deposits in the Serra dos
Carajas by the

Companhia Meridional de Mineracao

,

a US

Steel subsidiary, with an

estimated reserve of 45 billion tons of ore. 127

But the

existence of ore was repeatedly denied and US Steel
submitted
several research requests under Meridional's name and
several

other trusted employees, to circumvent the Mining Code
bylaws,

which before 1967 prohibited foreign companies to explore
Brazilian minerals.

Iron ore was known to have existed all

along, but the multinational corporation wanted to avoid

competition and keep the site as

a

strategic reserve. 128

CVRD depended heavily on Iron-Carajas for its expansion
and survival as an iron-ore exporter.

Minister Antonio Dias

Leite, of Mines and Energy, just before leaving the presidency of

CVRD (1967-69), negotiated the firm's association with Meridional

constituting AMZA

(

Amazonia Mineracao S.A.

)

in 1970,

enthusiastic

with the reserve estimates showing 18 billion tons of high grade
ore.

Initial projections indicated production beginning in 1978

]

.
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reaching 44 million ton-year by 1985.

The site was considered as

one of the best mines in the world
for its grade, location and
position with respect world markets,
in particular the United
States'*.
Despite CVRD being the majority stockholder
in the
joint-venture AMZA, US Steel controlled the
implementation pace
and the technology used.
Confrontations soon arose between CVRD
and US Steel about the means of transporting
iron ore, with US
Steel preferring railroad
so it could supply rails
over a
barge system on the Tocantins River preferred
by CVRD, as part of
its diversification program DOCENAVE) 129

—

—

(

CVRD and other Brazilian interests, linked to ports,
ship construction and capital goods industries, challenged
US
Steel at a moment in which it (US Steel) was already
losing

interest in the undertaking as

a

result of the worldwide

recession and decrease in steel sales.

decisions prompting

a

The American firm stalled

reaction by President Geisel, who stated

that the private sector, apparently responsible for implementing
the basic inputs projects, would receive governmental support

only

...as long as it did not systematic ally
procrastinat [e] for long years, the use of known
reserves of certain minerals of high national interest,
because interested groups are undefined, looking for an
adequate managerial solution through association
between private and government firms, if necessary. 130
[
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The confrontation between CVRD and
US Steel worsened,
causing US Steel to withdraw from AMZA
in 1977, receiving US$
50.3 million in compensation, although its
actual investment had
been only US$ 35 million. 131 Being an
inelastic product, that
is, price reduction will not promptly
increase the consumption of
iron ore, it is hard to understand why CVRD
would spend US$ 5.3
billion on a project if it were not to give
incentives to private
capital to invest heavily in the middle of a
particularly

unfavorable conjuncture for long range investment
decisions.
It
means that when confronted with a situation of high
uncertainties
the Brazilian government offered investors the possibility
of

transferring

a

priori to the tax payer the possible losses

incurred from investment in Carajas,

a

typical case of

socialization of losses and privatization of benefits. 132
In view of the US Steel withdrawal and since Carajas

was crucial to CVRD survival, CVRD strived to make the project
viable.

Carajas was scaled down and its duration extended.

As a

result of the re-evaluation of the Iron-Carajas Program and as

a

result of Delfim's economic policy, 133 CVRD elaborated the

Greater Carajas Program, privileging infrastructure,
transportation, energy investment and incentives as

a

catalyst

for other investment in the region. 134

Carajas' s dependence on the private sector's interests

was so great, that even

a

request to the World Bank

(International Reconstruction and Development Bank) for

a

US$

"
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304 million loan to finance

Ferr^rajas

was only granted with

the provision that CVRD would issue
"no less than US$ 250 mill ion
in debentures in the stock market."
The issuance of that stock
was done in lots, since only 15
percent of the CVRD was in
private hands. The first issue, equivalent
to US$ 80 million,

corresponded to 17 percent of CVRD
in 1982,

•

s

capital.

The second issue,

totalled US$ 80 million, which served,
according to the

president of CVRD, Eliezer Batista,

"to substitute the loss of

revenues equivalent to the sale of 10 million
tons at that
critical juncture of low prices. 13 5 immediately
after the
third issuance of stock, when total revenues had
reached US$ 181
million, the operation was called off since the risk
of losing

control was imminent.

However that stock market operation

meant more than just gathering money to investment: in May
1984,
the CVRD Vice-president Euclides Triches, then acting
president,
wrote

a

memo to the Minister of Finance asking for an emergency

US$ 20-million-purchase of CVRD stock by the Treasury, which was

dangerously reaching the 50 percent mark in private hands.
analogy if the 80 million corresponded to

By

percent of the

17

CVRD's capital then US$ 250 million corresponded to 53 1/8
percent, which would have caused the privatization of the state

mining company.

This issue was taken up by

Chamber Investigating Committee in 1985.

a

Joint Senate-

The controversy on the

issue of CVRD stock sales originated in the fact that the US$ 25C

million that would have been received from the sale of stock

accounted for

5

percent of the P^rrp^Caraias
Project.

How then

could the firm transfer 17 percent
of the company in exchange fo
5 percent of a single project ?
CVRD is worth much more
considering its mines, railroads,
port facilities, ships, and
dozens of subsidiaries in varied
areas.
its investigation was
continuously stalled by its president,
the former Minister Cesar
Cals then completing his Senatorial
term.
It could however be
detected that the stock market operations
had benefitted the
buyers.
The US$ 160 million in 1982 was worth
US$ 700 million b
the end of 1985, with more than half a
billion dollars in profit
with no risk.
It seems that the scheme functioned well,
since
the dividends distributed to the stockholders
increased seven
times from US$ 6 million in 1980 to US$ 44 million
in
1984,

in a

period marked by desperate search for funds. 136
Under adverse crisis conditions the Greater Carajas
Program was given the full support of the government and foreign
lenders,

including the multilateral World Bank due to the high

potential of controlling immense mineral resources in
area of the world.

a

strategi

In the absence of a PND Il-type of grandiose

project, the Carajas Program was the Figueiredo government's
"national, grandiose and systemic project." 137

Demonstrating

the intention of transferring Carajas to the private sector, the

Inter-Ministerial Council of the Greater Carajas Program,

presented

a

Minister Delfim Netto-signed Resolution obligating

CVRD to furnish "the terms and conditions for the sale of its
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rights over the copper, nickel
and m anganese m ines, in
the are a
of the Greater Carajas Program
so they could be developed
by
private enterprise
^*-j
rprise. "138 mu
Q
m
The National Security
Council stopped
the implementation of that
Resolution by informing CVRD
that the
mining of those minerals could
not be privatized since they
served national security interest.

Greater Carajas was the principal
program of the
Ministries of Mines and Energy and of
Planning during the
Figueiredo term, on a par with the
petroleum exploration program.
The Minister of Mines and Energy,
Cesar Cals, expected that this
"most charming project- would need
expenditures totalling US$ 60
billion in 20 years, with the Brazilian
state's provision of
infrastructure for production.
All these developments were possible with
the

completion of infrastructure projects:

i)

-

the port facilities

at Vila do Conde (Belem, PA) and at Ponta da
Madeira/Itaqui
ii)

iii)

,

MA;

the 550-mile railroad Cara jas-Ponta da Madeira/Itaqui;

-

the Tucurui Hydroelectric Plant.

and

In spite of all these

developments no real action has been taken to curb or to control
mining on Native Indian Reserves.

The Congress will increasingly

fill this gap with debates over this mounting problem

—

important item in the agenda from the late 1980s on. 139

an

1
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TABLE 4.13
BRAZIL
CVRD
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS,

SOURCES
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±y o
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SELF-GRTD 72 9
NSG
72.9
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.

i

1982

1983
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56. 6

68 4
33 4
34 9
.

44 5

.

28.3
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.

4

.

9
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7
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6

23 1

33 5

.
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18.4

8.7

7.8

20 4
9.2

.

2

34

4

25. 7

11.2

4

81.5

88 0

12

15.6
7.8
7.8

75.1
18.9

55. 8
16 5
1.4
15. 1

.

.

2

.

14

.

.

.

USES
CAP EXPTS
*invst
66.4
*amtzn
20.7
Int
* Ext

Source

90

.

9

4

.

9

0.5
4.4

88

.

7.9
2

.

8

5.1

.

5

5.2
7

.

3

.

4

.

6

14

.

3

.

SEST, Relatorio, various years. CVRD,
Relatorio, various years. Percentage from
Total Resources, excluded current expenses.
See Glossary, p. 199 and Observation, p. 200
for explanation on negative numbers.
'

E.

Implications and Conclusions

The period of 1974-1985 was undoubtedly marked by the

attempt to implement grandiose development projects in the areas

analyzed above based on empirical data.

The importance of each

state sector varied in terms
of both political and
financial
autonomy, the variables proposed
for analysis.
The energy sector, including
electric energy, nuclear
and petroleum, was in those
years of growth cum debt the
most
important, both in political and
economic terms:
it absorbed
more than 50 percent of all state
investment in the period of
1974-85, and reached the impressive
mark of three out of every
four dollars spent by the state,
in 1976.
The growth of all state enterprises
during the growth
cum repression years, their political
insulation and their
financial capabilities have allowed their
use as providers of 1 ow
cost inputs for the good performance
of the consumer and durabl e
goods industries, and therefore for the
advancement
of a form of

associated capitalism in Brazil.

Policy-making in that period

was more autonomous vis-a-vis societal
interests and demands.
In contrast, during the growth cum debt
period, having

accepted the role of policy instruments

—

by being incited to

pursue grandiose developments objectives and at the same
time to
serve as "captors of foreign savings" (using the official

jargon)

,

state enterprises, with some exceptions, incurred in the

error of relinquishing their financial autonomy to those

responsible for administering the economy
Finance and the Secretary of Planning

institutions within Brazil and abroad.

—

—

the Ministry of

and to credit
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TABLE 4.14

DISTRIBUTION OF STATE ENTERPRISE
INVESTMENT
Selected Years f%)

Enterprises

1976

Eletrobras/Itaipu
Petrobras
Siderbras
Telebras
CVRD
Transportation

1980

1985

47.7
25.9

25.5/7.9

22.4

19 2

12

29 5

18.5
9.0

.

5

3.5
7.6
2

.

1

.

.

4

.

6

4

.

3

12 8
12 6

14

.

3

5.3

.

.

iiivebuient calculated f
m
v.i
.
i
Table
- State Entrepreneurial
4.3
Group
investment; and SEST, Relatorio d* Avaliar.An
1yo5~6

.

On the other hand, political power continued
virtually

unchanged, though not evenly distributed through
the state

enterprises.

While energy state enterprises took on

a

new

dimension in the Brazilian political structure, their
interests
were heavily articulated with the services and equipment
supplied
by the private sector or linked to military objectives, such
as
in the case of nuclear energy and Itaipu,

state enterprises in

the transportation, steel-making or even mining sectors

continuously lost their political autonomy, as we have seen.
Even if that articulation meant mutual reinforcing of political
power, the state enterprises of the energy sector have seen their

autonomy ultimately cut short.
In the years between 1975 and 1979 all state companies

experienced growth, not uniformly distributed as it can be seen
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in Tables

4

and

Between 1979 and 1982, despite
signs of
deep macroeconomic imbalances,
expenditures of some sectors
continued growing above the limits
imposed by SEST, mainly
because of the state sector's
"anxious desire to spend" and the
inability of the central government
to control their autonomy in
spending. 140 state sectors continued
to import equipment and
were forced by the central state to
take loans in the
international financial community to solve
balance of payments
problems in critical periods during the
1974-1984 period, as
.

3

mentioned before.

4

.

4

.

Therefore, their investments in development

projects have remained in

a

peculiar "spinning wheel"-situation

as "new investments are needed every year
and the projects seem
to remain in the same stage as the year
before," as was stated by
a high official. 141

The crisis of the state enterprises, their

indebtedness, their financial quandaries and their administrative

disarray coexisted with the crisis of the authoritarian-

exclusionary regime.

By 1982 the central question was how to

enforce control over the spending of the state enterprises -over both uses and sources.

As Luiz Gonzaga Belluzzo stated,

When formulating their expansion programs, public
enterprises try to take into account, naturally, their
private objectives. Thus, for example, in placing
equipment orders there is no preoccupation with
directing purchases to the internal market to stimulate
the development of firms in the capital goods sector or
to save foreign exchange in the face of the grave
situation of the Balance of Payments. In this sense,
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the more modern firms of thp
secto^escape from the

.

n

poSSiSl^^

State autonomy thus, has

a

.

,

dual component.

When the
central state tries to control its own
agencies, limiting their
autonomy in deciding policies, programs
and projects
which
includes both political and managerial
autonomy
we have one
type of state autonomy which may be depicted
as

~

-

internal state

autonomy

On the other hand, when the forces of
society

.

—

private entrepreneurs, commercial banks, labor,
political parties
and other social groups
influence the policy-making process
to convey their idiosyncratic interests
we confront

—

—

external state autonomy type.

the

With respect to the first, Baer

argued that

issues of control suggest that central government
use of state firms for macroeconomic programs even if
such uses are well conceived, is likely to be
foredoomed. 143
.

.

.

The political component seems to have been equally

important, to say the least.

The largest number of the grandiose

projects in execution by 1985 were planned and initiated in
earlier military presidential terms.

Having in mind that the

transition from one military presidential term to another was
supposedly a natural process, without abrupt changes, the new

governments were repeatedly cautious as to where and how to cut

spending on these grandiose development
projects, in order to
maintain political support for its
own projects.
At the same
time the international dimension
also played an important role:
m ° St ° f thS lo ^-^™> large-scale
development projects were the
result of schemes involving powerful
financial institutions
abroad, bilateral agreements between
governments and supply
contracts with multinational firms.
All of these contracts were
very difficult to dishonor.
Therefore, considering that the syndrome
of "Brazil
Emerging Power" is a malaise transmitted
along with the

presidential ribbon, in such
in power could,

a

-

way that the general-president

even if they unwillingly inherited an
impressive

legacy of development projects, find resources
and find specific
areas in which new, politically highly visible,
grandiose

projects were started.
Angra

I

The Rio and Sao Paulo Metro Systems, and

were planned in Costa e Silva's period, but began

operating partially in Figueiredo'

s

period.

Geisel received fro

Medici the responsibility to implement Itaipu

—

which resulted

from a convoluted military/diplomatic agreement between Brazil

and Paraguay

—

and the Steel Railway, which he passed along to

Figueiredo added to Tucurui, the Nuclear Program, the Stage III
of the Steel Plan plus Acominas and Tubarao.

Figueiredo, despit

being empowered in a juncture of economic crisis and having to

maintain investments in Itaipu and Tucurui, did not fail the
tradition inherited from his predecessors.

Figueiredo left the
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government with

a

Telecommunications Program costing
US$ 6.6
billion, the continued Nuclear
Program (Angra III and

Peruibe/lguape I), the Parallel
Nuclear Program,
Albras/Alunorte, the Petroleum Off-Shore
Program costing US$ 7.7
billion, and the installation of
equipment

at Itaipu and Tucurui.

It was,

indeed, very difficult to control
the "anxious
desire to spend." By 1983, the
National Information Service

was called in to control state
enterprise spending
but to no avail.
Not even the SNI could force the
abandonment
of unnecessary projects at the half-way
point.
As was stated by
a Seplan official,
(SNI)

The shot can backfire [referring to SNI
control]
The
agent designated can become its ally, as
happened with
many trusted comptrollers placed by Delfim. 144

Although state enterprises have maintained

a

certain

degree of relative state autonomy in the political arena,
in
general, their managerial-financial autonomy was gradually
eroded
by the progressive need to borrow to finance projects and to

cover balance of payment holes, by the use of certain prices and

tariffs to stem inflation (see Table 4.7), by the gradual
implanting of control mechanism over financial resources and

investment plans, and by contracts requiring imported equipment.
The creation of SEST in 1979 has contributed to the

question of control.

SEST's concern with reducing the budget

deficit was politically .ore
successful with the agencies
performing "typical" government
functions

(social security,

medical assistance, health, education,
food supply) during^e
first half of the 1980s than it
was with the so-called
productive
state enterprises we have analyzed.
Even if created to control
them, BEST'S political power was
insufficient to extract reliable
and accurate information from the
productive state enterprises.
In summary, the decade was
characterized
by a gradual

lessening of security concerns and
underdevelopment.

a

gradual striving to overcome

That is, less people in prison for
political

reasons, amnesty, elections of governors,

a

"new syndicalism,"

creation of new political parties, transition
to a less
authoritarian (or to a democratic possibility)
occupied the
political scene of the decade. On the distribution

question,

labor and the Brazilian private sector continuously
voiced their
discontent as regards the policies pursued and
raised demands of

their own.
While Geisel began his term with the motto "a maximum
of development with a minimum of security,"

—

what seemed an

apparent continuation of the high relative state autonomy and
insulation of the preceding terms --, in the eleven years that
followed what could be observed was an increasing loss of

relative state autonomy.

Against the background of increasing

demands from various groups in society (labor unions, private
entrepreneurs, parties, hard-line military), the authoritarian

.
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regime gradually lost its control
over political power to a
moderate civilian coalition, under
the leadership of Tancredo
Neves
The question of control of
development projects and
state sector policy was not, as of
the early 1980s, one of
controlling but rather the government's
inability
or

unwillingness to reconcile internal
political variables with
international economic variables, the combined
effect

of which

provoked an unprecedented crisis.

within the state, part of the

technocracy withdrew their support to the
military regime,
resulting in the contradictory effect of using

state enterprises

as policy instruments for government objectives.

in the first

place, the state enterprises resisted government
directives on

price controls;

secondly, the use of state enterprises to obtain

loans abroad to "roll-over" interests and principal
was always

denounced. The outcome of this government policy was that
state

enterprises tended to behave as private companies, due to their
structural dual nature, in particular those with politically

highly visible and financially salient projects such as Itaipu
Binacional and Eletrobras/Eletronorte
in the next chapters.

s

Tucurui, which we analyze

TABLE 4.15

BRAZIL
ALL STATE ENTERPRISES
USES AND SOURCES OF FUNDS,
PERCENTAGES

SOURCES

CREDIT OPERATIONS
INTERNAL

EXTL

&

RES.

63

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

15

29

36

21

34

20

114*

71

64

81

66

80

USES

CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
AMORTIZATIONS
Int '°PExt .Op. &Res. 63

"

42
58

33
67

21

m

77

68

27

26

73

74

19
81

22
66

25
75

25
70

25
75

31
69

CURRENTS EXPENSES
FINANCE CHARGES
Int. Op.
Ext. Op. &Res. 63

Sources:

SEST Relatorios, various years. State
Enterprises
Reports, various years.* Overborrowing, Cf.
Banco
Central do Brasil, Boletim AnuaJ
1981.
f
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CHAPTER V

BINATI0NAL ITAIPU
mt^1
MILITARY POLITICAL POWER,HYDRO-POWER

PROJECT
DEVELOPMENT POLICY
AND INSULATED POLICY-MAKING

Having analyzed the energy,
industrial and mining
policies for the decade 1974-1985,
we now turn

to the first of

the two specific case-studies.

This study reconstructs the
basic

pattern of interest articulation
that has marked the formation,
decision and adoption of this development
project.

The analysis

focuses on the specific political
mechanisms through which
bureaucratic and military power were
translated into political
power and control of policy-making in
this specific development
endeavor:
the binational Itaipu Hydro-power
Project.
As seen in Chapter II, policy-making
efforts in semi-

peripheral societies like Brazil are characterized
by imperatives
of capitalist development and by
particular categories
of

political domination.

This study is

a

case of the development of

capitalism and of state intervention in the sphere of
the
economy, as well as demonstrating some characteristic

patterns of

behavior on the part of the bloc-in-power and state bureaucracy.
The decision to build Itaipu was taken by authoritarian
regimes
of both Brazil and Paraguay which favored specific fragments
of

the dominant classes of both countries.

Brazilian and Paraguayan

ruling elites shared common beliefs, socialization 1 and strived
to weave the same affinities between the authoritarian265

.

266

bureaucratic regime and dominant
classes.

The Itaipu case-study

is a policy-making and
implementation show-case for the
internal

political and economic dynamics of
the two countries involved and
it has an international dimension
as well.
As seen in Chapter
II, the central variable state
autonomy is to be investigated
not only within the confines of
national boundaries.
As also

mentioned on Chapter II, the political
contexts within which the
policy-making process takes place involve the
agency-sonify
context (electrical sector agencies, actors,
interests), the

politico-institutional context (an insulated, repressive
regime,
or a more liberalized one), and the international
relations
context (Brazil's political, economic and strategic
position with
respect to other Southern Cone countries)

A-s

1

•

The Bac kground of the Binational Project

Economic and Technical Aspects

The River Plate Basin, formed by the Parana River, is

among the five largest river basins in the world, and is the

second largest in the Western Hemisphere, after the Amazon
Basin.

2

The Basin covers an area of 5.18 million square

kilometers (1.98 million square miles) involving five countries,
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.

The most

developed economically in South America, this region contains

a

1

MAP

5

.

PARANA RIVER BASIN REGION
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population of 178.12 million, according to
a 1985 estimate.
Forty six percent of the Basin is in
Brazilian territory, 31
percent in Argentina, 13 percent is Paraguayan,
and the remainder
is equally divided between Bolivia and
Uruguay.
The Brazilian
portion of the Basin is comprised by the more
industrialized
states of Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro
and Parana and
by the Center-West and South regions.
in Argentina, the Parana
river cuts across Misiones, Corrientes, Santa Fe and Buenos
Aires
provinces where 60 percent of Argentineans live. These four

provinces account for 85 percent the economic activity of
Argentina.

3

Paraguay's population is concentrated to the West

around the capital, Asuncion, at the margins of the Paraguay
River.

Table 5.1 contrasts the Basin's countries, in terms of

showing the overwhelming strength of Brazil and Argentina over
more modest neighbors.
From the source of its largest tributary (see map 5.1)
the Parana River flows 4,500 kilometers (2,800 miles)

southwesterly before joining the Uruguay River, forming the
estuary River Plate between Argentina and Uruguay.

tributaries in Brazil
Iguacu

—

—

Its principal

Grande, Paranaiba, Tiete, Paranapanema

flow East to West.

The Parana River flows South to

where Paraguay and the Brazilian States of Mato Grosso do Sul and
Parana meet, forming the 200 kilometers of the Brazil-Paraguay
border,

from Salto Grande de Guaira to Foz do Iguacu.

In this

Guaira Canyon, with deep embankments, the Parana dropped more

272

TABLE 5.1

PARANA BASIN COUNTRIES
ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 1985

Population
GDP
million
US$ 1,000

Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Paraguay
Uruguay
TOTALS
Source:

30.56
6.43

60, 251

134 51
3 69

249, 137
6, 559
6, 473

1971
840
1852
1777
2208

5,403

.

.

2

GDP/capita
Energy
US$
Consumption

.93

178 12

327823

.

*

49.2
1.8
93 6
.

0.6
2.7

1840

GDP, GDP per capita: IDB, Economic and Social Progress
in Latin America
1986 Report, Table 3, p. 394.
Energy Consumption: UN Statistical Yearbook 1980;
* - in million metric tons of coal eguivalent.
Population: IDB, 1986 Report Country Summaries.
.

.

.

than 120 meters in 170 kilometers and formed the huge hydro-

power potential where it is joined by Acaray River from Paraguay
in the West and Iguacu River from Brazil in the eastern side.

From there, the Parana River flows between Paraguay and Argentina
until it meets with Paraguay River
the Brazilian State of Mato Grosso.

—

a

river also originated in

After that point the Parana

flows entirely in Argentine territory until it meets, at the
delta, with the Uruguay River forming the River Plate Estuary.

The Uruguay River also has its source in the Brazilian State of
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Santa Catarina and flows southwesterly
successively forming
Brazil-Argentina and Uruguay-Argentina borders.
The Parana River Basin hydro-power potential
is

estimated to be 40,000 MW (or three and half times the
Itaipu
output), upstream of and downstream from Itaipu.
Map

5.2 shows

the existing power plants above Itaipu.

facts combined to create

a

Geography and historical

growing concern with the role that

hydropower potential could play in the regional economy of the
Basin's countries.
a

Paraguay, although capable of absorbing only

small fraction that potential, became the principal beneficiary

from the huge potential of the Parana River.

Paraguay benefitted

from the indivisible nature of water as a resource
pool public good.

—

a

common-

Paraguay and Brazil jointly built the Itaipu

plant and Paraguay and Argentina are building Yacyreta and Corpus
power plants.
By 1987 Itaipu Hydro-power plant was generating half of
its 12,600 MW

(or 72,000 GWhour/year 4

)

,

with its completion

planned for 1991, when the last of the eighteen 700 MW-turbines
will be installed.

Itaipu, constructed between 1973 and 1985,

is the largest hydropower plant in the world followed by Grand

Coulee (USA)
(USSR)

,

,

Guri (Venezuela)

,

Churchill Falls (Canada)

Tucurui (Brazil)
,

Complex (Brazil), Asswan (Egypt).

,

Krasnoyarsk

Paulo Afonso and Ilha Solteira
From Guaira, where the

magnificent Sete Quedas Falls are now submerged, to Itaipu, the
Parana River drops 120 meters in just 170 kilometers, which makes

.
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possible such

a

potency (see Figure 5.3).

The dam was built on

Itaipu Island ("the stone that sings" in Tupi-Guarany

kilometers (12 miles) from the Argentine border and

kilometers

(8

miles)

)

located 20

14

from the Friendship Bridge, on the road

linking Asuncion to Paranagua,

a

port on the Atlantic Ocean.

construction consumed around US$ 20 billion

—

The

there included

direct investment, interest, and transmission lines and

a few

billion more in other expenses in the region.

It is by far the

most expensive single project in Latin America.

5

The Paraguayan-Argentine Yacyreta, near Encarnacion,

will operate with thirty turbines of 135 MW producing 4,050 MW
and an annual generation of 19,000 GWhour/year when finished in
1994.

6

Although in the initial planning phase due to persisting

financial quandaries of the 1980s, Corpus is estimated to

generate 4,400 MW.

Other binational dams in the Uruguay River

are Salto Grande Hydro-power Plant

project --, and Garabi,

a

—

an Argentine-Uruguayan

medium size power plant under joint

Argentine-Brazil ian construction
Because Brazil's energy frequency is sixty cycles per

second and Paraguay's fifty -- as the rest of South America
nine turbines will generate at 50 and nine at 60 cycles.

Paraguay now only uses about

2

—

Since

percent of Itaipu 's energy, the

surplus energy is sold back to Brazil through

a 50-Hz

direct

current circuit which is transformed to 60 cycles (alternate
current) near Sao Paulo, where it enters in the regional grid.

2
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Itaipu's energy supplied 20 percent of
electric power consumption
needs in 1987 (residential, industrial,
commercial use) in the
South, Southeast and Center-West Regions,
where more than 70
percent of Brazilian GDP is produced and more
than 60 percent of
the population, and 81.5 percent of total
energy consumption in
7
Brazil.
Table 5.2 depicts regional disparities
of the

Brazilian energy market

.

TABLE

5

.

ELECTRIC ENERGY CONSUMPTION
BRAZILIAN MARKET, 1986 (GW-HOUR)

Regions

North

Northeast

Southeast/
Center-West/
South

Consumption
Residential
Industrial
Other*

TOTAL
Source:

1,

517
865
1,811

4

,

5,

12

,

9, 194

23

BRAZIL

399
998
5,754

29 148
79, 553
34 639

98,417

151

143 340

175, 685

,

,

,

,

35 064
,

42 204
,

Estimates used in the Eletrobras, Piano de
Recuperacao do Setor de Enerqia
Eletrica 1985.
* Obs.
includes commercial, rural, public street
ilumination, use for water and sewage treatment,
temporary use on construction site, irrigation.
.

2
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Political and Diplomatic Background

General issimo Alfredo Stroessner has ruled Paraguay

since 1954, when he seized power in

a

coup d'etat.

Every five
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years he is re-elected in an election
that resembles the caudillo
rule of his Latin American predecessors.
in a few years he
gained political control of the Army and the
Colorado

Party, thus

assuring that all positions of command and
of political power
were appointed by him, and dominating these
two powerful
bureaucracies.

His regime is based on

8

a

system of personal

rule, distributing privileges and deriving power
and support from

different groups.

The military are deeply involved in the

smuggling of whiskey, electronic equipment, cattle, vehicles
(180,000 cars, trucks and pick-ups are stolen yearly in Brazil

and taken to Paraguay, according to the Contraband Control Agency
of Brazil's Ministry of Finance).

Stroessner rule created

a

class of powerful, Mafia-like businessmen who arbitrate import
and export licenses among themselves and the military in a

country with

a

virtually non-existent middle class.

Small

farmers and peasants have gained little under Stroessner, except
from the fact that he manipulates on specific occasions their

nationalist support.

Civil servants are corrupt and incompetent

in general.

Brazilian President Kubistchek and Alfredo Stroessner

were responsible for the rapprochement of both countries, whose

relations were soured by the Triple Alliance War (1865-1870)

9

and by decades of Paraguay's economic and cultural dependence on

Argentina.

Stroessner had been trained in Brazilian military

schools beginning in 1943, and his training included the Superior
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School of War later.

Even before he seized power, Stroessner

criticized Paraguay's dependence on Argentina,
and to change
that, after he seized power, he named Paraguay's
Ambassador to
Brazil, Raul Sapena Pastor, as his Foreign
Relations Minister

with the specific task of opening "a new Brazilian
economic lung"
through which Paraguay could breathe economically.
In the early 1960s,

in view of the rapidly

industrializing Southeast/South regions

's

demand for energy,

Brazil's pressing needs for energy forced it to come close to
Paraguay.

The Urubupunga Complex on the Parana River (Jupia,

Ilha Solteira and Tres Irmaos dams,

finished in 1973) was started

during Janio Quadros's term as Governor of Sao Paulo (1955-59),
and in Quadros's scant 7-month presidency (1961)

future studies

were recommended by the newly created electric power agencies,
the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) and Eletrobras.

Later

under the Goulart presidency (1961-1964), the consulting firm of

Octavio Marcondes Ferraz was hired to perform
Parana's potential.

a

study of the

Marcondes Ferraz recommended

a

60-kilometer

channel before the Sete Quedas which would divert the river into

Brazilian territory, making possible the construction of

a

totally Brazilian hydropower plant, thus avoiding the problems
lingering from limits demarcated by the 1872 Treaty, re-examined
in 1927.

After Goulart'

s

Minister of Mines and Energy, Oliveira

Brito, went to Asuncion stirring protests by the Paraguayan

elites Brazilians came to realize that the river could only be

s
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used to mutual advantage and with previous consent. 10

Paraguayans fears were meaningless since Goulart was
overthrown

a

few months after and Brazil-Paraguay relation
with respect to

Itaipu changed substantially.
In 1965,

fears of Brazilian imperialism in the region

were exacerbated when

a

Brazilian platoon occupied

a

small strip

of land near the Sete Quedas Falls, which previous treaties
had

not defined, and which was

a

source of diplomatic problems,

influencing the very use of the hydroelectric potential of the
river. 11

Brazil's awareness of the wealth in the waters of the

Parana River in the Guaira Canyon and of its importance for the

country's development, made the military regime stage that

muscle-flexing exercise.

Although the question of limits had

already been settled by the Goulart-Stroessner January 1964

meeting in the State of Mato Grosso, the new military regime
acted as if it was overlooking that diplomatic agreement between
two heads of state.

Even though the study commissioned by Quadros

'

Minister of Mines and Energy, Joao Agripino, and the Octavio
Marcondes Ferraz study commissioned by Goulart 's Mines and Energy
Minister, Oliveira Brito, spoke of more than 10,000 MW potential

with the lowest cost of hydroelectric energy ever achieved in the
world, 12 the Paraguayans insisted that nothing be done until
final demarcation of the most important of the seven falls (the
fifth)

.

Therefore the military muscle flexing in fact weakened
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the Brazilian position, only demonstrating
that there were
problems of limits." The impasse was set:
Brazilians were

convinced of the ownership of Sete Quedas while
Paraguay insisted
on a definitive demarcation of the area before
anything was
decided.

Apparently the incident of the occupation was
unimportant, just serving to see how far Paraguay would go in
the
case of a military solution.

Counterattacking, the Paraguayan rhetoric increased.

Stroessner's

1

April 1965 speech in the Assembly,

though

reinforcing Paraguayan will to negotiate, inflamed spirits even
further.

The Brazilian Embassy was attacked, a Brazilian flag

burned and students demanded the Brazilian Military and Cultural

Mission to leave Asuncion.

That year of 1965 was particularly

meaningful to the Paraguayans as the centennial of the National
Epic Journey
Paraguay)

(

Epopeva Nacional

—

the Triple Alliance War against

was being celebrated, so that the invasion stirred

deep-rooted sentiments.
In late 1965, General Golbery do Couto e Silva, then

head of the SNI, went to Asuncion to meet Stroessner about the
Sete Quedas issue, a question he mastered as he had been

a

skilled strategist for the military and taught it at the Superior
School of War and written

a

book on the issue. 14

The special

envoy of the Brazilian government tried to change the bad image
left by the military occupation and the foreign policy towards
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Paraguay implemented by the Brazilian
Ministry of Foreign
Relations ( Itamaraty ) then headed by General
Juraci Magalhaes.
Golbery tried to negotiate a settlement of
joint development of
the Parana river if Paraguay would accept
Brazil's rights to the
Sete Quedas.15 Evidently the Paraguayans
denied the Brazilian
claim to Sete Quedas or to the Salto Grande de
Guaira, arguing
that historically the Luzo-Braz il ians had always
played
,

cartographic expansionism. 16

The fact that Brazil and Paraguay

sent troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965 did not
contribute
to remove the basic diplomatic, economic, and political
deadlock:

the tremendous importance of the water in the Guaira Canyon.

For

the Brazilian strategic and diplomatic interests, the solution to

the Sete Quedas question represented

a

steady source of much

needed renewable energy for the Southeast/South regions.

For

Paraguay, above and beyond the decisive economic meaning of

generating considerable income from the sale of energy, it could
also benefit Stroessner politically as he could maneuver the

impoverished peasants for nationalist causes against the

imperialistic Brazilian stances discharging their frustrations
not against the local oligarchy but rather on

responsible for their plight.

a

foreign aggressor

.
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The Itaipu Decision: AcnnminnH atina P.r.g.Mv.n,

Argentine

a nd_Jj

mL

mj^nti^^

Strategic Int.prp^ c

The decision-making process about the
tapping of the
Parana potential took several more years
to materialize, roughly
from 1966 to 1973 and it involved the
participation of several
actors, namely the ruling military forces of
Brazil, Paraguay,
and Argentina, (all three under military-authoritarian
regimes
during that period)
the diplomatic circles and the economic
,

elites

1-

Paraguayan-Brazilian Joint Decision-Maki

In June 1966,

the Brazilian and Paraguayan Ministers of

Foreign Relations met and signed the Accord of the Cataracts
(Ata das Cataratas or Acta de Iguazu

)

whose main accomplishment

was the establishment of the common property of the waters

between Guaira and Foz do Iguacu and the equal division of the
electric energy, including the preferential right to buy back the
same energy for

a

fair price. 17

Although conceding to Argentina's interest "to study
the common problems of the region" 18 in the upcoming Meeting of

Chancellors of the Plate Basin Countries, Brazil and Paraguay in
fact alienated Argentine support for the endeavor by adding, in

separate note, that the excess energy would be first offered to

a

.

,
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the other signatory before being
offered to any other country.
In this way the dispute over limits
seemed superseded
by the recognition of the Parana River
waters as a common-pool
resource, what contributed to the completion
of the Itaipu
Treaty.
The situation required a novel solution
to common-pool
goods in which a less efficient use of the
Parana River or a use

which encroached on second or third-party rights
were to be
avoided
In the following act,

then Brazilian Ambassador to

Asuncion, Gibson Barbosa, and Chancellor Sapena Pastor

established

Joint Technical Commission

a

Brasileiro-Paraguaia

)

Comissao Mista Tecnica

to study the economic, technical and legal

feasibility of the endeavor.
in May 1967,

(

Although the Commission was staffed

it was not until the early 1970s that serious

studies began.

The Brazilian representative was General Amyr

Borges Fortes, later nominated for the Administrative Council of

Itaipu Binacional company, and the Paraguayan representative was
the president of ANDE

(

Administracion Nacional de Electricidad

Engineer Enzo Debernardi,
from each country)

,

^

(together with three other specialists

which demonstrated the Brazilian military

preoccupation with security and development.
However only after Medici took office (in October 1969)
did the project take off.

Medici nominated Gibson Barbosa as his

Minister of Foreign Relations and Jose Costa Cavalcanti was
shifted form the Ministry of Mines and Energy (1967-1970) to be
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Medici Minister of the Interior

-

the agency in charge of

regional and frontiers development, to
which. Itaipu fit
perfectly.
Only then Eletrobras and ANDE signed
a protocol
designating an Executive Committee with
powers to contract
feasibility studies with foreign engineering
consulting firms.

^

The 1971 Partial Report showed that more
than 50 sites
in the Canyon were feasible for the
construction of the project.
One of the two main alternatives considered
building a single dam
at the Itaipu site, while the second recommended
the building of
two dams
one at the Santa Maria Rapids, using the 60 meters

—

fall from the Sete Quedas Falls,

and a second dam near Itaipu,

with another 60 meter fall. 20

According to an electric power sector official, one of
the technical staff at the Treaty of Itaipu, the second

alternative, though providing more output per unit cost, had the

political disadvantage of dispersing resources.

This

alternative would require more firms executing the civil works,
and contractors were not willing to transfer part of their

potential profits to other firms. Since the engineers at the

Executive Committee and their counterparts in the private sector
(mainly the engineers within it) wanted Itaipu to be the "project
of the century" the single dam alternative was chosen.

engineers bunch wanted it!" ("A enqenheirada quis!"

)

"The

was

mentioned by an electric sector official used to mean not only
that the technical aspects were considered but the financial and

1.
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technical aspects as well of performing

With two power plants the contractors
smaller.

2

*

'

s

a

grandiose project.

profits would have been

2

Argentina-Brazil Relations and Itai u Decision-Making.
19f^p

Brazil and Argentina have historically been rivals
in
the Parana Basin.

Their Armed Forces have been suspicious and

tried to outwit each other for decades.

In the 1960s, when

Argentina's economy lost its primacy to the Brazilian economy
the
relations between them soured.

Brazil came to replace Argentina

as the supplier of economic, cultural and military assistance
to

the smaller countries of the area.
The Itaipu project only exacerbated that trend.

Increased Brazilian activism in the region, specifically with the

common-pool waters of the Parana River fueled Argentina protests
and suspicions of Brazil's strategic interest in the area, namely
to secure Paraguayan and Bolivian (and to

a

lesser extent,

Uruguayan) markets for Brazilian manufactured goods and services,
as well as aiding their Armed Forces with training and

equipment 22
Right after the Foreign Relations Ministers

's

Meeting

in Buenos Aires in February 1967, Argentina repeatedly diverged

with respect the use of the Parana waters.

As the downstream

country, Argentina proposed the establishment of certain
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principles by which Argentine rights would
be secured.
has favored the attainment of a global
solution, that
tripartite accord reconciling the interests

of Brazil,

and Argentina.

Argentina
is,

a

Paraguay

Argentina's main concern, right after the

signature of the Ata da Cataratas was better
depicted as being

a

protective move against eventual unilateral
utilization
of those resources by Brazil which could
impair
its own
use [Argentina's] ."23

Despite public protest

and enraged attacks by

extremist reactionary Admiral Isaac Rojas and newspapers
staging
a

public anti-Brazilian campaign;

EL Clarin (30 September 1968)

mentioned that the river navigation would be seriously affected,
water pollution from factories installed along the river would
reach Buenos Aires, the Port of Rosario would have to stop its

activities and even the waves from the turbines would affect
Argentina, probably flooding would occur.

worked with more reasonable arguments.

Argentine diplomacy

They defended the

principle of prior consultation in order to evaluate possible
inadvertent flooding on another riparian country.

In the Salto

Grande Accord (the hydropower plant built on the Uruguay River

between Argentina and Uruguay)

,

Brazil was brought in to agree to

prior consultation with those downstream countries in cases which
might cause severe damages. 24

.
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Such was not the case with Parana
River, however.

Brazil was opposed to the principle of
prior consultation because
Brazil was pressed to use this energy
source (93 percent of the
electric power generated is hydraulic 2 *)
in order to meet a
growing demand derived from rapid industrialization.
Moreover
the military strategic interest of security
and eventually

making Paraguay

a

buffer zone

—

likewise Uruguay

—

was

paramount 26
For Brazil the principle of indivisibility of water

resources existed only for countries sharing common borderwaters, as was the case between Brazil and Paraguay, Argentina
and Paraguay in the Parana River, and Argentina and Uruguay

the Uruguay River.

in

If Brazil had accepted the principle of

indivisibility of shared resources and prior consultation, Brazil

would have relinquished its sovereignty and granted Argentina

a

veto power over any Brazilian action with respect that resource,
over and above the cases of negative spillovers.

The fact of a

sudden drop in the volume of waters in the Iguacu Falls caused by
the diversion of the river to build Jupia and Ilha Solteira in
1968, prompted the Argentineans to press their case further.

Between 1969 and 1973

a

convoluted diplomatic and legal

dispute over the controversial issue took place. 27

Stroessner

continued to play his pendulum diplomacy 28 having been to Buenos

Aires to talk with Argentine president Alejandro Lanusse about
Yacyreta and Corpus, which provoked even further Argentine
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resentment.

At stake was Argentina's historical
influence over
Paraguay and a struggle over hegemony in
the region.
itaipu (or
a dan to be built between Brazil
and Paraguay as it was not yet
decided) represented the way in which Brazil
asserted its

hegemonic ambitions. 29
The 1971 Declaration of Asuncion and
additional

documents of the Coordinating Committee, signed
by the
Chancellors of the Parana Basin Countries reinforced
Brazilian
positions of applying the principle of prior consultation
only

for contiguous jurisdiction cases and the principle
of avoiding

"sensible prejudice to the other states of the Plate systemin
the case of consecutive jurisdiction. 30
However, internal strife in Argentina led Lanusse to

make concessions to the Peronists, who were staging

a

comeback by

1972, which deeply concerned the repressive, exclusionary

military regime of Brazil.

Due to continued disagreement over

the use of common-pool resource, the Argentineans took their case
to the June 1972 United Nations Conference on Human Environment,
in Stockholm where an agreement could not be reached by both

parties, who then referred that draft about the principle of

mutually sharing information on the use of the natural resources
to the UN General Assembly which met later that year.

Symptomatically

,

the Brazilian delegation was headed by Interior

Minister, Jose Costa Cavalcanti.

"
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But before the General Assembly
met, both parties
agreed to the principle of prior
consultation only between

contiguous countries and, in the case of
severe damages, for
countries with successive jurisdictions. 31

3

*

The Treaty of

I ta

ipu and the Po litical

Pnntov^

The signature of the Treaty of Itaipu was
expedited by
the election of the Peronist candidate Hector
Campora
in the

Argentine 1972 presidential elections, an important event
in the
decision-making process for Itaipu Project. The Treaty was
signed on 26 April 1973 by Stroessner and Medici in Brasilia,
one

month before Campora

1

s

inauguration in Buenos Aires.

Most

diplomats and state officials believe this did not occur simply
coincidentally. 32

The Argentine Ambassador in Brasilia was

recalled to Buenos Aires as

a

protest, and even before Campora

took office, Argentina denounced the "shameful New York Accord"
as detrimental to its interests

as a user of common-pool waters

and "submitting Argentina to accept the demands of continental

subimperialism. 33

Argentina feared losing the river as

a

vital

means of transportation between the Northeast Provinces (or
Paraguay for that matter) and Buenos Aires, and that the Itaipu

construction would hinder the construction of its own power
plants in the Parana River (Corpus and Yacyreta)

.

.
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The good relations between Brazil
and Paraguay were not
restricted to the construction of Itaipu
or building bridges or
smuggling of luxury items in and out of
the country.
Medici's
Minister of the Army, Orlando Geisel (brother
of president-to-be
Ernesto Geisel) promised military help in
case Paraguay suffered
an external aggression 34 since both
regimes were anti-

Communist, repressive, exclusionary and against
the Leftist trend
sweeping Chile (Unidad Popular) Uruguay (Frente
Amplio) and
,

principally Argentina (Peronist Party)

.

One week later, Allende

was ousted in Chile with the involvement of Brazilian
security
forces not only during the overthrow but also in the following

harshly repressive years.
The signing of the treaty, however, was viewed as

confrontation by Argentina.

a

The Peronists, resolved to reinstate

their previous influence with the smaller countries of the Basin
area, pushed for an autonomous foreign policy, non-alignment with

United States' foreign policy and the adoption of
World posture.

a

pro-Third

Argentina took its complaints against the Treaty

of Itaipu to the 1973 Algiers Conference of the Non-Aligned

Countries and to the 1973 UN General Assembly, having approved

in

both fora, resolutions which called for cooperation between

countries sharing natural resources, systematically conducted by

prior consultation and mutual sharing of information.

This was

viewed by Brazil as another attempt to hinder the construction of
Itaipu
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However, Brazil was in an advantageous
position with
respect to the Parana River, and Brazil's
historical concern for

Spanish-speaking alliance in the Southern Cone
influenced the
military regime's concern for security and
sovereignty in the
a

area.

Brazil's military regime took advantage of its
ideological
continuities with Stroessner's government and projected
its

economic supremacy by embarking on the largest single
Latin

American project, roughly estimated at US$
time.

3

billion at that

In spite of Third World and UN fora support of the

Argentina's grievances, the latter were ineffectual as Argentina
failed to obtain Paraguayan support of its views.
The novel binational entity

Binacional

—was created

—

Entidade itaipu

in May 1974, with its capital equally

divided between Brazilian Eletrobras and Paraguayan ANDE
(Administracion Nacional de Electricidad

)

Because of Paraguay's

.

inability to raise US$50 million in its capital market, Brazil
lent the Paraguayan share in the enterprise.

The additional

investment capital needed would come almost exclusively from
Brazil, both from its domestic capital market and from

international commercial loans.

No loans came from the World

Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank for the project.

Itaipu Binacional is managed by

a

council and an

executive board of directors made up by an equal number of

representatives from both countries.

The bylaws devised a system

of rotation between Brazilian and Paraguayans directors in such

a
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way that neither would have greater
control over the other.
However, since its inception, Itaipu's
Director-General has been
Brazilian, either General Jose Costa
Cavalcanti (retired) (May

1974-May 1985) or General Ney Braga
(retired)

(1985+) with

Engineer Enzo Debernardi as Deputy
Director-General since 1974.
Furthermore, Brazilians occupied the most
influential positions
in the Administrative Council, and the
Technical, Financial and
Coordinating executive directorships, "the most
important ones in
the phase of implantation of the project." 35
The years of 1974-75 represented

a

watershed in the

Itaipu policy-making process. The decisional phase
of the Itaipu
development project had ended
although the cycles and height

—

decisions were still to come.
The variable of relative state autonomy in this phase
of the process refers to the international relations content.

referred to in the beginning of this chapter.

Brazilian

diplomatic and military interests were critical and determined
the policy output.

Itaipu could have been more than just

a

project contemplating, on the one hand, national security and
regional hegemony, and, on the other, technical or economic
demand:

this project could have facilitated political

integration for the Basin countries.

Instead the project,

derailed by ideological and geopolitical character of the
National Security Doctrine, only awakened "rivalry and
mistrust.

Il36
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C

1

'

implementation of Ttaipu: I nt ere st
gynong
Basin Countries and the influe nce of Accoinmodation
rnn^ ruction and g
Capital Goods Industries

National Interes ts Accommodation

—

Brazil -Paraquay and the Questi o n of Cy rils.

The Treaty

of Itaipu and the Itaipu Binacional were
just the initial act of
the implementation of Itaipu.
However there were still national

interests to be reconciled.

The Treaty of Itaipu stipulated the

distribution of energy but it did not mention anything
on how the
energy would be generated and/or delivered by Itaipu
to each of

the two national electric power utilities, Eletrobras and
ANDE.

Moreover, no mention was made about the fact that Brazil and

Paraguay consumed energy at different frequencies nor mentioned
in what frequencies would Itaipu generators produce electric

power.

Brazil.

This was in all likelihood premeditated on the part of
The foreign-owned LIGHT converted 50 cycle-to-60 cycle

in the city of Rio de Janeiro

(1965), which at the time had

approximately the same power demand as Paraguay in 1975.

37

Brazil expected to raise the issue when it would be more

beneficial for its own interests and expected to convince

Paraguay to change over its frequency adopting the Brazilian 60
cycles.

In such way,

Brazilians expected to use a technical

solution to its advantage by creating

equipment and manufactured products. 38

a

market for Brazilian
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Stroessner and the Paraguayan elite
viewed Itaipu "not
[as] a business but an opportunity
for the development of
Paraguay" so the distribution question was
not raised at the
talks once Paraguay lacked the technical
expertise
and the sharp

difference on industrialization level dissuaded
any competition.
Stroessner also let the question linger as he
could use
it to

Paraguay's advantage at the negotiating table with
Argentina and
Brazil. 39
it was following up on that strategy, that
Paraguay
signed the Yacyreta Treaty in December 1973 with Argentina,
a

few

months after the Treaty of Itaipu was signed, and drew heavily
on
the latter as a path-breaking legal instrument.
Brazil and Paraguay then agreed to build the 18-

turbines, 700-MW generators, nine on the Paraguayan side of the

river and

9

on the Brazilian side of the river.

According to an

official who was instrumental in the signing of the Treaty,
Itaipu Project had the unique feature of,

whatever was done in the Brazilian side, and was
necessary, was unnecessarily repeated on the Paraguayan
side. 40

Annex C of the Itaipu Treaty mandated Itaipu Binacional to sell
one half of the energy generated to ANDE and half to Eletrobras's

regional subsidiaries, Furnas and Eletrosul
do Sul do Brasil

)

.

(

Centrais Eletricas

The first US$ 3.5 billion credit line was

opened from Eletrobras to Itaipu Binacional when Geisel visited
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Asuncion on December 1975 to sign the Treaty
of Friendship and
Cooperation (Tratado de Amizad^ e CooBerag ao) 4 *
A special

credit line was opened at the Banco do Brasil
in Asuncion for
Paraguayan industries to buy Brazilian industrial
products and
improvement of the roads of the neighboring States
of Parana and
Mato Grosso do Sul was also included in that Treaty. 42
As a result of this agreement, Brazil asked Paraguay
to

change its frequency to 60 cycles for which Brazil would

compensate Paraguay.

This solution seemed the most economical to

Brazil, as the Brazilian government was prepared to pay US$ 130150 million in cash and provide financial and supplier's credits.

Stroessner played the pendulum diplomacy once more.

At his

request, he met with President Geisel (11 April 1977) and

demanded a compensation of US$ 300 million cash, financial and
technical assistance to explore hydropower from the Monday River
near Itaipu for its own use and military hardware and
training. 43

The Brazilian government perceived that this was

another of Stroessner' s double-dealing, since, if Brazil did not
agree to the deal, Paraguay would be free to sell the surplus of
its share to Argentina, using the same 50 cycles frequency.
In the final analysis, this meeting ended laconically

and no decision was taken.

The Paraguayan Union of Industries

manifested its discontent with the proposed change to 60 cycles
because it would mean their complete surrender of political and

economic sovereignty to Brazil.

That was the insinuation needed
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by Stroessner to rally around the
internal nationalist
discourse. 44 Soon after General Rafael
Videla, Argentina's
strongman, visited Stroessner and a note
was issued stating that
the change of Paraguayan cycles would
hinder joint Paraguayan-

Argentine projects in the Parana River. 45
the conversion to 60 cycles but expected

Brazil had emphasized
a

nationalist reaction,

as in fact occurred. 46
In November 1977 Antonio Carlos Magalhaes,
Eletrobras

president announced that Brazil would adopt a dual
system for
transmission of Itaipu energy, in view of new technology
in

transmitting bulk, high-voltage direct current through long
distance lines.

In all probability resources from European banks

(including the French agreement for Tucurui and for Northeastern

power plants, as discussed in Chapter VI) were involved since

Eletrobras procured foreign loans in whichever way in order to
fulfill government macroeconomic needs.

Geisel finally decided

against conceding to Stroessner demands because:

i)

that

technology would help in the development of know-how for future

transmission lines from the Amazon Region, where
potential was waiting;

ii)

a

100,000 MW

he disliked Stroessner's proposal of

building a dam for Paraguay's own use near Itaipu. 47

The costs

for this system were much higher than what Stroessner had asked.

The bid, won by a consortium of

a

Swedish firm (ASEA) and its

Brazilian subsidiary together with the Brazilian Promon which
would build the civil works of the lines, was originally tendered
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at US$ 850 million, but that cost
has escalated to US$ 3.5

billion, of which US$

2

billion were already spent by 1987.

This decision, although based on American,
Swedish, Canadian and
Soviet prior experiences, was the first to
utilize super-highvoltage (625 kilovolts) on a 84 0-kilometers
distance. 48

Brazil-Argenti na

a nd

Height Tssup
,

Brazilian-Argentine

relations had not improved since the beginning of the
civil works
at Itaipu site and deteriorated with the return
of the
military,

by means of a coup d'etat against Isabelita Peron
in March 1976.

Argentina advocated that the height of Itaipu dam would hinder
its development of the Corpus hydro-power plant.

issue of a geopolitical rather than

a

At root was the

technical nature Brazil ian.

Argentine relations only improved after President Geisel and
Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations Antonio Azeredo da
Silveira left office in March 1979.

Although Brazil and Paraguay largely ignored Argentine
protests with respect to Corpus, Paraguay and Argentina had
signed the Treaty of Yacyreta in December 1973.

decision on the generators imposed
technical solution contained within

The upcoming

tripartite solution

a
a

—

a

larger political solution.

With the beginning of Itaipu works, a few basic

technical decisions had to be made -- number of turbines,
generators' frequency, specifications of complimentary equipment

—

,

which made Argentine-Brazilian confrontations more evident.

.
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Itaipu and Corpus interdependence
naturally raised the question
of the maximum height which would
entail the most efficient use
of the common-pool resource.
The potential energy of a hydropower plant depends on the fall measured
by the difference
between the levels of water above and below
the dam and on the
volume of water that flows through the river.
In Itaipu, Brazil
and Paraguay agreed to build the dam at the
point where the fall
was 120 meters above sea level.
That limited Corpus height to

^

100 meters above sea level, what caused Corpus to loose
1,900
MW,

or 1/3 of its power capacity.

5°

Considering that the level

of water which provided Yacyreta with its maximum
output (4,050
MW)

was 82 meters above sea level then the fall of Corpus could

not be more than 18 meters.

Feasibility studies done by

Argentina indicated that the maximum efficient use of the waters
would be an upstream level of 120-130 meters and

a

downstream

level of 100 meters, giving Corpus its maximum capacity of 6,400
MW.

The optimal solution for Argentina, then, was to raise the

level between Itaipu and Corpus to 130 meters what would have

made Corpus even more feasible.

flooding of Itaipu'
a

s

However, that would cause the

turbines since they were already defined in

specified master executive engineering project, in addition to

flooding fertile Brazilian and Paraguayan lands, and hindering
the use of power plants in nearby rivers.

interdependency required
countries 51

a

Therefore this

tripartite negotiation among the three
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Negotiations on the trilateral accord
began in
September 1977 in Asuncion at the Meeting
of Foreign Relations
Ministers and they ended with the signing
of the Accord

Itaipu-

Corpus in Ciudad Presidente Stroessner,
at the meeting point of
the three countries on 19 October
1979, when Figueiredo had

already taken office in Brazil.

The most feasible height to

Itaipu and Corpus was 105 meters above sea
level which caused the
smallest reduction of Itaipu' s output. 52

Argentineans were particularly worried about what would

happen when the sluices of Itaipu were closed to fill
up the lake
in 1982.

They were concerned that the water level would lower so

much that the ports of Rosario and Corrientes would have to
close
down.

Moreover the whole navigation on the river would be

endangered.

The Accord of the Heights

(

Acuerdo de las Alturas de

Itaipu y Corpus) addressed this responsibility question.

Notwithstanding the political solution to

a

technical problem,

what was truly important to an Argentine high official was the
new standing on which Brazilian-Argentine relations rested.

As

he stated,

More than the definition of the heights, indubitably
important, the 1979 Treaty represented a new beginning
of cooperation on the nuclear field, in the exploration
of the Antarctica, and on economic integration.
The
tripartite accord created the climate of exchange. 53
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That was

a

fundamental change from confrontation to

cooperation, a qualitative improvement in the
relations between
Argentina and Brazil. That was followed by a
May
1980

intergovernmental accord in areas of nuclear cooperation,
and
mutual consultation on joint development of the
Uruguay River;

interconnection of electrical system; building of

a

bridge over

Iguacii River directly to Argentina; cooperation
between both

state steel-making companies, military hardware and the
forming
of a permanent consulting body between chancellors.

It should be

noted the difference of style between Geisel's Minister of

Foreign Relations, Ambassador Antonio Azeredo da Silveira

—

who

served in Buenos Aires during the early 1970s and was aggressive

towards Argentina

—

and his successor during the Figueiredo

Administration, Ambassador Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, who was more

amicable to Argentineans and implemented a more cooperative
policy, 54

2

.

although difficulties are always recognized.

Capitalist Development and Brazilian, Paraguayan and
International Interests

The construction phase in the Itaipu Project began in
1974 and is to finish in 1991 when the last turbine will be

installed.

In 1986 Itaipu was almost four years behind its 1975

original schedule which stipulated the last turbine to go on line
by 1988.

Political and financial problems repeatedly delayed the

construction, in spite of Itaipu being

a

priority project. 55
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The comparison between the 1975 planned costs
and the 1987 debts
is illustrative of the dimension of the
project and of the

interest it provoked among many groups and actors in the
economic
sphere.
As Table 5.3 shows, at the outset of the Itaipu
Project
its cost was estimated to be US$ 4.24 billion,

interests during construction.

including

Thirteen years later that cost

soared to US$ 21.3 billion.

TABLE 5.3

ITAIPU BINATIONAL PROJECT
COST ESTIMATES AND DEBT
US$ billion
COST ESTIMATES

DEBT

ITEMS

June 1974

January 1976

1987

Total Direct Cost
Engr. works, technical
supervision and administrative

2.87

3.47

8.5

Financial Cost during
construction

1.37

1.66

6.8

Transmission Lines*

3.5

Investment Necessary to
complete the project**

2

TOTAL
Source:

4.24

Itaipu Binacional, Relatorio
Financial Statements.
* Including interests.
** As of 1986.
In current US$.

5.13
.

.

5

21.3

various years. 1987

,
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This amount of resources stirred interest
not only in
both countries but also worldwide. As
Minister Dias Leite
stated

After the Treaty of Itaipu was signed it seemed
that
the representatives of the international banks
crawled
from under my bed offering money. 56

From the start, the Itaipu project used international
consulting, financial, and industrial goods and services.

The

feasibility study was conducted by the International Engineering

Company -Electroconsult consortium and it involved four Brazilian
and six Paraguayan firms. 57

Internal and international capital goods and financial

institutions involved in this project have been negotiating
since 1976.

Technical decisions on the number and freguency of

the turbines and generators were freguently influenced by the

political and diplomatic decision-making process.
slowly evolved in search of

a

The process

solution which would converge

demands and conditions imposed by Brazil and Paraguay as well as
the dynamic of internal interests to the two countries.
In view of the worldwide 1976-1978 recession, the

international capital goods industry was avid for orders, and
Itaipu seemed

a

project which would meet that need.

The

international capital goods manufacturers and their national

subsidiaries formed pools for supplying the machines and

.
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equipment needed by Itaipu, in
examined by Newfarmer.

5®

a

model similar to what was

The Itaipu Electromechanical

Consortium (CIEM, Consorcio Ttaipu Eletromecanico)

a pool of

Paraguayan, Brazilian, and European firms (see
Figure 5.4) was
responsible for manufacturing, delivering and supervising
the
assembly of the 18 turbines and generators, plus
complementary

equipment.

The Brazilian capital goods industry, probably the

most impacted by the Itaipu project, was transformed as

a

result

of the Itaipu project, both in organizational and
technological

terms 59
An amount of US$ 1.55 billion was estimated in 1978 as
the total needs of the equipment excluding engineering project

costs and other complementary expenses. 60

Since there are still

US$ 2.5 billion to be spent on Itaipu until the last machine goes
on line that was a conservative estimate, even considering

devaluation of the dollar.

At the signing of the contract,

October 1978, this represented the finalization of

a

in 20

long,

protracted process in which political and economic interests had
to be reconciled among the companies that fashioned the

consortium. 61

To demonstrate how politically important were the

negotiations of the Itaipu Project, sixteen executive meetings

between Itaipu Binacional and CIEM were held between February and
October 1978.

The Executive directorships of Itaipu

participated directly in price negotiations, conditions of

:

:
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BRAZIL:
- Mecanica Pesada (leader)
- Bardella SA Indiistria Mecanica
- BSI Indiistrias Mecanicas
- Indiistria Eletrica Brown Boveri
SA
- Siemens SA
-

Voith do Brasil SA

-

Maquinas e Equipamentos

PARAGUAY
- Consorcio de Inqenieria Electromecanica
(CIE) - assembly of
components manufactured abroad; at times just handlinq;
amounted
to 10 percent of the total operation.

EUROPE
-

Brown Boveri

Cie. Ltd.
A.G.
"

(Baden-Switzerland)
(Mannheim-West Germany)
- Siemens (Aktienqesselschaf t A.G.) (West Germany)
- J M Voith
Gmbh (West Germany)
"

-

&
"

Creusot-Loire/Neyrpic (France)
Alsthom Atlantique (France)

Source: Itaipu Binacional, Relatorio

.

1978, p.

44.

FIGURE 5.2
LIST OF FIRMS
ITAIPU ELECTROMECHANICAL EQUIPMENT CONSORTIUM

-

CIEM

payment and financinq dealinqs directly with the Brazilian,
Paraquayan and international directors of the consortium.
The CIEM consortium received a total of US$ 930 million
(1978 US$)

of which US$ 750 million were paid to Brazilian firms

or to the subsidiaries of the multinational firms.

Between 1978

and 1982 Itaipu alone was responsible for 40-to-50 percent of the

utilization of productive capacity of the capital qoods
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industries located in Brazil. 62

But it was only after Brazil-

Argentina negotiations were well underway that the
number of
turbines was defined (18 plus 2 reserve to be
operated during
maintenance).
The "index of nationalization," that
is,

proportion of

a

unit which is produced domestically, was

as high as 85 percent for generators, but averaged
75 percent. 63

The civil construction part of the process involved

Brazilian and Paraguayan firms only, although several
international firms were interested;

after all, it involved

heavy engineering works from which large profits could be made.
In 1973-74,

at the outset of the bidding process,

five

large consortia of Brazilian and Paraguayan firms were preselected, considering their technical and financial capacity and

from the juridical viewpoint.
The first hurdle the companies had to surpass was to

gain Stroessner's political approval.

In 1973,

Stroessner called

for a meeting with officials of the largest Brazilian civil

construction companies previously selected
Andrade Gutierrez

,

and Mendes Junior

)

.

(

Cetenco

.

CBPO,

Upon realizing that "Don

Sebastian," as he called Sebastiao Camargo, the owner of

Construtora Camarqo Correa
company

—

,

—

the largest Brazilian construction

was not among them he adjourned the meeting until

that company was included among them. 64

This episode

illustrates the collusion between the construction companies and

Stroessner military regime in Paraguay.

The Brazilian firms in

a
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series of meetings acquiesced in letting
part of the civil works
especially those on the Paraguayan side
be accomplished by
Paraguayan firms, united under CONEMPA.

—

—

In order to legitimize the bidding process,

in 1975

Itaipu Binacional opened all tenders presented to the
excavation
of the channel through which the river would pass
while the dam

was under construction (Phase

I,

1976-78).

was able to satisfy Itaipu Binacional

's

Binacional invited all bidders to form

Since no single firm

standards, then Itaipu
a sole,

solidary

consortium for the construction. 65
Itaipu Binacional'

construction considered:

s

i)

rationale for the unified
the size and volume of the works in

the first stage, to which no Brazilian company alone was able to

undertake, despite their two previous decades experience in large
scale engineering projects; 66

ii)

Eletrobras' credit of US$

3.5 billion for this required complex administrative and logistic

systems, all of which conduced to the formation of

a

consortium.

Two consortia were formed in Brazil (UNICON) and in

Paraguay (CONEMPA)

.

Since many of the of the works programmed

for the second stage entailed similar services to those up to bid
in the first stage, then Itaipu Binacional decided to augment the

civil works

which were object of the first contract in such a way
as to eliminate the need for another bidding process in
a short period of time [1978]. 67
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This proposal was promptly accepted,
and the following
Brazilian and Paraguayan firms formed the
two consortia.
In December 1975 the Paraguayan
firms constituted in

December 1975 the Paraguayan Consortium
of Construction Companies
(C0NEMPA " Consorcio de E mpr esas Constructors P

araguayan srl)

while the Brazilians formed the Union of
Constructors (UNICON
Uniao de Construtoras T.tda
.

,

-

)

The Paraguayans were probably the most benefitted
from
the works.

The civil construction sector reached growth rates

above 30 percent between 1978 and 1982, reaching 32
percent in
1981.

Itaipu helped the Paraguayan companies to increase

their technological level.

CONEMPA participated in all phases of

the construction but initially it had to invest US$

5

million in

the purchase of equipment to be used in the construction.

That

capital was provided by Brazil in the form of suppliers' credits
for equipment preferentially produced in Brazil.
of the construction (1978-1982)

CONEMPA hired

a

During the peak

maximum of 5,000

Paraguayan workers in Itaipu, most of which are now working in
the Yacyreta Project.

UNICON had

workers during the same period. 69

a

maximum of Brazilian 35,000
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CONEMPA

UNICON

Paraguay

Brazil

Compania General de
Construcciones, srl

Cetenco Engenharia SA

Barrail Hermanos SA de
Construccion*

Companhia Brasileira de
Projetos e Obras (CBPO)

Jimenez Gaona y Lima
Ingenieros Civiles*

Camargo Correa SA

Ingenieria Civil Hermann
Baumann

Construtora Andrade Gutierrez
SA

Construcciones Viales,
Civiles-Industriales - ECCA
SA
(Ingenieria J. C. Wasmosy)

Construtora Mendes Junior SA

Empresa Constructora Minera
Paraguaya (ECOMIPA)**
*

One firm until 1981

** Began in 1981

FIGURE 5.3
LIST OF FIRMS. CONSTRUCTION CONSORTIA
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Likewise for the assembly of permanent equipment
in
Itaipu, another consortium of companies was formed,
as shown on

Figure 5.6.

Itaipu Industrial Construction Ltd.

Construcdes Industrials Ltda

Hidreletrica de Itaipu

)

-

(ITAMON -

Montagu Eletromecanina

rf*

is formed by the following firms:

ITAMON

Montreal Engenharia SA

A.

SADE - Sul Americana de
Engenharia SA

EBE - Empresa Brasileira de
Engenharia SA

TECHINT - Companhia Tecnica
Internacional

SERTEP Engenharia e Montagem

TENENGE - Tecnica Nacional de
Engenharia SA

ULTRATEC Engenharia SA

Araujo Engenharia e
Montagens SA

FIGURE 5.4
LIST OF FIRMS
ITAIPU ELECTROMECHANICAL ASSEMBLY

Referring to the financial aspects of the project,
Table 5.4 shows the vast amount of resources consumed by Itaipu

during the its implementation.

Comparing the investment made by

Eletrobras (its subsidiaries and associated state companies) to
those made by Itaipu Binacional, the resources spent at Itaipu

were almost equivalent to those spent for the Electric Power
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sector as

a whole.

As shown on Table 5.5, the origin of

resources invested in Itaipu came primarily
from credit
operations.
Although high values are shown for Internal
Credit
operations they should be viewed carefully, as
those are funds

transferred from Eletrobras, which has borrowed
abroad heavily
during the late 1970s and early 1980s.

TABLE

5.4

INVESTMENT ELECTRIC SECTOR, ITAIPU

GDP
Eletrobras
BRAZIL Investment
US$ bn
US$ bn
(1)

1971 -75
1976 -80
1981 -85

1,
1,

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

1986 -90*
1991 -95*
1996 -00*

Source:

1,
2 ,
2
,

Eletrobras
% of GDP

as

(2)/(l)

(2)

732
059
202

12
23
23

235
237
229
240
260

4

580
049
678

30
28
48

1

.

6

2

.

2

1.9

Itaipu
Itaipu as
Investment % of GDP
US$ bn
(3)/(l)

(3)

16. 6

9

2

.

1

4

.

2

5.2

2

.

2

3

.

8

.

4

.

5

3

.

9

4

.

4

Eletrobras.
Piano 2010
* Estimates.

1.9
1.6
1.7
1.8

.

1

.

4

1

.

8

1987

2.7
3

.

1

2

.

8

0.1
1.1
1.4
1.8
1.6
1.2
1.3
1.1
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TABLE 5.5
BRAZIL

ITAIPU BINACIONAL
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS PERCENTAGES
,

1981

SELF-GNTD
NSG
OtRes
GVT TRSRY

CRDT OPTNS
Internal
Ext+Res63

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

-25. 7
-31. 1

-40.9
-41.1

-50. 6

-51.7

-49.1
-55.4

-67
-70

5. 5

0.2

1.1

6.3

3

0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

125. 7
67 6
29 5

140.9

149 1
59 7
38 6

167 2
21.7
77 5

0

.

.

.

80. 5
16 6
.

150.
57
42

6

.

2

.

8

.

.

.

.

.

.

2

5
2

.

.

USES

CAPITAL EXPDT
*Inv.
*Amtz
In t.
Ext.

Sources:

100.0
95.5
4.5
0.1
99.9

100.0
90.5
9.5
7.8
92.2

100.0
74.1
25.9
13.4
86.6

100.0
38.5
39.9
7.9
92.1

100.0
59.2
40.8
8.7
91.3

Calculated from SEST, Relatorio various years and
from ITAIPU BINACIONAL, Relatorio various years.
Percentage of Total Resources.
.

,

SELF-GNTD
NSG
OtRes
GVT TRSRY

Self-generated resources = NSG + OtRes
Net Sel f -generated resources
Other resources
Funds allocated from Federal, State or
Municipal sources Government/Total Resources
CRDT OPTNS
Funds allocated from Credit
Operations/Total Resources
Internal
Credit institutions within Brazil
Ext+Res63
Credit institutions abroad and Res. 63
CAPITAL EXPDT - Capital Expenditures = invst + amtzn
Investments as percentage of Capital
*Inv.
Expenditures
Amortizations as percentage of Capital
*Amtzn
Expenditures
To credit institutions within Brazil
Int.
To credit institutions abroad, Res. 63 and
Ext
Av MF/GB588
See Observations p. 197, for explanation on negative values.
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Implications and Conc1iiRinn<;

The intent of this chapter was to
study the decisions
regarding the Itaipu hydropower project
from political and
economic facts to evince the high degree
of state autonomy
during the decision-making phase and the
gradual loss of that
autonomy during the implementation stage
vis-a-vis powerful
private national and international interests
namely the civil
construction, electrical and mechanical equipment
manufacturers

—

and financial institutions.

The joint Brazilian-Paraguayan

Itaipu endeavor is characterized by unique accomplishments

referring in particular to the variable state autonomy and
its
subcategories, political and financial autonomy, and the

international context, as established at the outset of this
chapter.
It was seen that Itaipu decision and implementation has

spanned seven different Administrations and three regimes in
recent Brazilian political history

—

Quadros/Goulart

,

Castello

Branco, Costa e Silva, Medici, Geisel, Figueiredo, and Sarney.

Paraguay, on the other hand, was governed by Stroessner since
1954.

In Argentina, a decisive actor in the Itaipu decision, the

political regimes have gone from

a

populist-electoral to

a

military dictatorship to an elected-Peronist government, to

a

military-authoritarian, highly-repressive regime, and lately to

transition regime.

a
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The Itaipu decision was conducted
in a political
climate dominated by conflictive relations
between Brazil and
Paraguay and Brazil and Argentina, especially
the latter.
Although this decision stemmed from the fact
that energy was
necessary primarily to power factory equipment
and to supply
electricity to homes and public services in the
Southern

industrial part of Brazil, the final decision in
reality stemmed
from national security concerns.
in the early 1970s,

Brazil had

the expertise and the political/economic conditions
to build

several dams along the Southern rivers, thus being able
to supply
the energy demanded by the region.

One of the principal national

security concerns was to avoid collusion between Paraguay and

Argentina against Brazil, for the simple reason of strategic
location of the Brazil/Paraguay border and the extremely fertile
soil.

Therefore the Brazilian military insisted in making

Paraguay

a

partner in the Itaipu endeavor.
That, however, was not the road chosen by the

repressive, insulated, authoritarian regime between 1967 and
1974.

Costa e Silva, under the influence of the hard-line

faction of the Brazilian military, engaged in construction of the

turn-key Angra

I

Nuclear Power Plant as shown in Chapter IV, and

the first step toward defining the construction of large

hydropower plant with Paraguay, along the common stretch of the
Parana River.

These were two fundamental decisions which

reflected the highly militaristic character of the authoritarian
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regime, that privileged the ideology
of national security and
development above all other considerations.
The highly

autonomous central government agencies
of information (SNI,
National Information Service) and security
(National Security
Council), together with the military
ministries, were influential
in underpinning the Itaipu decision
to national security
objectives in the Basin region.
Politically important to the
development project of the military regime, Itaipu
was one of the
highly visible, grandiose project which the
exclusionary, pro-

business military regime visualized as bringing
economic

development to Brazil.

Economically, Itaipu policy output was

welcomed by the financial capital, by the capital goods
manufacturers, both local and multinational, and by the

construction firms which depended on hydropower projects.
The decision was taken rapidly when

a

mistrustful (as

perceived by the Brazilian military) Peronist government was
ready to take office in 1973, which prompted the signing of the
Itaipu Treaty in April of that year.

Whereas this was

a

first

step in the decision, it was a decisive step which involved a

commitment between the two governments.
Although Brazilian government imposed its bureaucratic
and political strength during the Itaipu decision-making phase,
in the implementation phase Brazilian state autonomy dwindled,

both politically and financially.

Itaipu devoured a huge sum of

investment, the vast majority being internal and external debts.
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That investment represented an
important percentage of the
Brazilian GDP, primarily during the
recession years of 1981-1983
and was particularly significant when
compared with investments
made by Eletrobras
the holding Brazilian electric power
company (Table 5.5). More significantly,
Itaipu' s share of
investment during the same period remained
at 10 percent (see
Table 4.3), but much of Eletrobras investment
was directed to
Itaipu (loans, transmission lines).
During the late 1970s

-

resources were relatively easier to secure due
to the high
liquidity situation of the international financial
market in the
aftermath of the 1974 oil price increase. When the
international
financial systems signaled the first warning signals in
1980, the
highest political post on the electric power sector was changed
to comply with governmental priorities.

Schulman did not accept

the policy and spending orientation set by Delfim Netto and Cals
and his substitution by Costa Cavalcanti as president of

Eletrobras reaffirmed the Brazilian government's disposition to

maintain international financial agreements and contracts to
purchase equipment.
General Jose Costa Cavalcanti

—

a 1937

military

academy classmate of President Figueiredo and of Army Minister,
General Valter Pires

—

,

held jointly the position of president

of Eletrobras with that of president of Itaipu Binacional,

showing a political resiliency which made him survive through

successive administrations. 70

Costa Cavalcanti is probably the
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most perfect example of an anfibio.71

H is nomination guaranteed

that the electric sector and the large
scale endeavors of Itaipu
and Tucurui would continue undaunted,
despite the generalized
lack of financial resources.
Costa Cavalcanti's nomination was a
guarantee to the business community that
resources for Itaipu
would not stop flowing.

Notwithstanding that voluntarism, it seems that the
autonomy showed by Itaipu, or Eletrobras, in the
late

1970s and

early 1980s did not match the relatively higher levels
of state
autonomy of the decision-making phase, 1966-1973, which
coincided
with the insulated, exclusionary Costa

During its implementation

phase,

e

Silva e Medici terms.

Itaipu lost political autonomy

vis-a-vis business interest and political clientele
similar manner to other central government agencies.

—

in a

Political

society, entrepreneurs and workers gradually began forcing more

liberalized political stances on the part of the Brazilian

government and an administrative openness which demonstrated the
weaknesses of Itaipu project.

Its gigantism and geopolitical

connotations were often criticized despite its need.
The beginning of its operation showed further

weaknesses.

In late 1982, Itaipu's lake was filled.

In 1984,

Itaipu installed two 50-cycles turbines, but generating at only
20 percent capacity to supply Paraguay.

The transmission lines

to the Brazilian grid were only completed in 1985.

Repeated cuts

L
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in investments have curtailed Itaipu
's financial and

administrative autonomy.
For Brazil, undoubtedly Itaipu is and
will continue to
be an important source of electric power
for industrial Southern
Brazil.
However, Brazil is bearing the full burden
of the debt
incurred to build it (See Tables 5.5 and 5.6).
In 1985 Itaipu

Binacional began selling energy to Eletrobras and ANDE
and should
have received US$ 273.4 million dollars; actually
Itaipu only

received US$ 9.8 million. The remainder was used to pay
royalties
and to roll over loans. 7 2
if this system of rolling over
almost

100 percent of the debt continues, the total amount Itaipu

TABLE 5.6

ITAIPU DEBTS, 1987 BALANCE

TYPE

US$

000

%

WITHIN BRAZIL
Eletrobras
BNDES/Assembly
FINAME/Agents
Other

5,715, 419
529 487
610, 984
23, 355

47

.

4

4

.

4

SUB-TOTAL

6,879, 245

57

,

1

1.743, 126
95, 284
566, 776

14

.

5

ABROAD
Commercial Banks
Resolution 63
Buyer's/Supplier's Cr.
SUB-TOTAL
BANCO DO BRAS I
Notes - Ministry of
Finance

TOTAL
Source:

1,

,

5.1
0.2

0.8
4.7

,405, 186

20.0

2,763, 519

22 9

2

12,047, 950

Itaipu Binacional, Financial Division

.

100.

0
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will owe at the end of its planned
life (50 years), will be US$
250 billion in 2023, more than double the
present Brazilian
foreign debt. Thus it will not pay for
itself as originally
planned.
For Paraguay, Itaipu changed its economic
life in

a

way

similar to that of Volta Redonda (CSN) Steel
Plant which changed
Brazilian economic life in the 1940s. Like Brazil,
Paraguay's

development can be divided before, during and after Itaipu.
The Paraguayan economy went through boom and bust
under

Stroessner.

During the construction of the dam (1975-1981), GDP

annual growth rates reached 11.4 percent in the years 1978-81,
the peak of the construction.

generated euphoria;

The so-called Paraguayan "miracle"

the construction sector expanded above

percent each of those years;

3 0

the great majority of Paraguayan

private commercial banks were set up at that time.

Similarly to

the so-called Brazilian "miracle," the Paraguayan counterpart

engendered perverse social and economic consequences when Itaipu

construction ended.
Since 1982 Paraguayan GDP decreased or barely

maintained its previous level.
30 percent.

Inflation has risen from 15 to

Characteristically, the Itaipu boom was not been

used to save and invest in productive activities;

Paraguayans

preferred to speculate in the financial and real estate markets
as well as expanding its informal economy

contraband. 73

—

particularly

Paraguay's fertile soils have attracted 450,000
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Brazilian to live and produce on Paraguayan
lands, what caused
the Portuguese language to be spoken and
taught inside Paraguay,
whereas Spanish was spoken in the Western
portion of the State of
Parana a few decades ago. 74 Additionally, the
Paraguayan
foreign debt, which was non-existent until Itaipu
began, soared
to US$ 1.8 billion in 1986, approximately the
amount which Itaipu

brought into the country. 75
KW or

5

Paraguay is currently using 250,000

percent of the electric power currently produced at

Itaipu (4,800 MW)

.

It is not receiving any money to repay the

US$ 50-million loan to establish the partnership.

This situation

should change in the future as Paraguay is already moving toward
a

revision of the payment clause. 76
In conclusion,

the state autonomy during the initial

decision phase of the Itaipu project gradually eroded, giving way
to putting political power and autonomy under some form of

control, parallel to what has happened to the central government.

The seemingly unchecked financial autonomy of the 1970s was

substituted by

a

controlled form spending by the Brazilian

government (SEST) or became subject to macroeconomic guidelines
imposed by the IMF.

In addition, political parties,

labor unions

and industrialists reigned in the state autonomy during the last

decade of the military regime.

.

.
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The Parana River basin is formed by the
2. Parana River the
main river of the region, Paraguay
Uruguay and River Pte
Several smaller tributaries make up the Basin
as shown in Map
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CHAPTER VI
THE TUCURUI HYDROELECTRIC
POWER PLANTPOLITICAL POWER, DEVELOPMENT
POLICY
AND LIMITED STATE AUTONOMY

'

The infrastructure development
project of Tucurui
Hydroelectric Power Project must
also be analyzed under the
notion of state relative autonomy,
as this case-study contrast
:s
with the autonomous decision on
Itaipu.
During the elaboration
and execution of this project the
capacity of the Brazilian stat e
to formulate and implement the
Tucurui policy diminished becau se
of factors related to the
international interests.

This chapter analyzes how and why
authoritarian

Brazilian policy-makers decided to build
the largest solely
Brazilian hydroelectric power plant on the
Tocantins River, 300
kilometers South from Belem, state of Para.
This chapter
analyzes how the agency for electric power in
the Northern region
Centrais E letricas do Norte do Brasil s.a. Eletronorte a
.

subsidiary of Eletrobras

—

implemented the Tucurui project even

when the international market for metals was in crisis
and in
face of the critical financial situation of the mid-to-late1970s, both of which called for careful and sound planning of any

grandiose projects, especially with

a US$ 8

billion project like

Tucurui
Tucurui was born as an integrated development project.
It does not justify itself solely on the basis of supplying
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electricity to cities and towns
of the Eastern Ma.on.
Sound
engineering practice for
hydroelectric power plant
construction
even recommended Tucurui to
be the last dam built on
the
Tocantins River.
The
determining reason for building
1
Tucuru,
was the high energy demand
for the production of
non-ferrous
metals and the requirements for
mining, a overwhelmingly
superior demand to that mentioned
above.
This chapter is organized as
follows: it begins with a
brief historical overview of
development in the Amazon.
This is
followed by the decision reconstruction
of the mining-industrial,
bauxite-alumina-aluminum, energy complex.
This reconstruction
will examine how decisions or
non-decisions have influenced what
was decided about Tucurui.
A parallel analysis is undertaken
showing how the international interests
articulated with the
Brazilian state and the national private
capital interests,
especially in the area of export of industrialized
metal

products
Next,

an analysis of how the Tucurui decision was

implemented is elaborated.

Beginning 1976, two European

consortiums of banks and capital goods industries manifested
interest in financing Tucurui.

This section shows how and why

the international financial capital and the multinational capital

goods industry had its eyes on the development of the energy,

mining and industrial projects of the Eastern Amazon, and how
they related to the Tucurui project, from

a

position of political
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power.

This section also shows that
interests within Brazil
just as powerful as the foreign
ones
articulated around
Brazilian contractors and suppliers,
were strong enough

-

-

to

prolong and sustain the building
of Tucurui during the crisis
years of the early 1980s and even
after the 1982 debt crisis.
The chapter ends with a section
analyzing

some of the

outcomes of Tucurui.

Despite facilitating production and
export

of alumina/aluminum and other
minerals, contributing to an

increase of foreign currency generated
by export of manufactured
products,
Tucurui has left a legacy of unresolved
environmental
and social problems, exacerbated when
one verifies that the
pollution caused by activities that generate
foreign currency
will be costly to the environment, thus
decreasing the
benefits.

Therefore, not only decision reconstruction -as in
the Dahlian pluralist method of policy analysis

considered;

—

is

,

this case study also considers reputation analysis

of the decision-making and implementing elites

—

derived from the joint elite and policy analysis.

methodology

a

Therefore, an

analysis of the ministerial and presidential action is crucial to
fully comprehend the decision-making process in this case.

In

addition to these two methods, structural analysis is fundamental
in this case:

the hypothesis that the state could be

a

provider

of the conditions of reproduction of capitalist relations of

production in the periphery, internationally and within the
country, must be analyzed through structural analysis.
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Multinational and large national
firms were the benef iciaries
o£
the integrated develops
mining-industrial-energy project,
leaving behind thousands of
unemployed workers who had to
dislocate once again.
First,

it is argued that the
decision to build Tucurui

can be empirically determined
as a result of the multinational
interest in the mining and industrial
transformation of bauxite
in the Eastern Amazon.
it will be determined whether
it has been
a decision taken by
Eletrobras or Eletronorte directors
or

resulted from government decision and
actions taken by the
Ministers of Mines and Energy, Antonio
Dias Leite (1969-74) and
Shigeaki Ueki (1974-79). Eletronorte,
despite its apparent high
degree of autonomous formulation and
definition of engineering
projects, could not rely on self-generated
financial resources in
the case of Tucurui; it depended on
negotiated pricing policies
which curtailed Eletronorte s managerial and
technical capacity
to define the equipment to be used in the
construction.
'

Furthermore, during the latter part of the implementation
under

Minister Cesar Cals (1979-85), Tucurui was delayed numerous
times
due to lack of financial resources

—

in view of the severe

balance of payment crisis of the early 1980s and the debt crisis
of 1982

—

,

and because of badly managed environmental issues.

Second, as argued in Chapter II, the government itself

dictated the use of its state enterprises as sustainers of
growth,

in order to maintain the conditions of and to promote
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capitalism in the periphery.

Therefore the utilization of state
enterprises to implement development
projects in the 1970s
and

early 1980s, resulted from a
political relationship which
limited
the state enterprise managers'
autonomy to pursue sectoral
objectives.
Directed from a higher echelon
of decision-making,
such decisions only partially
reflected the interests of
Brazilian society. After all, electric
energy was needed, but
the form by which it was achieved
could have been used to
distribute resources better throughout
Brazilian society, it will
be shown how political power was
used by the highest hierarchical
positions on the state to influence or
to obtain actions
from

state enterprise managers and how firms
responsible for the
construction of Tucurui were capable of changing
the

implementation to serve their particular interests,
endangering
the environment and social settings, as well
as on
the part of

the interests of financial and industrial foreign
capital with

respect to their Brazilian clients.

A.

Historical Overvie w

In the Amazon region several myths coexist with bleak

realities.
wealth.

Everything there has

a

sense of vastness, of immense

Since the 1600s it attracted different interests.

Spaniards and Portuguese built the first forts in the mouths of
the larger rivers, protecting the Amazon hinterland from
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exploring expeditions.

in the
cne l7onc
1700s,

settlers tried to enslave

the native Indians while rne
the Jesuits
Teanfe counteracted
trying to
establish a religious nation.
The results were whole nations
decided. The rubber boom of the
180 0s attracted half-a-mil!
ion
Northeasterner to the Amazon. Even
an epic battle to conquer
what today is known as the
state of Acre from Peru was
fought. 2
in the early twentieth century
Brazil nuts, gold and diamonds
continued luring thousands to the
Amazon El Dorado. However, of
those who sought wealth very few
became rich or made it back home
alive.
The vast majority was overwhelmed
by the forest, remained
planting subsistence crops or entered
in the circle
of

indebtedness of the "aviamento"3 £ysteIn<
which resulted
wealth for few and misery for many.
Nevertheless, Amazon myths
still attract even today.

^

Today's explorers are more sophisticated,
but the

patterns of exploration resemble past ones.

During the past

decades the Amazon region has seen government-sponsored
action
infrastructure, mining and industrial development,
which have
favored the dynamics of capitalism.

projects

—

in

Recent Amazon development

region which comprises 59 percent of the 8.5

a

million square kilometers of the Brazilian territory but has only
11 percent of the population

kilometer)

—

,

(3.0 inhabitants per square

were started with the construction of the Belem-

Brasilia Highway in the late 1950s, as an offspring of the

construction of Brasilia integrating the North to the South.

In
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the mid-1960s Herman Kahn,
of the
une Hudson
rtuason t««-m*
Institute,
proposed th e
creation of an i mm ense lake. The
National Security Council
responded with the National
Integration Plan (PIN)
a policy
directed to keep the A.azon region
under the Brazilian control,
in view of these foreign
interests.
These actions took place
under aegis of the National
Security Doctrine, fully supported
by
the harsh authoritarian Costa
U5ta e bllva
qilv^ ar»d Medici governments
(1967-74).
in the early 1970s the
Transamazon Highway was
started, disrupting Indian tribes
and leaving a path of misery
behind.
Daniel Ludwig's floating pulp and
paper plant (Jari
Project) startled everyone with its
trip across three oceans.
Recently, infrastructure, mining and
agricultural projects cause
extensive, uncontrolled deforestation,
displacement and
,

•

relocation of native populations, disrupting
their traditions and
culture and killing thousands.
When the mineral reserves of the Serra dos
Carajas were

revealed in 1967 by U.S. Steel, and particularly
when the bauxite
reserves of the Trombetas River (Oriximina) region and
of the

Capim and Gurupi Rivers (Paragominas) region were announced
by
the Aluminium Company of Canada (Alcan) in 1972 and by the

British Rio Tinto Zinc, these companies urged the government to

provide energy to explore these resources.

4

In the case of

aluminum alone large amounts of energy were necessary since it
accounts for
of mining,

a

substantial proportion of the inputs; in the case

it was necessary for electrifying the exploration of

.

mines and the railroads on
an industrial scale. 5
Most
importantly, in the costs of
production of a ton of aluminum
what ultimately determines
the profits of the firms
bauxite
accounts for 15 percent
(including transportation,,
alumina f or
percent,
18
and the other inputs in
the final transformation
int o
aluminum 67 percent. Just in
the second stage of transforming
alumina into aluminum, electric
energy accounts for 80 percent
of
the input costs.
Therefore electric energy accounts

-

-

for 55

percent of the total cost of factors
of production of
aluminum 6

a

ton of

President Geisel's grandiose
development projects were
thought to provide the structural
requisites that would enable
Brazil's entrance into the class of
developed countries and world
power. 7 That p i an proved to be
unrealistic and continued an
inequitable development process on social
and on economic
grounds.
addition, the still unresolved ecological
problems
caused by Tucurui turned it into a potential
danger as

m

well as

learning case for future Amazon development projects.
Tucurui, the largest solely Brazilian hydro-project, -a

3,960 MW-power plant in its first phase (2,640 MW in
1988,

progressively augmented then on) and 7,920 MW in its final stage
(in 1993)

—

,

is the largest single development project in the

Amazon region, and the fourth in the world after Itaipu, Guri in
Venezuela, Grand Coulee in the U.S.

Its dam spans almost

thirteen kilometers (eight miles) taming the fast waters of the
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large Tocantins River, up
stream from its mouth in
Bel,,, state
of Par,.
until the late 1960s electric
power officials believe,
Amazon Region rivers were
unsuitable for energy generation,
and powerhouses could be
anchored.

understood that there was

a

In reality,

it is now

political decision to postpone

infrastructure projects in the
Amazon, since they were not yet
attractive and profitable for the
ejBp^eiteiros 8 The
Coordinating Committee on Energy
studies for the Amazon Region
(ENERAM)
found it unsuitable to build
power plants along a 250kilometers-strip of flat lands on both
sides of the Amazon River
because of the high flooding risks
and environmental
.

,

damages.

The studies, lasting from 1968 to
1971, indicated a potential
after the 250 kilometers range
of more than 100 million kw for
the region, ten times larger than the
total Brazilian installed

-

~

capacity in 1971.

9

As mentioned before, the power plant itself
was

unjustified if it were not linked to the energy intensive
mineral
and metallurgical projects, since any transfer
of electric
power

among regions required technology for long-distance
transmission,
then unavailable.

Even with impressive population and economic

growth rates, the states of the Northern Region to which Tucurui

would supply electricity do not demand large amounts of electric
power, as shown on Table 6.2.

Still,

in the Medici period

74), Minister Antonio Dias Leite began negotiations on the

(1969-
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construction of a hydroelectric
power p lant on the Tocantin
s
n0t yet defined to be
Tucurui.
Minister Dias Leite
negotiated the construction
of a hydroelectric
plant with
Japanese groups in conjunction
with the implanting of the
alumin;
and aluminum plants.
During the negotiations,
oias Leite invoke,
the "Law of Participation,"
mandating beneficiary large
consumer
industries to be co-investors
in infrastructure

Rmr

'

^

projects."

The

Japanese were eager to produce
alumina and aluminum in the
vicinity of energy sources
since the cost of producing
aluminum
in Japan skyrocketed on
the wake of the
19 73 oil shock,

when
Prime minister Kakuei Tanaka
visited Brazil, both governments
signed a letter of intention
considering an US$ 800-million

financing agreement for the construction
of
plant, "but there was no firm
commitment

a

hydroelectric

on the part of

Japan. "11

Furthermore, the Japanese groups were
more interested
in avoiding high transportation
costs and escaping strict
controls and regulations for producing
alumina and aluminum in
the advanced countries.
Therefore, placing production units near
the estimated 7-billion-tons-bauxite mines
and near the source of
abundant energy, with lax environmental controls
suited their
interests.
Another important consideration was the 1974 prices
for bauxite "in natura,"

USS 6-7 per ton; alumina sold for ten

times as much, and the price of aluminum was quoted at US$
1,000

per ton in the London market, prices attractive enough to

.
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transform the Eastern Amazon into a
significant bauxite-aluminaaluminum producing and exporting area.

The Tucurut Decision- A Decision wi+h^
Manor Devpl npment Poli cy Decision

a

When the Mining Code was re-enacted in
1967, one the
objectives was to give unprecedented incentives
to private mining
companies to research and exploit mineral areas,
especially in
the Amazon while maintaining the state enterprises'
rights to
explore mineral resources. Before 1967, the foreign
companies
could explore minerals only if they were associated to
Brazilian
firms (The 1987-88 Constituent Assembly negated such right)

Some of the examples were Companhia Auxiliar de Emoresas de

Mineracao (CAEMI, of the Azevedo Antunes Group) associated with
Bethlehem Steel in manganese exploration in the Federal Territory
of Amapa and with Hanna Mining in iron ore in Minas Gerais, and

Union Carbide (in association with U.S. Steel) and CVRD in the
Iron-Carajas project.

The association model for mining became

commonplace, protected and fostered by the authoritarian regime.
In contrast, during the Goulart regime, demonstrations and

political resistance were continually staged against the

associative model for mining. 12
Tucurui was decided during the Ernesto Geisel
government, which began March 1974.

Ueki

—

Geisel appointed Shigeaki

who had been the Financial Director of Petrobras when
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Geisel was its president

-

as Minister of Mines and Energy. 13

Geisel's presidency was characterized
by the active use of the
state enterprises as instruments of
economic development policy,
in the wake of the 1973 oil shock,
the Brazilian state planned
its industrial and mining policies
within PND II seeking
to

develop the capital goods industry and the
basic inputs sector
through large scale import-substitution, and
the insertion of
peripheral regions into the capitalist relations
prevalent for
the rest of the country.
As Minister Ueki stated,

The large scale production of aluminum would be the
ideal solution to the absence of non-ferrous materials
-- copper, zinc, tin -- as it [aluminum
production]
would enable the import of other basic inputs without
unfavorable balance of payment repercussions.
Therefore government should take the initiative to
produce abundant and cheap energy in the region to
ultimately produce aluminum. 14

To achieve the objectives defined on the PND II the

Brazilian state specifically engaged its state enterprises in the

mining sector

—

the CVRD and its subsidiaries

—

related to substituting imports in basic inputs.
and 1976, CVRD was turned into

a

in activities

Between 1974

policy instrument 15 and its

capacity was extensively used in development projects located in
the Eastern Amazon.

CVRD

1

s

access to foreign capital and

commodities markets was instrumental in engaging the company in
several projects.

In that period,

CVRD diversified into new

areas of action according to government objectives.

In addition

>

.
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to new mining projects, new plants
for

peptization of iron ore,
sea transportation, prospection
and engineering,
CVRD expanded
its activities into the fields of
paper and pulp, fertilizers and
aluminum, including a regional
decentralization contributing to
PND II 8 national integration objectives.
We turn to the
analysis of the linkage between CVRD, its
partners and
Eletrobras/Eletronorte, specifically for the
construction of
Tucurui serving the bauxite-alumina-aluminum
and Greater Carajas
projects

1

.

Bauxite

The mining of bauxite in the Amazon started as

a

result

of the 1967 Mining Code which lifted restrictions to
giving

mining concessions to multinational companies.

Mean

(Aluminum

Company of Canada) revealed its bauxite deposits on the Trombetas
region right after the 1967 Mining Code went into effect,

calculated in more than 500 million tons or the equivalent of 50
years exploration at 10 million ton per year.

In 1972, the

Canadian firm partially pulled out of the Trombetas reserve

because of a slump on the international markets for bauxite.

Although the decision resulted from the market uncertainties
regarding the fuels and mineral areas

rearrangement of the sector

—

—

a signal

for coming

the decision also reflected the

fact that the Brazilian authoritarian state induced its mining
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enterprise, CVRD, to become part of the
project, and to incur in
expenditures for prospection. Mean's
pullout was an intentional
delay waiting for Docegeo (Rio Doce
Geologia e Mineragao)
CVRD's
mineral prospecting subsidiary, to assist
the multinationals in
minerals research in the Amazon. Docegeo
spent an annual average
of US$ 15.6 million in geological
prospections of non-ferrous
minerals, phosphate and inputs for steel industry
during the
years 1975-80.16 while the Brazilian state acted
as a "growth
sustainer" making knowledge of mineral resources in
the Amazon

available to the multinationals, it also took care of
its own
interests.
At the same time that CVRD was induced to
participate,

it gave fiscal incentives and made available

knowledge, attracting other investors.

Although CVRD

participation was justified on grounds of preventing total
dominance of the multinationals, CVRD lacked autonomy to decide
in the bauxite projects.

Once knowledge of soil was available it was passed

along at very little cost to Alcan and other multinational firms.

Although Alcan, and a group of other six multinational firms
resisted CVRD's partnership, Minister Dias Leite negotiated CVRD

participation in the bauxite exploration, and its
industrialization before export.
Rio do Norte (MRN)

,

They constituted the Mineracao

in charge of the exploration of bauxite from

the Trombetas region.

In 1975 CVRD and the partners agreed on

the following division of shares: CVRD retained 46 percent, Alcan
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19 percent,

Companhia Brasileira

^

aluminum private Brazilian company

Aluminio (CBA)

-

10 percent,

remaining 25 percent were divided among

American and

Spanish firms.

a

"

a

—

the largest

and the

Norwegian, a Dutch, an

By 1986 the composition of

state-multinational-local capital on MRN had changed,
and the
Spanish firm had pulled out:

OWNERSHIP OF MINERAQAO RIO DO NORTE
CVRD
Alcan
Reynolds
Metals

-

(US)

-

0%
24%

CBA
Billiton-Shell (Great
Britain-Netherlands)
Norskhydro As (Norway)

4

5%

Source: SEST; Gazeta Mercantil

.

13

10%

16%
5%

-

January 1986

The initial annual production of this US$ 300-million-project was

estimated at 3.4 million tons beginning 1979.

In the first years

the output was totally exported but the bauxite was progressively

used to make alumina and aluminum, marking Brazil's presence in
the aluminum world market; by 1985, 69 percent of Brazil's

bauxite production (4.5 million tons) came from the MRN-Trombetas
project. 18

Actual investment in MRN by 1981 was US$ 403 million

dollars for the first phase, making it the largest Brazilian firm
in mining of non-ferrous metals, and the world's second largest

exporter.

The expansion of the mining of bauxite up to

8

million

tons was linked to the conclusion of the alumina/aluminum

projects in the country.

In 1983 and 1984,

CVRD was negotiating
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the MRN expansion of production to

4

.

7

million tons per year in

order to meet Alumar's (Muminio_do
Maranhao s.a.
demand of 1.2
million tons. 19 The alumina/aluminum
plants
Albras/Alunorte
and Alumar
will be discussed in the next section.
i

-

—

Other bauxite reserves, in addition to
the 1.7 billion
tons Trombetas reserve, 20 were discovered
by Docegeo on the
Almerim region and in the region between the
Gurupi and Capim
Rivers (Paragominas)
the former estimated in more than 0.5
billion and the latter, 2.4 billion tons. 21 The
British firm
,

Rio Tinto Zinc was given concession to explore part
of the

deposits in the Paragominas region in association
with CVRD,
forming the Mineracao Vera Cruz
CVRD's share is only
36

.

percent, but its importance is its closeness to the alumina
and

aluminum plants, Albras and Alunorte, contributing to the
lowering the costs of production.

The investment in the

Mineracao Vera Cruz project was US$ 300 million aimed at
producing

4

million tons of bauxite per year. 22

MRN was

a

controversial joint-venture from the start

despite its important role in the international market.

CVRD's

position as the largest shareholder did not equate to having much
weight in the firm's decision-making.
(CVRD and CBA)

,

MRN Brazilian partners

despite having 50 percent of the capital always

experienced pricing problems.
Ermirio de Moraes

—

By 1986 CBA's Chairman, Antonio

one of the larger industrial entrepreneurs

in Brazil and a critic of the military regime

—

spoke out

.

^
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condemning the pricing behavior of
the foreign partners in MRN.
According to MRN s policy imposed by
the multinationals, any
changes in price requires approval of
2/3 of voting capital; any
capital increase requires 90 percent
of the votes.

The foreign

partners using their oligopsonic strength
forced the selling
price down, thus obtaining fallout profit
in international
markets.
Ermirio pointed out that

If undeveloped countries like Brazil do
not devel
serious policy on bauxite, they will always be
me
suppliers of raw materials and exporters of low-p
^
goods. J

Furthermore, BNDES decided against financing MRN or

entitling it to incentives in view of Mean's disproportionate

decision-making power over the other partners

—

namely the right

to withdraw from the MRN-Trombetas Project during the first ten

years (1974-1984) and the right to acquire as much as 1.2 million
tons per year (more than half of the production) at reduced

prices on long term contracts just because it was the original

holder of the concession. 24

The Brazilian state enterprise CVRD

therefore lost autonomy in the MRN-Trombetas project, and became

weak where it most counted: in the financial decision-making

component of that variable and in the capacity to price its own

products

348

The Industrial Projects and Tnmn U
Hvdro-Pnw Pr Plant: Th P
Lo ss of Relative state Autonomy

The aluminum policy of the Brazilian state
was

a

priority on the PND II in view of the pressing
need to substitute
imported basic inputs to complete industrial
development in
Brazil.

It was a combination of political will of
developing the

Amazon, producing for the internal and external
market, and of

foreign producers' strategic transfer of production to
the

periphery near the bauxite mines and abundant energy sources,
in
the wake of the 1973 oil crisis.
Negotiations for these projects
began in 1972-73, accelerated with the Geisel government's wishes
of exporting energy with profit from the Northern Region's

rivers.

Tucurui was going to materialize part of this plans

together with the alumina/aluminum plants implanted near Belem
and Sao Luis, Maranhao, both ports on the Atlantic Ocean facing

world markets of the North Atlantic.
As in the bauxite exploration (mining-electric sector

linkage)

,

industrial and energy policies were also intertwined

for the Northern Region.

Aluminio Ltda

,

Since 1977 CVRD's subsidiary Valenorte

originally created (1972) as an engineering and

consulting firm for bauxite exploration, became the CVRD holding

coordinating aluminum investment in the North of Brazil. 25
Negotiations for the processing of bauxite began with
Dias Leite, the Minister of Mines and Energy, in 1973.

Dias

Leite, a kind of CVRD spokesman since he had been its president
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during the its greatest expansion
period, initially only dealt
with Aluminum Resources Development
of Japan concerning the
production of alumina, which interested
the Japanese because of
stricter environmental controls.
December 1973, the Japanese
demonstrated interest in the production
of aluminum

m

as well,

since their energy costs at home were
rapidly increasing.
Soon
after Geisel's inauguration, Minister
Ueki formed a joint
committee involving CVRD, the recently
created Eletronorte and
the Light Metal Smelters Association
LMSA) of Japan with the aim
of performing a feasibility study. 26
The five largest companies
making up LMSA
Nippon Metal, Showo Denko Mitsui Sumitomo
and
Mitsubishi
were looking for alternative sites of production
(

-

.

.

—

outside Japan; among the sites considered were Venezuela,
New
Zealand, Australia and Brazil's Eastern Amazon. 27

Brazilian long

association with the Japanese in steel making (USIMINAS) was
strong asset in the new aluminum partnership.

a

Both countries and

the firms did control prices, the investment was highly risky and

included the energy factor as well:

they were complex and they

required the intervention of both governments.
The initial study, with projected investment totalling
US$ 2.6 billion, recommended

a

two-staged one-million-ton year

plant (at US$ 1.1 billion), an alumina plant (US$ 500 million),

hydroelectric power plant (US$ 800 million for

a

Stage

and infrastructure (US$ 200 million, village, roads)

.

I

a

1200 MW)

The

Aluminio do Brasil (Albras) first stage was projected at 640,000

.
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tons, with half the total investment,
an attractive investment
considering the international price of US$
1,000 per ton in 1974;
it would consume 1,200 MW and was
going to be built in the town
of Barcarena near Belem.
The Alumina dn N orte do Brasi]

(Alunorte) was included in the initial study
to produce 1.3

million tons annually, but the attractiveness
of alumina
production was lower since it competed in price
with imported
alumina.
Both were in partnership with Valenorte

and LMSA-NAAC

The euphoria regarding of the initial plan between
CVRD

and LMSA agreement signed on 17 September 1974 dwindled
as the

Japanese become aware of the economic downturn as the aftermath
of the 1973 oil crisis.

Excessive inventories of aluminum

worldwide and falling demand turned the aluminum/alumina project
in the Eastern Amazon unprofitable at that time,

specially

considering that the "law of participation" mandating final
consumers as beneficiaries to invest in the construction of the

hydroelectric power plant. 28

LMSA stalled the negotiations

while the Tucurui decision was being drafted.

The Japanese

withdrew their responsibility for investing in the energy supply,
turning the "law of participation" into

a

other factors induced LMSA's delay on

decision until 1976:

a

dead letter.

Three
a)

both Japanese and Brazilian governments and firms had no control
over aluminum prices internationally;

b)

highly risky investment

demanded government action, as presented in Chapter II, and
government-to-government negotiations

;

and

c)

as the scale of
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production increased, so did the cost
of investment and cost of
electric energy. All three factors
caused Japan's loss of
interest in the project. Additionally,
an aluminum plant takes
three years between its design and
commissioning.
A Tucurui-size
hydropower plant takes eight to ten
years to build, considering
the difficulties of construction in
the Amazon.
This Japanese
decision delayed for a year the Brazilian
government decision
about the construction of the power plant.
A statement from
Minister Ueki showed some embarrassment with the
situation
created by the Japanese pull out. He stated
that "with or

without partners" Tucurui was
action. 29

a

priority program for governmental

Furthermore Ueki specifically mentioned,

We want to break a vicious circle that is happening.
There is no industrial project in the Eastern Amazon
because there is no electric energy and there is no
decision to build the power plant because there are no
industries to create demand. Therefore, the government
decided to build the hydroelectric plant once and for
30
all.

Albras and Alunorte were eventually installed in the
1980s, but not before strenuous long negotiations.

According to

an Eletrobras official, the market slump was used by the Japanese
to scale-down the project, to achieve preferential electric

energy price varying with the aluminum price on the London
market, to negotiate supplier's credits to CVRD for Albras and

Alunorte equipment, and to obtain BNDES fiscal and investment

1
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advantages.

Albras and Alunorte were scaled down
and the
Brazilian government committed itself
to the supply

energy, to

build the infrastructure for the project
and to guarantee foreign
loans in exchange for eventual export
3
income.

Geisel's 1976 visit to Japan was decisive
in
materializing the project.
it was already clear that

PND II was

an "exercise in voluntarism, "32 thus
Geisel wanted to accomplish
a few large scale projects, of
which Tucurui was a show-case

example.

Albras

—

by then transformed into an association

between Valenorte (51 percent) and NAAC, Nippon
Aluminum Amazon
Corporation (49 percent)
was built slowly, beginning operation

—

in 1984,

and is expected to produce at full capacity
(320,000

tons per year) by 1988. 33

Alunorte decision was repeatedly

delayed for it was cheaper to buy alumina in the international
market.

Nevertheless, Alunorte project of an 800,000 tons per

year alumina plant, which was integrated to Albras (Barcarena,
Para)

,

only started construction after Albras was operational in

1985.

Despite Geisel's reassurance that the Brazilian

government was going to bear the full burden of the hydroelectric
project and the needed infrastructure

—

apparent in Ueki's and

Geisel's classification of Tucurui as "the redemption (sic) of
Para and of all the Amazon" 34

—

the Japanese LMSA continued

redimensioning the project down to less than 10 percent of what
was originally planned in 1974 (40,000 tons by 1981).

In 1977
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Brazilian restrictions on imports
and rising internal interest
rates, discussed in chapter IV,
frustrated Japanese suppliers who
had planned on selling equipment
to Brazil. 35
Albras and Alunorte accords on
stockholding, technology
and sale of aluminum and energy
involved Seplan, BNDE Consider,
the National Institute for
Industrial Property (INPI)
importexport incentives agency (BEFIEX)
Portobras and Eletronorte, and
were only signed in 1978.
Despite CVRD being the majority
stockholder many decisions required
approval by 2/3 of voting
stock, what in effect gave LMSA
control of decision-making. 36
,

,

,

Once more BNDE refused to finance the
projects and to grant them
fiscal incentives.
Only in 1980, after BNDES had been
transferred to the Secretariat of Planning
(adding an "S» for

Social in its acronym), could the all-powerful
Minister Delfim
Netto obligate BNDES to finance the Albras/Alunorte
37
project.

The Japanese association obtained from Mines and
Energy

Minister, Cesar Cals, the guarantee that energy would
cost Albras
and Alunorte a price corresponding to

a

1/5 of the aluminum price

in the international market, during 20 years, without

readjustment or increases, income tax exemptions up to 15 years

guaranteed to projects in the Eastern Amazon and the provision of
infrastructure by the State of Para. 38

In m id-i980 LMSA-NAAC

obtained an elimination of the contract clause which stipulated
that 50 percent of Albras production would serve the purpose of

substituting aluminum imports to Brazil.

Only when this
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agreement was finalized, the
Japanese NAAC invested US$ 400
million dollars in the plant. 39
In a demonstration Qf its
over the Brazilian partner, NAAC
also secured the purchase of 55
percent of output at 93.5 percent
of the international market
price with an option to buy the
other 45 percent of the output at
96.6 percent of that price. 40

^

By 1985,

in area of 6,000 hectares,

US$ 580.7 million of

a

Albras had invested

total of US$ 1.5 billion.

In 1982 the

consortium Albras/Alunorte was extinct
and the two plants
operating under separate management. Albras
increased its
production to 80,000 tons in July 1985
a target which had been
planned for six years earlier according to the
original
schedule. 41 Alunorte's investment, estimated
at

-

US$ 700

million, was at the level of US$ 175 million by
1985, without any
indication that it would be profitable to produce alumina,
since
it could be found at a much lower price than the
estimated US$

250 per ton coming out of Alunorte. 42

Aluminio do Maranhao (Alumar) was decided in 1982, and
it was considered to be one of most modern, efficient integrated

alumina-aluminum plant in the world, with an annual production
capacity of 500,000 tons of alumina and 110,000 tons (Stage
of a total of three)

.

I

out

A totally private enterprise owned by

Alcoa (Aluminum Company of America, with 49.9 percent), Billiton

Metais (Shell, 40.1 percent) and Camargo Correa (10 percent),
bought in 1984 from Billiton,

43

it competes with Albras for

s
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external markets, and

a

portion of the internal market.

it has

an adjoining alumina plant, Alunar,
which will be capable to

produce

million ton per year of alumina when
completed.
1987 two modules were operating of Alumar.
3

By

Tucurui's engineering design was conditioned
by the
aluminum plants, as shown on Table 6.1 and
6.2.
Eletronorte
engineering had to specify the machines to be used
in Tucurui
"backwards, that is from Albras's point of view." 44
They worked
closely with Japanese specialists from LMSA in the
specification
'

of the basic project.

TABLE 6.1

ELECTRIC ENERGY CONSUMPTION-ALUMINUM OUTPUT
(MW - 000 TON)

ALUMAR
energy
1984
1985
1986
1987*
1988*
1989*

186
200
460
486
486
558

ALBRAS
energy

output
80
100
200

32

90
290
434
434

300

596

Source: Eletronorte, Relatorio Anual 1986.
* Estimates.
Energy in MW, Output in 000 tons-year.
,

output
20
40
120

320

s

.
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TABLE 6.2

PARTICIPATION ON TOTAL ELETRONORTE SUPPLY,

CEA - Centrais Eletricas do Amazonas
EletroAcre
CELPA* - Centrais Eletricas do Para
CEMAT - Centrais Eletricas Mato Grosso
CERON - Centrais Eletricas Rondonia
CELG* - Centrais Eletricas Goias

cvr

Source:

1985

1986

1.95

1

1fi

23*70
11.80
3.07

14*47
6*87
1*74

55

o\r

0

s*

CVRD
CEMAR*- Centrais Eletricas Maranhao
IC0MI "
ALUMAR*
Manaus

(%)

0.84
15.34
0.25
27 90
15 ?6
;

0.80
6?

9

0*14
33 28
10. 13
.

Eletronorte, Relatorio Anual 1986.
* receive energy from Tucurui.
.

With the beginning of the industrial projects,

Tucurui

's

importance was fully recognized.

The designing of the

Greater Carajas Program, initially elaborated by Japanese
consultants, 45 took into account that the developments planned
for the Eastern Amazon were not possible without Tucurui'

energy
However, according to the data above in Table 6.3 and

Table 6.4 one can easily contrast that the income paid by final

consumers (Albras, Alumar) to Eletronorte does not match the
energy they receive.

Alumar, which is paying 25 mills per KWh

mill= l/1000th US$ 1.00), consumed 33.9 percent of the total

(1

3

.

.

t

.

.
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TABLE

6

.

ELETRONORTE
OPERATIONAL INCOME
PARTICIPATION OF ASSOCIATED COMPANIES AND
FINAL CONSUMERS
1985

ALUMAR
MANAUS*
ALBRAS
CELPA
CEMAR

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

,

(%>

i9 86

21>9
33.3
6>7
15>0
10>0

Vt'

8.3

Source: Eletronorte, Relatorio, and Income
Statements,
Energy supplied from Tucurui, except for Manaus 1985-6.
(*).

TABLE 6.4

ELETRONORTE
ENERGY SUPPLY
PARTICIPATION OF FIVE LARGEST CONSUMERS,
191 55
1

2

.

3

.

4

.

5.
6.
7.

ALUMAR
ALBRAS
CELPA
CEMAR
MANAUS
OTHER FINAL CONSUMERS
OTHER STATE CONCESSIONAIRES

(%

of MW)

1986
27, 9
11 2
23 7
15. 3
15. 7
.

33

.

9

21 0
14

.

5

9

.

6

10.

1

7. 7

13

.

9

Source: Eletronorte, Relatorio 1986
Obs.: - Total Eletronorte Supply = 10,254,809 MWh or 1170 MW
- 38 % to State Concessionaires, Celpa, Cemar, Cemat, etc.
- 62 % to Aluminum Companies.
- Manaus, not supplied by Tucurui, had its own thermal
generation
- Tucurui generated circa 80 % of Eletronorte s energy,
,

1

in 1986.

while it paid 30.2 percent.
subsidized paying only

13

its cost to Eletronorte.

More strikingly, Albras is heavily

mills per KWh -- about one fourth of
The data shows that for an energy

s
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supply of 21 percent it paid only 12.6
percent of Eletronorte
sale of energy in 1986.
The description of the Tucurui
decision highlighted the
fact that it was taken as part of the
PND II mining and
industrial policies oriented toward substituting
basic imported
inputs and toward the development and
occupation of the Eastern
Amazon. Those policies however were contingent
upon exogenous
factors, such as the 1974 oil shock, the ensuing
worldwide

recession and the environmental regulations imposed
to aluminum
manufacturing in advanced countries.
International interests prevailed in both MRN and

Albras/Alunorte decisions.

The availability of resources for

investment in the bauxite-alumina-aluminum complex, its timing -and more importantly the form by which the investment arrived in

Brazil

—

dominated the evolution of the decision-making process

rather than a voluntaristic political and technical rationale.
The elites in charge of the mining, industrial and energy policy

coalesced with national and international financing institutions
and with mining and industrial groups to agree on this

development policy.

The resulting Tucurui policy output is

therefore geared to provide the international and national
private sector with a crucial, inexpensive basic input

—

state role described by Gerschenkron for promoting rapid

industrialization and development.

a

basic
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The Implementation of Tucurui

When Tucurui's first two turbines
began generating
power on 22 November 1984, that fact
was the culmination of
almost ten years of implementation of
that development

project.

This section will analyze how the
national and international
interests have articulated to carry out
the project which
provided income and profits for the corporations
in charge of
building and supplying equipment and materiel.

1

*

Investment Financing and the Infl u ence of the International
Banking and Capital Goods Industries

The influence of international banking system on

investment financing in the Third World was thoroughly studied
by
Stallings. 46

The abundance of petro-dollars in the European

financial markets and the advanced countries' s economic recession

were sufficient reason for the eagerness in finding new and

promising markets.

Brazil's hydroelectric projects were such

interesting and promising markets.
When Tucurui was decided and its implementation began
in late 1975, Eletronorte president, Colonel Raul Garcia Llano,

wanted to produce a "fait compli" which would make Tucurui's
construction irreversible.

President Geisel and Minister Ueki

were committed to its construction, even without the Japanese
loans and lawful participation.

At that time, Tucurui was

:
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expected to cost US$

2

billion,

including the transmission lines

which would supply electric power to
the alumina/aluminum
complex, the Cara j as-Itaqui Railroad,
to Belem and other cities
in the region and a long transmission
line to the Northeast in
view of exhaustion of Northeastern s
hydroelectric potential.
Shigeaki Ueki insisted that
•

...the dimensions of Tucurui make it the largest
project to be executed by Eletrobras in Brazilian
territory, since its value surpasses that of all the
ships, refineries and oil pipelines summed up that
Petrobras owns.
President Geisel himself referred to
just two projects in his latest pronunciamento
Itaipu and Tucurui. 47
'

'

With political support of that caliber, Llano went

ahead and began the bidding process for the preliminary civil

works necessary before the construction of the dam itself.

Construtora Cam argo Correa won that first bid which paved the way
for future bid-winning since it was already installed at the

construction site,

13

kilometers of the city of Tucurui.

In the meantime, an intra-agency rivalry began.

During

the negotiations involving Eletronorte, Eletrobras, Ministry of

Mines and Energy, Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Ministry of
Finance and Planning, it was clear that Eletrobras was only

interested in finding funds for Tucurui if it could also find
resources for the development of Itaparica,

a

power plant on the

Sao Francisco River, in the Northeastern State of Bahia, in such
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way that it would render political
dividends for Eletrobras «s
president, former State of Bahia
Governor Antonio Carlos
Magalhaes, and for Eletrobras Director
of Coordination, former
State of Ceara Governor Cesar Cals.
a

Eletronorte, "resulting from the laziness
of Eletrobras
in developing Amazon potential," 48
sided with fche agencies Qf
Ministry of Industry and Commerce, CONSIDER
and its nationalist
Minister, Severe Gomes, and with CVRD
interested in developing
Eastern Amazon mines and industrial potential
trying to find
,

~

—

markets for the development of Brazilian basic and
capital goods
industries, one of the PND II -s primary objectives.
Severe

Gomes

announced that Tucurui and Albras/Alunorte were going to be
delayed for lack of resources, according to the economic policy
of the early part of Geisel's term.

That gave time for the

national aluminum producers to prevent comercial damages.

Against this nationalist view of Brazilian development, Antonio
Carlos Magalhaes, stated that it was the "Ministry of Mines and

Energy's responsibility to determine hydroelectric projects,
their schedules and their power." 49

Antonio Carlos Magalhaes travelled to Paris with
President Geisel in April 1976 to continue negotiations initiated
by Brazilian Ambassador to France, former Finance Minister

Antonio Delfim Netto.

There were two main proposals for

financing the construction of Tucurui from different banks and
capital goods industries.

The first proposal,

involving an
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European Consortium was objected
to by Ueki because of its
diverse range of equipment suppliers
from three different
countries (France, West Germany and
Italy) that could cause
delays. 51 The second proposal was
more acceptable
and

eventually adopted making Tucurui's
equipment be supplied solely
from a French group of banks and
capital goods firms. 52
However, both groups were granted
Brazilian
projects, since the

economic recession in Europe and excess
liquidity made the
negotiations very attractive to the Brazilian
authorities.
A. C.
Magalhaes could not resist the political appeal
of building
another large hydroelectric power plant in his
native Northeast
(Bahia)

and granted the European Consortium the financing
and

supplier's credit to Itaparica Hydro-Project, built on
the Sao
Francisco River, in the Northeast. This was an accommodating
solution that pleased Eletrobras, the foreign comercial banks,

equipment suppliers and the construction companies.
Eletronorte, not having participated of the Paris round
of negotiations, was suddenly surprised.

A high official stated

Those negotiations with the French came as surprise to
us and it was stuck down our throat. 53

Eletronorte reluctantly accepted this contract with the French
since it meant a slim margin of equipment to be built by

Brazilian firms, who were already capable of an "index of
nationalization" of 90 percent on turbines and 100 percent in
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generators, following the guidelines
of the Nuclei of
Articulation With the Industries (MAI),
institutionalized by
Geisel at each state enterprise, and
of the PND II.
Eletronorte's concerns were seconded and
strongly resented by
several interest groups, such as the
Brazilian Association for
the Development of Basic Industries
(ABDIB)
the Brazilian
Association of Electrical and Electronic
Industries (ABINEE)
and
,

,

the Brazilian Association of Machinery
Manufacturers (ABMAQ)
whose directors voiced their discontent for the
low share granted
to the Brazilian firms on the Tucurui project. 54
As

a

result of the financing and supplier's credits

agreement the Brazilian industry could only supply less than
40
percent of total equipment to Tucurui.

Eight turbines were going

to be supplied by Creusot-Loire/Neyrpic (330 MW each totalling

2,640 MW for the first stage), with some minor assembly done by
its Brazilian subsidiary, Mecanica Pesada

.

even though formally

it was Mecanica Pesada who supplied half of the turbines.

With

respect to he eight generators that could be totally produced in
Brazil,

four of them were be produced in France by Alsthom-

Atlantique, and four of them produced in Brazil by General

Electric (United States) and Brown Boveri (Switzerland) utilizing
internal financing from BNDE.

However the financial scheme obligated the suppliers to

uncommon associations.

For example, normally the generators

manufactured in Brazil by GE and Brown Boveri had their most

.
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sophisticated parts not yet produced
in Brazil Sported from
their main plants, Canadian GE
and Brown Boveri-Swit Z erland.
But
since Tucurui-s imported equipment
was financed by French banks,
both General Electric and Brown
Boveri had to couple their
equipment with some French parts for
the two generators each had
contracted with Eletronorte 55
This unusual financial package was
finalized only in
late 1978, when the French president,
Valery Giscard D'Estaing,
visited Brazil.
In that visit the agreement between
the
Brazilian Government and the French banks
and manufacturers was
signed, but that was detrimental to Brazilian
interests.
As

stated by an Eletronorte official,

Evidently the costs of such an agreement were much
higher than they would have been were the contracts
made with a simpler scheme of supply. 56

There is

clear sense here that the French financing and

a

supplier's credits have contributed to the slump in capital goods
industries, as have all other loans made to Brazil in the period,

beginning

a

protracted crisis from 1978 on.

The hydro-mechanical equipment of Tucurui were supplied
by Brazilian firms in another package, but the majority of the

firms supplying Tucurui project were subsidiaries of the

multinational firms mentioned above. By force of the contract of
supply of turbines, generators and transformers, the firms which

.
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were supplying the first package
were not able to participate in
the second bid.
This process described in this case
was a pattern
reproduced many times over the latter
part of the 1970s and early
1980s.
A severe crisis in the national
capital goods industry
resulted from the fact that loans were
tied to supplier's
credits.
Tucurui's inde x of nationalisation did not
achieve 50
percent as a result of the loans agreed with
the European

Consortium of banks. 57

In addition> the dollars entering Brazil

via Central Bank caused

a

spiralling inflation, and

a

financial

"merry-go-round" as financial applications became less risky
than productive investments.

The political liberalization

climate helped the capital goods fraction of the industrial

entrepreneurs to endorse opposition banners, to sign the
"Manifesto of the Eight," and make statements in favor of the
Estado de Dire ito Democratico and redemocratization
Not only international banking and capital goods

manufacturing interests were operative in the case of Tucurui
project.

Brazilian contractors which had been historically

linked to infrastructure development projects since the late
1940s were just as eager to participate, as will be seen next.
However, they have not coalesced in
the case of Itaipu;

a

consortium, as they did in

this time only one major construction

company was awarded the contract.

2
"
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KzMSg^^
When Sebastiao Ferraz de Camargo
Penteado

—

carrying

all three traditional Paulista
coffee-elite last names
began
his company in the 1930s he could not
imagine that Construtora

~

Camarqo Correa (now the parent company of
subsidiaries in
agriculture, industry and services) would
build numerous dams
throughout Brazil in consortium with other
firms or alone,

producing 25,400 MW, about half of the 1986
Brazilian installed
electric power capacity. The history of Construtora
Camargo
Correa (from now on just Camargo Correa) can be traced
parallel

to the development hydroelectric power sector in
Brazil.

Sebastiao Camargo' s personal worth was calculated to be US$
1.2
billion, according to a recent Fortune survey. 59

Since 1975, Camargo Correa has been building Tucurui.

Having won the initial bid for the preliminary works in 1975,
the company was awarded

a

construction contract, in January 1977,

for the civil works valued in US$ 1.82 billion.

In 1977,

all

state investments were being scaled down, as we have seen in

Chapter IV, except for investment in Itaipu and in Tucurui,

although Tucurui was delayed for other reasons as will be
seen. 60

Several delays and cost overruns have increased the

costs of Tucurui to more than US$ 5.6 billion (plus US$ 3.5

billion on interest yet to be paid)

,

of which Camargo Correa

received more than 57 percent of that total. 61

Right after the

)

.
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commissioning of the power plant in November
1984, Camargo Correa
was awarded
without any formal bidding process once more
the construction and installation of
Tucurui Stage II to be built
until 1993, but costing only 14 percent of

—

—

the total.

Camargo Correa and Eletronorte worked close together
in
the solving the logistics problems
that is, the "Amazonian-

—

problems of building

a

huge power dam in the middle of

a

forest

whose only means of transportation were military airplanes
and
barges up the river 300 kilometers from Belem.

(The Transamazon

Highway passed nearby but it was impassible during the rainy
season

.

Camargo Correa benefited from the three consecutive

years in which unprecedented floods occurred (1978-1980), which

increased Tucurui

1

s

costs and schedule of completion at the same

The first flood, on March 1978, ruined the civil works

time.

done, which obligated Camargo Correa to ask resources not only to

reconstruct what was lost but also to change the construction

principle from an "economic height" to
dam"

—

,

—

that is, adding

13

a

"safest height of the

meters to the total height of the dam

increasing the costs of the dam by 20 percent,

approximately. 62 Subsequent heavy floods in 1979 and 1980 also

delayed construction and forced Camargo Correa to layoff and
dismiss thousands of workers, resulting in social unrest in the
area 63
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However none of these problems
described above were as
indicative of Eletronorte dependence
on Camargo Correa as the
financial backing Camargo Correa
provided to finish Tucurui. By
1980, with the definitions of the Greater
Carajas Program
(including Iron-Cara j as industrial
plants, railroad and hydropower plant) and the pressing need to
supply electric power to
Belem
then suffering successive black-outs
turned Tucurui
an "indispensable" project.
But that need was not met with
resources by the federal government. As Eletrobras
,

—

-

president,

Mauricio Schulman stated

The electric sector is pressed for funds, and that's
why those projects that can be postponed will be
postponed in order to concentrate resources on the
indispensable ones. 64

Despite that fact, Tucurui' s activation was delayed to December
1982,
1984.

then December 1983 (from 1981), and then again to December
From 1980 to 1982, notwithstanding Costa Cavalcanti's

reassurance that the priority projects of Itaipu and Tucurui were
not going to be stopped, repeatedly Eletronorte remained short of

resources for investment.

As an illustration,

in 1979

Eletronorte asked for an investment budget of Cr$
632.7 million);

17

billion (US$

Eletrobras reduced it to Cr$ 14 billion;

reduced it to Cr$ 12 billion and later cut
all state enterprise investment.

a

Seplan

flat 20 percent from

As a result, Eletronorte

received only Cr$ 10 billion (US$ 372.2 million), 59 percent of
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what it had asked for. 65

This lacR Qf resources had Uttle

influence on Camargo Correa

with its own resources.

-

s

ability to continue civil works

During three months on the first

semester of 1982 Eletronorte did not pay
Correa, which disbursed

a

a

cent to Camargo

total of US$ 250 million of its own

resources.

According to Eletrobras's supervisor at Tucurui
site,
Roberto Dourado,

Although a Cr$ 157 billion-budget (US$ 875 million) has
been approved for Eletronorte during the 1982, only
Cr$
35 billion (US$ 195 million) have been actually
disbursed up to June 1982, rather than Cr$ 80 billion
(US$ 445 million) which should have been paid. 66

Camargo Correa avoided paralyzing the construction, but
charged interest of 10 percent

a

above interest charges by banks.

it

month, plus monetary correction,

Camargo Correa thus avoided

dismissing half of the almost 30,000 employees,

fact which

a

would have caused further severe social problems, what, in fact,

demonstrates Eletronorte weakness and its dependency on the
contractor, Camargo Correa.

Evidently Camargo Correa had all interest in keeping
the construction going

—

troubles would be solved.

eventually Eletronorte

1

s

financial

At the highest point of the feverish

construction activity in 1980-81, Camargo Correa received from
Eletronorte about US$ 90 million per month, which represented
more that 70 percent of all receipts Camargo Correa had for those
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years. 67 Notwithstanding this
impressive income, Camargo Correa
did not pay its workers as well
as it was paid by Eletronorte.
in April 1980, in the wake of
labor strikes in the industrial
Southeast, some 8,000 Camargo Correa
workers went on strike for
better wages, better food rations
and better living quarters.
One week of workers protests evolved
into riots and looting at
the site of the construction.
The workers confronted security
guards and later the Military Police sent
in from the State
Capital, Belem, headed by a sheriff from
the Division of Social
and Political Order (DOPS - a division of
the Federal Police

Department),

to repress the generalized mutiny.

official count was

market looting

—

7

—

dead

including

a

The extra

woman and child in

and dozens of injured. 68

Camargo Correa

1

s

power and influence can also be

depicted not only by what was delineated above but from the fact
that this firm has invested heavily in industrial enterprises in
the Eastern Amazon region.

In 1984 Camargo Correa disbursed US$

240 million to associate itself with Alcoa and Billiton Metais in

tne Alumar

-

Aluminio do Maranhao project.

Moreover, Camargo

Correa was granted exemption of income tax (US$ 92 million,

representing 75 percent of due income tax) provided it would
invest in the area.

Camargo Correa used that to implant

Silicon industrial plant near Tucurui.
Camargo Correa

a

a

Ferro-

That location also gave

15 percent discount on electric power rates,

granted by the National Department of Water and Electric Energy
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(DNAEE)

an i.portant input since
the salting of silicon is a
highly energy-intensive activity. 6 9
,

The facts described above
demonstrate an important
blurring of the public-private
distinction. The literature on
implementation of public policy has
dealt with specific problems
of implementation
namely the problems of communication
of ends
and means, of resources, of
capability, and of political
disposition of implemented.
The Tucurui case is a show-case
example of how international actors
multinational corporation,
and financing institutions
have influenced its implementation
with over-pricing and restrictive commercial
schemes.
it also
shows how Camargo Correa became a surrogate
public institution in
order to obtain private gains during the 1982-83
debt-crisis.

-

™

-

-

D. The CAP EMI C ase
Military Politics, Presidential
Succession a nd The Environmental Question at Tucurui
:

When Tucurui lake began filling up 2,430 square

kilometers (240.000 hectares or an area of 170 by 15 kilometers
average) of land it submerged 13.4

million cubic meters 71 of

tropical forest with 43 billion cubic meters of water.

Besides

the worth of the wood, valued anywhere from US$ 350 million to
US$ 2.5 billion, depending on the estimates done, Tucurui lake
has become one of the largest potential ecological disasters in
the history of hydroelectric reservoirs.

The environmental
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question at Tucurui was also at the
centerstage of political
events in the first half of the
1980s.

Tucurui

-s

lake was not only the largest flooding
of a

tropical forest but it was potentially
the most dangerous case,
as pointed out by experts. 72 At
least three other similar cases
have occurred before:
i) in 1974, the Temmengar
dam (Malaysia)
was closed inundating the adjacent forest,
whose decomposition
produced an acid strong enough to break the
rotors of the

Japanese turbines;

ii)

in Brokopondo Hydro-Project

(Surinam)

tons

of fish died, and clouds of hydrogen sulfide,
methane gas and

sulfur dioxide emanating from the semi-dead reservoir
waters
flooded in 1964, were carried as far as Paramaribo, 100

kilometers from the dam at the delta of the river, intoxicating

thousands 73

;

iii)

in the Amazon region itself,

the small hydro-

project of Curua-Una, near the city of Santarem, Para where the

submerged forest is still bubbling gas and poisoning water since
1977,

occasionally preventing operators from getting close to the

operations control house. 74
Technically, the photosynthesis of a torrid tropical
sun over that quantity of water, wood and leaves produces an

incredible amount of nitrogen and phosphorus in its biochemical
reaction.

The existing wood and leaves

be extracted by Capemi Agropecuaria

a

,

—

subsidiary of

military pension fund conglomerate, CAPEMI
Pensoes e Montepio-Benef icente S.A.

)

,

which were supposed to

(

a

private

Caixa de Peculios,

especially created for the

Tucurui project

~
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summed up 500 tons of biomass
per hectare;
when that quantity of biomass
rots it produces 200 tons of
carbon
dioxide per hectare, 7,295 kilos
of nitrogen per hectare,
f

450

Kilos of phosphorus and 40 tons
of plankton, all of which
consume
an enormous amount of oxygen.
To maintain the ecological
equilibrium the waters should be
renovated every two months,
what has not occurred causing a
deficit of available oxygen to
prevent fertilization and decomposition.
if Eletronorte had not
eliminated, for cost reasons, a water
passage at the bottom of
the dam's main body, the reservoir
waters would be continuously
renovated preventing that problem. As
a consequence of not
having done that only the top 15 to 20
meters of the lake are
being renewed, leaving stagnant the bottom
50 meters.

^

That ecological damage called the attention
of

environmentalist and researchers worldwide:
of Amazon Research

Amazonia

)

(INPA,

a

National Institute

Institute Nacional dp Pesauisas da

report indicates that only in 1993 will there be an

ecological equilibrium after repeated mortality of fish and
release of poisonous gas; 76 the World Bank concluded that

environmental and health concerns, adding up to 3-5 percent of

a

hydro-project total costs, and finally conceded, in 1986-87, to
numerous demands of environmentalist groups demanding revision of
loans for tropical forest hydro-projects where environmental

damages were imminent. 77
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By 1985 there were signs
of Tucurui being an

"ecological bomb," resulting from
the a series of technical
mistakes and omissions, and
politico-administrative
malfeasance. 78
December 1984, only one month after
the
closing of the dam, scores of fish
laid dead at the margins of
the lake.

m

1

'

Decision Reconstruc t ion and

Tucurui

's

»

F jjtes

TnvnlvpH

ecological bomb" could have been avoided if

Eletronorte and other agencies had power to stop
the uses of
public resources for political objectives and private
gains.

Despite deforesting the reservoir being an Eletronorte
concern
since 1977, only in 1979, when Joao Figueiredo was already
in
power, was the decision made to extract the wood. 79

That

decision however, became one of the worst political, financial,

administrative and ethical scandals of the military regime,
strongly contributing to the "ecological bomb" situation created
at Tucurui.

The agreement between Carlos Galluf, the president of
the Brazilian Institute of Forest Development (IBDF)

,

the agency

for forest management and control, and Eletronorte to extract the

wood coincided with the interests of the small lumber and timber

entrepreneurs of the Eastern Amazon

—

the madeireiros

.

IBDF and

madeireiros considered that to do the job there were needed 90
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small lumberyards scattered
throughout the area with an yearly
production of 60,000 cubic meters
during two years, in addition
to the existing capacity of
1.5 million cubic meters in the
Southern Para area.
Despite the short length of time the
project's return on investment seemed
attractive
for all

involved, but it rapidly diminished
as the decision was postponed
for political reasons. 80 By May 1979
local madeireiro^ found
that two years (Tucurui was then scheduled
to be commissioned in
December 1981) were simply insufficient to
import forest

equipment,

install the lumberyards, open roads, build
ports, make

barges for transportation, all of which could
easily take one
year.

Apparently the decision was delayed repeatedly to
alienate

the local entrepreneurs, as will be seen next. 81

Behind the delay were powerful political and military

groups struggling for the commercial exploitation of the
area.
On the one hand, the civil construction companies which were

sensing severe reductions in future public investment spending
and saw an opportunity to project their image abroad. 82

On the

other hand, the military high echelon (the SNI, the National

Security Council) were considering

a vast,

project for the area (Greater Carajas)
a

;

politically visible

therefore there should be

grandiose scheme for exploiting the wood too.

According to the

June 1979 IBDF/Eletronorte basic guidelines, an area of 10,000

hectares near the dam was reserved to be cleared under

Eletronorte

'

s

responsibility.

But in the remaining 216,000

.
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hectares IBDF would be responsible
for the extraction, for
contracting small local entrepreneurs,
for the construction of
roads, ports, deposits, and for
the sale of "class I»-wood
abroad 83
IBDF and Eletronorte defined that
only national

companies could participate in the bidding
process with a mini mum
capital of US$ 750,000. That was rapidly
changed to US$ 9.5
million to exclude dozens of small timber
and lumber firms
contracting directly with the government.
But the problem of
selling that huge amount of wood in only two
years without
wrecking markets and prices remained. 84 IBDF
anticipated the
bid arguing that time was running out while
Eletronorte kept

postponing the bid for the small area near the dam. 85
So in November 1979 Construtora Norberto Odebrecht

Andrade Gutierrez

,

Servix Engenharia and Brasilinvest

to foreign firms and to, at least,

23

.

local madeireiros

proposed bids for extracting the wood. 86

associated
,

Apparently Carlos

Galluf had his way in the project, involving large Brazilian
companies, foreign associates contributing with technology and

know how, and engaging experienced local entrepreneurs. However
by April 1980 this decision was superseded by on-going

negotiations to implant large scale development projects inserted
in the Greater Carajas Program and to have a grandiose scheme for

the forest extraction.

Carlos Galluf was ousted for his refusal

to accept other solutions and was replaced by Mauro Reis, who was
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more cooperative with the central
government wishes to nullify
and redo the bid.
By that time, exultant madeireiros
demanded
that in the second bid the minimum
capital be reduced from US$
9,5 million to US$ 950,000 "reducing IBDF's
pharaohnic solution."
87
None of that occurred, of course, since
the Brazilian
government wanted to find a grandiose, visible
project to which
it could cling for the duration of
Figueiredo's six-year-term.
Few changes occurred in the second bid, the
most

notable one being the reduction of the area to
103,410 hectares
and 5.6 million cubic meters, about half of the
original forest.
Most strikingly,

a sole

tender was presented by Capemi

Agropecuaria this time around.

The other companies "were

•convinced' not to participate" 88 because that was "a mission,

more or less imposed by the government to be executed by us," as
a

Capemi official stated. 89
Capemi Agropecuaria and its company holding were

repeatedly favored by the central government, after signing the
contract in August 1980.

First,

the fact that it did not have

enough capital was disregarded by the Minister of Agriculture,

Amaury Stabile (1979-85)

,

who ordered IBDF to consider the

holding's capital to satisfy that clause.

Second, an addendum to

the contract was signed in November 1980 reducing the area to be

extracted to 65,000 hectares (from 103,410) and the volume to 3.0
million cubic meters (from 5.6).

Additionally, even if the

original contract explicitly mentioned "the maximum amount
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possible" to be extracted, the
supplemental contract allowed
Capemi Agropecuaria to extract
only "class-I", export-type
wood.
Third, the National Council of
Foreign Trade (Concex) acceded to
central government pressure to lift
legislation prohibiting
the

export of unprocessed logs. 90

Cooperative Credit

(a

Fourth> the National BanR

^

federal agency subordinated to the
Ministry

of Agriculture) guaranteed a US$
100 million French loan to
Capemi, against its bylaws mandating
such collateral be posted

only to cooperatives.

Such actions were part of

a

powerful hard-

line military scheme in the 1979-82 years to
return to power, or
at least to maintain some political power,
as discussed in

Chapter IV.

General Ademar Messias de Aragao, president of

Capemi, supported the hard-line stance of top-echelon
military

ministers (SNI, the Cabinet of the Army Ministry and the
office
of the Secretary General of National Security Council
attended

meetings with Capemi, IBDF, Ministry of Agriculture, Eletronorte
on a regular basis) who were struggling against political

liberalization.

These actions were also inherent to the

government's decision of concentrating investment in the Greater
Carajas Program, instituted
of Capemi contract,

a

a

couple of months after the signing

fact that demonstrated the political

importance of this project. 91
Two years later in 1982, the outcome of Tucurui's wood

extraction project was dismal.

Early in 1981 Capemi had

subcontracted Servix Engenharia (one of the four original
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tenders) but

a

few months after Servix
rescinded it because

Capemi was not honoring payments. 92
sales of US$

Notwithstanding expected

billionn ror
t.i
for "Msec
c lass-l»
wood against an investment
of US$ 165 million, Capemi,
unable to perform the job alone,
contracted three other firms, which
in their turn were also
unprepared for such a gargantuan
endeavor. 93 Facing
unsatisfactory results, Eletronorte
commissioned an ecological
study concluded in March 1982 recommending
that "the minimum are a
to be cleared should be 85% of all
vegetation in future Tucurui
reservoir i94 Still uncertain whether
Capemi was going to
perform the job Eletronorte constantly warned
IBDF/Capemi of the
l

timetable while, at the same time, knowingly
allowed Capemi to
use toxic defoliants with the tacit agreement
of the SNI and

National Security Council. 95
Capemi

1

s

performance was criticized from several

angles. First the effective extraction of the wood did not
comply

with "the maximum possible" dictated by the contract.

Tucurui

wood samples marketed at Hannover and Paris fairs attracted

potential European buyers, in late 1980, incited Capemi's to find

international partners.

Maison Lazard Freres,

a

French financial

house, constituted a firm associated to Capemi, Compagnie

Forestiere d'Amazonie (or Amazon Timber Company, in Panama)
put together a US$ 100 million loan.

,

and

Under the terms of their

contract Capemi agreed to supply 5,000 cubic meters of logs per
mo nth for two years and 1.8 cubic meters in lumber, totalling

3
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million cubic me ters.

However the results were bleak.
Jean
Claude Meyer, Lazard Freres
official, stated

e
1 rreaSiar

H» 1

CritiCiSm ° f the Brazilian wood
is its

HpsgSpSi^SSSS^ SEISES?

1

equipment and the third supplier's
credit of French

?™?2-part

Pe

ly

^

?ea°Vlng Untouched
bankers the mo; t !i?

US$ 25

*»t

*^i°n °f the
interested the

in terms of volume Capemi only
delivered 3,600 cubic meters of

logs and 340,000 cubic meters of
lumber up to June 1982.97
Financially, Capemi only applied US$ 10
million direct expenses
in the project, and circa US$ 30
million
in roads,

ports, etc.

However, US$ 15 million were spent in
various other activities
including political public relations to the
hard-line fragment of
the bloc-in-power:
i) at least US$ 3 million were
contracted
with Antonio M. Abissamara, who bought the
magazine 0 Cruzeiro
from Alexandre von Baumgarten, assassinated in
October 1981

allegedly with the involvement of SNI 98

million in

a

ii)

;

another US$

2

contract signed between Capemi Agropecuaria

president, Fernando Pessoa, and Antonio

M.

Abissamara

Cons ultoria e Empreendimentos Internacionais

^

(

FAN-

to publicize Indian

Foundation activities and the relocation of the Paracana and
Gavioes Indians, as

a

'proof of Brazilian government good-will;

s
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iii)

other two contracts to advertize
Tucurui wood abroad and
within Brazil, for an undisclosed
99
amount.

Capemi was also politically
favored with the July 1982
Seplan decision to cut 10 percent
across state investment.
SNI
rapidly endorsed it, seeing an
opportunity to delay Tucurui for a
year and thus permitting Capemi
to recoup.
SNI s shifting role
-- already characterized in
Chapter IV by its involvement in the
RiOCentr ° bombi "9> in electoral analyses
and in countrywide labor
conflicts, can be definitely characterized
with its involvement
with Capemi/Tucurui. That 10 percent
cut across the board did
not reach Itaipu, a development project
as important as Tucurui,
but Capemi 's peculiar situation of malfeasance
were not enough
reasons for the government IBDF) rescind the
contract after the
French Maison Lazard Freres had done so for Capemi
's dishonoring
«

-

(

of schedules.

2

•

Politic al and Environmental Consequences

In March 1983, Capemi bankruptcy was requested by

Unibanco,
De Carli

a

Brazilian commercial bank, and Deputy Carlos Alberto

(PDS-AM)

,

a

congressman and an entrepreneur from the

State of Amazonas engaged in the Paulo Maluf presidential bid and

creditor of US$ 414,000, who became administrator of Capemi'
remaining assets. 100

Capemi political importance related to the

fact that its high-officials were involved in

a

power struggle,

s
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interna! to the .ilitary regime,
for Figueiredo's succession.
Capemi's chief-executive, General
Ade.ar M. Aragao, a retired
hard-liner, who supported General
Octavio Medeiros candidacy
(Figueiredo's ^ectore and the sistena^lOl
candidate), but
would support the Planalto Palace
second choice, Minister of
Interior, Mario Andreazza.
This bankruptcy prompted

a

Parliamentary Investigating

Commission to investigate Capemi's
politico-administrative
malfeasance.
Capemi's folding forced the Brazilian
government to
assume its US$ 27.75 million-debt with
French financial

institution, Maison Lazard Freres.102

inexperience in exploiting

a

•

tropical forest should have been

offset by hiring foreign experts, as

contract mandated.

Capemi Agrope cuaria

a

clause in the IBDF-Capemi

Capemi, on the contrary, dishonored the

contract with IBDF and with French backers, who
finally broke the
contract.
After that, Capemi sought help from domestic
banks,

further complicating its already precarious situation

Eletronorte was left with the pressing responsibility
to clear 10,000 hectares adjacent to the dam, and to use

defoliants diminishing the biomass left to decompose in the rest
of the area.

Eletronorte was determined to follow

recommendations suggesting the clearing of 85 percent of the
future lake's area.

Considering that less than

been cleared by Capemi, in April 1983
the picture --,

—

3

percent had

with Capemi already out

IBDF/Ministry of Agriculture opened

a

32,000

"
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hectares-tract for bid at the right
margins of the Tocantins
River, where were concentrated
first-grade, resistant to climate
wood (mahogany, iee, angelim,
iatoba, etc.).
Three alternatives
were devised:

w% T

domestic construction
°£ fered to
coLanLf
companies, but did not
wish to participate at their own risk
(when they wanted in 1979 they were
103°™
shunned away)
ii) medium size Para madeireiros who did not want in view
of little time left and lots of risks.

iii)
a

jo£

small size Tucurui and Maraba madeireiros no
al structure
no equipment to do the large scale
i04
'

None of these alternative worked for reasons ranging
from

economic (high cost of cutting, transporting, warehousing),
insufficient time to promote sales abroad, social and judicial

pending questions (Capemi left unpaid more than 1,000 workers and

relocations of 18,000 people in three cities and two indian
reserves, Paracana and Gavioes, shown in Map 6.2).

continued to be

a

But time

crucial factor, as argued by an IBDF report

Considerations led to the conclusion that the endeavor
was not economically feasible given the ten months
period (1 May 1983 to 30 September 1984). Considering
the rainy season from October 83 to April 84 that was
reason enough for the large construction companies and
madeireiros to refuse participating at their own
risk.

1Ub
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Therefore an imminent environmental
disaster both by
the ecological impossibility
of lake's waters to digest
the
submerged forest
for the lake would need 230
times more oxygen
10
than it has *
and by
indiscrilTlinate use Qf hazardous
chemicals, forbidden in most
countries including

-

^

Brazil.

According to Eletronorte, clearing
the 10,000 hectares
resolved the safety problem of
operating the turbines.
But it
did so at a very expensive cost of
US$ 25 million with no return
since the trees
which could have been sold by US$ 550
million
in foreign markets
were buried before the reservoir was
filled 107 and the job was only done after

-

-

Capemi had left its

,

area of influence to avoid legal conflicts. 108
Since there was no escape from ecological
damage, the

Minister of Agriculture, Amaury Stabile, tried to
reduce the
environmental, financial, and political fiasco.
IBDF

inventory

found out that Capemi had spent US$ 53.5 million in
equipment,

building roads and ports, villages, offices and

warehouses, cut

some 400,000 cubic meters of wood but only delivered
of that.

fraction

As disparate as estimates of cutting, warehousing and

export had been Capemi' s own estimates were only
that. 109

a

a

little above

Above all, not even General Aragao and Eletronorte

president, Douglas Luz 110 statement at the hearings of the

Capemi Investigating Commission elucidated much.
Capemi

's

folding influenced negatively the hard-line

candidacy of General Octavio Medeiros, for his known connections
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with the case reported in
daily newspapers and magazin es
as a
consequence of growing political
liberalization.
Figueiredosupport for Andreazza matured,
at the same time as government
pressured against the approval of
the "Direct Presidential
Election - Now!" amendment.
By mid-1984, after the amendment
was
defeated, Tancredo Neves' consensus
candidacy developed with the
distinctive feature that military
power exorbitance
and

wrongdoing were not going to be
investigated. HI
In the absence of censorship,

and the fact that an

opposition governor was elected in the State
of Para (Jader
Barbalho) helped unveiling the proofs of
use of defoliants and
toxic chemicals sequentially. Eletronorte
had allowed the use of
defoliants with the knowledge of the National
Security Council
(CSN

'

Concho

de Seguranca Naciona]

)

already knew that Capemi

had used and left unused, unmarked barrels in the
areas that it
worked during 1981 and 1982 H2 Therefore Eletronorte
and INPA
.

were constantly attacked by the press and politicians.

INPA

president stated that although ecological impact would certainly
happen,

five to eight years would be necessary to extract that

amount of wood, but it would "smell less than Venice anyhow!" 113
Moreover, Eletronorte itself used defoliants to clear

path for transmission lines.

In all areas where defoliants have

been used at least forty six people 114 died and hundreds were
left with sequels of grave consequences such as increase in the

number of natural abortions, blood in the urine of children. 115
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The use of pentachlorophenol
and Tordon 101 (Agent
Orange) disrupted local economy.
Fifteen percent of Para's
economy lived off Brazil-nut
extraction by natives in the
forests; part of that economic
activity was impacted by the
killing of some 2,000 by those
toxic chemicals.
The most
striking fact, however, was that
Capemi paid workers wages in
arrears in kind that is with
unused barrels
,

of

pentachlorophenol.

since the workers evidently had
little use
for the substances they abandoned
the barrels in at least 400
different places dispersed throughout
the area. Even though
former Capemi teams were hired by
Eletronorte to collect the
toxic barrels it was hardly possible to
comb such a large area.
Water pressure burst the barrels left,
although a large portion
of were found.*"
In order to minimize consequences to
fauna
Eletronorte initiated an animal rescue project 117
which was

extensively used in public relations campaigns during
1984-1986
to demonstrate that Eletronorte cared about
environment.
As of July 1984 the water passages at the bottom of
the

dam were progressively being closed with concrete with the last
one scheduled for closing on September 1984.

several actions were taken to prevent it.

Nevertheless

The State of Para

Legislature requested explanations about the consequences of
Tucurui closing.

The State government was concerned about

salinization of drinking water

—

which would result from the

water reflux of Tocantins River right after the closing of the

.

dam
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-

and the disruption of the
riparian fishing economy
affecting see 300,000 people
downstream when Tocantins River
would stop running for 60
days in the 300 kilometers
traot f:roin
the dam to the delta and
the 1. 2 million people in
.8

BeW11

The Government of Para sued
arguing if Eletronorte had
infringed
state and federal laws in
several counts: water code,
forest
code, national environmental
law (Law 6938) and for the
"crimina!
submersion of the
.+.v^
une wood.
wood "119 Pllv
Furthermore citizens grouped under
the National Movement for the
Defense of Life sued to stop
.

Tucurui 120
Tucurui created social problems as
grave as the

ecological ones.

Around 4,000 families or 17,310

people^

were expropriated at prices set in
1978 and not readjusted when
payment was made in 1980. That was a
motive of unrest and deaths
in 1980, when the majority of
relocation cases were resolved

including by the use of force.

indirectly elected by the PDS

,

Governor Alacid Nunes (1979-83),
ordered the intervention of the

Military Police of the State of Para to clear the
areas, causing
unrest and at least 11 deaths. 122 Furthermore, the
village of
Tucurui

—

which had had

nut selling town

a

3,000 inhabitants, a sleepy, Brazil-

until the mid-1970s

—

was by 1985

a

disorderly

town, with a population of 80,000 dwellers, most of them young

and unemployed, a condition exacerbated by the end of the

construction of Tucurui Project.

These social facts were

explored by Opposition governor Jader Barbalho. 123
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The fact that sixteen tons of
pentachlorophenol were
found in the future lake's area!24
containing 23 percent Qf
lethal dioxin (enough to kill
5.3 million persons according
to
experts), despite its irrefutable
dangers, were politically used
by Deputy De Carli to obtain
an injunction forcing the closing
the da. by Eletronorte 125 what
±n reality

^

.

^^^

the closing of the dam be done only
after Capemi s assets had
been taken out of the future flooded
area and auctioned.
In fact
this was the creditors last ditch
effort to save some of the
money sunk in the Capemi project.
Eletronorte responded trying
to gain time by legally maneuvering
and counteracting

politically.

As it was stated by a high Eletronorte
official,

if

Capemi/IBDF were so interested in the case they
would have
rapidly taken out the tractors, the three operating

lumberyards,

5,000 cubic meters of wood in deposits, 300 small wood
houses, an
energy generator 12 6 in addition, Eletronorte had formally
asked
.

Capemi where the barrels were and got no response prompting

hurried search over the areal 2 ? Eletronorte

1

s

a

president, Douglas

Luz did not hesitate between abiding by the injunction and

following technical opinions.

He stated

The lawsuits are untimely, innocuous, and have
political objectives... We will not be able to close
the water gates after the rain begins and the dam may
break with the force of the water. 128
In an action resembling more an adventure, Douglas Luz dodged the

court summons for 15 days.

His action was politically backed
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since no other action was
taken by central government.
Luz
profited from an early rain in
the headwaters of the Tocantins
River, and on 6 September 19
84 ordered to close the ten
remaining
Mufas, out of total of forty. The
only other authority present
was, significantly, the Minister
of Welfare, Senator Jarbas
Passarinho (PDS-Para) who remained
behind Figueiredo government
even after defeat was certain on
Electoral College.
That very
night Douglas Luz was dismissed for
"budgetary reasons 129
,

.

Since Tucurui was one of the principal
Figueiredo

government projects, part of the Greater
Carajas Program put
together by his Administration, its commissioning
was politically
crucial for Figueiredo. Thus the Luz action
was politically
justified, in the optics of the bloc-in-power
,

and also was kept

Capemi and Maluf supporters away from central power
avoiding the
dangerous financial malfeasance which could possibly
incriminate

high-echelon figures in Figueiredo team, which would worsen their
lame-duck months.
too.

The dismissal involved other political aspects

Douglas Luz maintained close working relations with

Eletrobras president, Costa Cavalcanti, and with former Governor
of Parana, Ney Braga, a PDS dissident (Liberal Front) who

embraced Tancredo Neves candidacy.

president of Itaipu Binacional.)
irritate Figueiredo.

(In 1985 Braga was nominated

That was reason enough to

However Figueiredo was already irritated

with Luz because some months earlier Luz refused to purchase the

building where Eletronorte headquarters is located in Brasilia.
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The price of the building was
increased by Cr$ 3 billion (US$
1-63 million) over its market price,
this difference was going to
be donated by the building's
owner to finance the presidential
campaign of Joao Figueiredo's candidate,
Mario Andreazza 130
.

Tucurui was inaugurated with pomp and
fanfare 22
November 1984 by Figueiredo, in the hope
that the waters would
cover the political, environmental and
social damages
done.

six

months later samples of water were analyzed
at the Swedish
University of Upsala, financed by London's The
Observer when
unmistakable proofs of poison pentachlorophenol and
dioxin were
,

found. 131

Tucurui's gloomy outcome was better exposed by
Lucio Flavio Pinto words. He wrote

Ten of million of tons of vegetal mass were submerged
by Tucurui lake In 1984. More than 10 million trees
were slowly drowned and died. Two years later every
one who visited the lake saw a desolating, perturbing
scene:
limbless and leafless trees lay at the margins
or even on the center of the lake floating in direction
of the dam.
Even though a total disaster has not
occurred water plants proliferate, gases are released
despite the strong Tocantins current. 132
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This chapter set out
to analyze the influence
of
political power over a policy
process
the decision and
implementation of the pioneer
Tucurui develops project
in the
Eastern Amazon. The
hypotheses posed at the
beginning of the
chapter
that is, the use of state
enterprises as sustainers of
growth and promoters of caDitsiie*
capitalist development, according
to the
theoretical model set cut in
Chapter I! and the influence
Qf
political power structure and
system of political domination
had
over decision and implementation
of Tucurui policy
were not
rejected.

-

-

n

^

-

The methodologies used in
this study of the relative
influence of private and state
actors over the decision and
implementation of Tucurui
decision reconstruction and elite
reputation analysis
produced a pattern of findings from
which
some observations can be made.
At the institutional

-

-

level,

political power was observed to be heavily
concentrated at the
top executive position
the Geisel and Figueiredo presidencies
at the ministerial level (Mines and
Energy, Agriculture,

-

—

,

Planning, SNI and CSN)

,

at the main executive officers of the

state enterprises (Magalhaes, Cals, Schulman,
Costa Cavalcanti,
Llano, Luz), and at the international and national
large private

companies involved in the project or in any other
economic

activities in the region.

.
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The chief figures active
in this development project
originated from the ranks of
the
me military,
milit*rv of <-k
the politicians and
of the dominant class.
Anfibios (amphibious, see glossary),
such
as Cesar Cals and Costa
Cavalcanti, politicians such as A.C.
Magalhaes, and military such as
Medeiros,
occupied positions in
the state bureaucracy, both
in repressive apparatus and in
the
Executive high positioned teen i cos
and bureaucrats.
Native
populations, working class and middle
sector leaders or

^

organizations had very little say and
were not active
participants in the policy-making process
or in influencing some
the implementation surrounding Tucurui,
nor did they or could
they exert any real influence over the
ultimate outcomes of this
project
Eletronorte was involved in an intra-agency
rivalry
with holding Eletrobras, which only agreed to
Tucurui after the
final decision had been reached within the highest
circles of
power.

Geisel and Ueki justified the project in terms of both

the "redemption of the Eastern Amazon region" and of
capitalist

development in

a

peripheral zone of the country, although that

principle was camouflaged under the "National Integration"
banner.

The interest shown by Japanese, Canadian, British,

Dutch, and American capital associated to state and private

Brazilian mining and industrial capital in aluminum and other

non-ferrous metals, and iron-ore were crucial elements behind
their initial decision in 1974-75.
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Eletrobras supported Eletronorte
s creation and
Planning of Tucurui only rhetorically,
merely conferring real
support after financing had been
secured with the European
consortium of banks, not only for
Tucurui but also for a
Northeast power plants, since the
region was the homeland of the
two major politicians at
Eletrobras helm (1975-1978), Antonio
Carlos Magalhaes and Cesar Cals.
•

Unable to obtain the application of
the "law of
participation, « that is the joint investment
of major consumers
in the hydro-projects, the agency
(Eletronorte) and Tucurui
project were at the mercy of the foreign
banks and capital goods
suppliers, Tucurui became a show-case
example of loss
of

political and financial autonomy.

associations

—

ABDIB

,

ABINEE

and international capital

—

,

The capital goods interest

ABIMAQ, which included Brazilian

voiced their discontent with low

proportion of equipment ordered to national companies.

Brazilian

entrepreneurs, moreover, choose to embrace opposition views and
to support its political party, the MDB during the latter
part of

Geisel years.
In addition Eletronorte left entirely to Camargo Correa

and other private firms the implementation of the project,

depending on the financial capacity of the main contractor to
keep the construction running.

Eletronorte also left to private

engineering firms the supervisory and logistic functions, which
have greatly elevated the final cost.
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Confronted with the objections
from the Brazilian
capital goods producers and
with the limitations imposed
by a
more restrictive international
financial market, the Figueiredo
government, also pressured by
balance of payment deficits, cho ose
to counterattack by including
Tucurui in the over-arching

mining/industrial, energy-intensive
complex, Greater Carajas
Program, for which available
resources were channelled.
addition, Figueiredo mobilized the
support from the hard-line
military faction of the regime, by
engaging Capemi "as a
mission," a private military pension
fund run by retired
military.
Although a private company, Capemi, was
an instrument
for marketing the achievements of
the military regime

m

and

particularly of Figueiredo government.

That firm, with the

veiled support of the SNI and of CSN and
other sites of hard-line
military positions, counteracted the ongoing
political
liberalization.

As a consequence state autonomy

—

as well as

the autonomy of the Eletrobras subsidiary in charge
of building
it

was relinquished once more in the greatest political,

administrative and environmental fiasco at Tucurui, adding to
earlier losses of political and financial autonomy.

.
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Brasil, 26 October 1981, p. 16.
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See Samuel Wainer, "o Motim de Tucurui," Folha de Sao
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69. According to Eduardo Celestino Rodrigues "Unidades e
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77. Eletrobras request for a US$ 500 million loan from the
World Bank was denied until Eletrobras complied with
environmental recommendations, especially for Balbina
hydroelectric dam, in the Amazon Region, projected to be flooded
in 1988 with a 33 million cubic meters of wood in it. Interviews
with World Bank official. Washington, DC April, July and
September 1987.
78. The expression "ecological bomb" was officially coined by
the then Special Secretary for Environmental Protection, Paulo
Nogueira Netto, in a letter to the then director of INPA,
Henrique Bergamin Filho, which became public in 1982.
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102. Capemi owed circa US$ 139 million in debts to
domestic banks, international and domestic equipment foreign and
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Ministry of Agriculture official, Brasilia 1984, analysis of
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12 pg,
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112. Eletronorte, INPA and CNPq allgedly knew IBDF/Capemi used
defoliants since 1981, with the knowledge and tacit agreement of
the SNI and of the office of Secretary General of National
Security Council. Minutes from meetings, December 1981 and June
1982.
See also statement by Henrique Bergamin, "Ameaca Ecologica
em Tucurui ainda sem Solucao," Jornal de Brasilia
10 April
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114. - According to Sebastiao Pinheiro, a SEMA engineer, who was
hired to clean up operation. "Denunciadas mortes causadas por
agrotoxicos em Tucurui," Folha de Sao Paulo 6 April 1984, p. 23.

115. - Joao Batista de Melo Bastos, Secretary of Agriculture of
the State of Para,
"Quadro de desolacao e dramatico," Folha de
Sao Paulo 10 July 1984, p. 22. See also "Tucurui e o tremendo
impacto ecologico," Jornal de Brasilia 4 March 1984, p. 6.
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12 5. Randau Marques, "Tucurui: Pode estar comecando uma grande
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS: THE DYNAMICS OF
POLICY-MAKING
AND SOME DEMOCRATIC PERSPECTIVES

This study concludes with a
comparison of the patterns
of power and policy-making
observed in the two major development
projects executed during the
authoritarian military regime. The
principal objective of this comparative
analysis
are:

1)

to

determine to what extent the basic
patterns involved in policymaking were similar or different in
each project;
2) the extent
to which the same leaders, groups and
institutions participated
in each project; and 3) the extent to
which the same
class and

class fractional interests benefited from the
two projects

implemented
It is important to recognize that this comparison
is

not exhaustive.

Although other state sectors were also analyzed

in Chapter IV -- industrial, mining and other infrastructure

projects

—

our focus was on the two most unique development

projects undertaken by the authoritarian regime. Other type of

decisions could also be fruitfully studied (social policy, or
other redistributive, regulatory or distributive policies)
Second, we have not considered

—

except in passim

—

the

similarities between the hydro-power policy-making between the

military regime and the civilian regime which preceded

it.

There

are many apparent similarities despite the differences in the

size of hydro-power projects undertaken three or four decades ago
407

408

and Itaipu or Tucurui.

Large construction companies
have largely
influenced hydro-power policy
both then and now.
But emphasis on
generation, as pointed out by
Tendlerl has vastly expanded to
include the interests of
equipment producers, transmission
and
distribution equipment manufacturers
and assembly contractors.

While continuity merits further
examining in view of regime
changes, the disparity shown in
these two case-studies have
surpassed any apparent continuity.
Third, the scope of this
study was limited to the 1964-85
period.
with the return to
competitive party politics, unnoticeably
as of 1974-76 but more
vividly after the 1979 party reform,
it is quite conceivable that
the role of many elites, groups and
institutions within the
policy-making process in the Nova Republic*
(1985+) period have
undergone substantial changes.
Despite its limitations, this comparison of the Itaipu
and Tucurui projects is capable of providing useful
insights into

several important aspects of the policy-making process in
Brazil.
In the first place,

because both projects had distributive

implications, they were highly publicized and controversial

projects that mobilized major social forces within their sector.
Consequently, both provide excellent opportunities for observing

patterns of political participation and interest representation

within the military regime.

Second, the expenditure of huge

resources for Itaipu and Tucurui precluded appropriation in other
electrical sector projects and in other social expenditures.
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Furthermore, both projects
involved more than one decision
and
spanned more than one
presidential term; their final
outcome s are
therefore revealing indicators
of the overall balance of
class
and the power of class
fractions power within the state
and th
dominant class during the
authoritarian military period.
Finally, the fact that the
decisions were of different scope and
nature permits an examination
of the factors that led to an
autonomous or to a heteronomous
decision-making within the
Brazilian political system.

A.

Patterns of Policy-Making

In Brazil, development policy has
changed less abruptly
in Brazil than other cases in Latin
America such as Peru in 1968

(and again in 1980), Argentina in 1976
(and again in 1983), and
in Chile 1973

(and again ?).

Major development policies have

been initiated by the Executive branch.

Individual congressmen

may have been particularly interested in one or another
project

affecting their constituencies but their influence has been
imperceptible.

Congressional oversight and inquiry was done in

the Nuclear Program, Tucurui and CVRD cases but Congress did not

have the power to recommend any policy changes.

In the Itaipu

case, the role of Congress was basically to rubber-stamp the

Treaty of Itaipu, essentially handled by the central military

government and diplomatic ranks in the Brazilian side.

In the
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Tucurui case, the raiiure
failure nf
of the tInquiry Commissions
proposals to
stop the flooding of the
tne re^P^^v
reservoir ,,,-4-u
y
with tons of biomass inside,
and the incapacity to enforce
the recommendations to the Nucl
ear
Program, confirm that only the
Executive was an effective poli cy
initiator.
In Itaipu case, all different
international treati.ies

and final decision were the
product of Executive predominance.
Ata das Catarata s of 1966 was the
final result of an Executive
and diplomatic approximation that
began in 1950s, when President
Juscelino and Generalissimo Stroessner
inaugurated the Friendship
Bridge.
The 1973 Itaipu Treaty was the ultimate
output of a

process set in motion by General Costa
was empowered in 1967.

e

Silva shortly after he

it spanned the repressive Costa e Silva

and Medici governments, and was entirely
drafted under the

instructions of the National Security Council and Itamaraty.
Likewise, A cuerdo de las Altura^ of 1979 resulted from

a

negotiation process involving the private and the public sector
of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay.

A similar pattern is also

detected in the case of Tucurui, in its initial phase.

The 1973

proposal of Mines and Energy Minister Dias Leite, was drafted

following the directives of the National Security and Development

Doctrine and its National Integration Plan for the Amazon. The
1974-76 decision-making process was elaborated under the close

supervision of General-President Geisel and Mines and Energy

Minister Ueki.
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P-^cts

A presidential deci^-inr. 4-«
aecision to undertake
development
was not at leasfc in
cases
,

^

^^^^ ^

soiely the outgrowth of
specific demands or direct
pressures
brought to bear on the
system by the potential
development projects. Among

'

fronfcier

rural workers, mdians
from the Amazon and most
of the working
class engaged in these
develops projects, levels of
organization and mobilization
were so low that the dominated
classes were essentially
incapable of articulating their
policy
preferences or pressuring the
political system directly.

Illustrating this point, despite
scattered outbreaks of violence
in the construction sites
of Itaipu and Tucurui, no
decision or
implementation directive can be traced
to specific demands
expressed by organizations representing
such groups.
Moreover,

no policy has been modified as

a

result of demands posed by

working class organizations in these
two cases.
The highly
organized economic interest association,
multinational
corporations and international banks, in
contrast, frequently
made direct requests for favorable policies.
The executive was
unquestionably influenced by these demands, but in
neither the
Itaipu nor the Tucurui Project can the specific
content of the

policy initiative put forward by the state tbe attributed
solely
to pressures from the private sector.

Rather than a direct response to carefully articulated

group demands, the decision of

a

General-President to commit his

.

administration to anv
any nxr-n
particular type of project
should be seen
as a result of a more
complex
p ex and ambiguous set of
indirect
Pressures. On the one
hand, the executive
was charged „ ith
primary institution*!
responsibility te planning
and promoti ng
economic qrowth
wth. that
t-h»+- is,
^ for
^
establishing and sustaining
the
conditions reguired for
capitalist accumulation,
on the othe r
hand, the executive also
was vested with primary
responsibility
for striving for legitimacy
and preserving the stability
of the
state and of cne
ji
the Pn
n>-c
m
it
entire military authoritarian
•

system.

These general pressures
were, of course, filtered
through personalities and
ideological biases of individual
presidents and the immediate
managerial-political elite. They
were also conditioned by the
specific historical context within
which each General-President
ruled.
Different presidents could
and did, therefore, react
differently to similar
set of

pressures.

General-President Costa e Silva, for
example, pushed
ahead with the insulation of the
policy-making process and the
expansion of the state enterprise
system while General-President
Geisel was forced to stop unchecked
growth of estatizacao due to
mounting financial crisis and growing
discontent from business
sectors.
Nevertheless, all the development projects
examined in
this study appear to have sprung from a
presidential conviction
that some form of state action was necessary to
stimulate

economic growth and preserve legitimacy and security of the
state
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A pattern of state
intervention and presidential
influence can be traced to
the l 940s with Getulio
Vargas-led
,

National Steel Company (CSN)
and Rio Doce Valley Company
(CVRD)
followed in the 19 50s by
regional hydro-power projects
and the
creation of Petrobras;
President Juscelino Kubistchek
inaugurated the internationalization
of the Brazilian economy
with the Target Plan, but his
grandiose project was the
construction of Brasilia, the new
inland capital.
Joao Goularfs
presidency deteriorated into a
-paralysis of decision."?
General-President Castello Branco was
committed to institutional
reform and to exclude working class
demands on the
state.

General-President Costa
a

e

Silva hard-line stance was committed
to

Emerging Power project in which the
Angra

I

Nuclear Power

Plant, the Transamazon Highway, and
the Rio-Niterdi Bridge were

grandiose projects pursued while dissidents
and opposition were
violently repressed. General-President Medici
furthered
political support to the Brasil-Grande?* ideals
with Itaipu
Project and Steel Plan, while Finance Minister
Delfim Netto

masterminded the engagement of international and local
capitalist
and financial interests.

General-President Ernesto Geisel

initially wanted to push ahead with the Grandeza project, but the
oil crisis and its consequences on the balance of payments were

an effective deterrent to the grandiose development projects

Tucurui, Acominas

.

Ferrovia do Acq

,

Nuclear Program,

Petroleum/Petrochemical Program, Albras/Alunorte Industrial

—

Complex.

Neverthele^o
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*-u
thGy
WSre

*

fina
financial and political
duress
ess.
.

-PI— ted
M

under tremendou s

r
Gener
al~President Joao
i

—
—
^

Figueiredo could muster
enouah
n ° Ugh r-«
c
resources
to initiate his own
project
Greater caraj4s

72 7
3,1(3

-

<the "

°"

authoritarian regime

.

P-ties, won state Executive

^

elections and strongly

-

In additio

^

^

^^

i979 _ ig85

^

deep recession in the Rra.iii
Brazilian economy, for
the first time
dUrin9
mUitary rUle
»» relationship between economic
.rowth and the legitimacy
of authoritarian
regime „ as shattered
in the case of itaipu,
diplomatic treaties with
Paraguay were conceived as
mechanisms for simultaneously
Placating Paraguayan interests
thus obtaining their agreement
on the use of a common
good -, and to satisfy Bra
2
'

.

-

ili an

military security concerns with
respect to Argentina.
The
establishment of the Binational
Entity was designed to gain the
support of Paraguayan public
officials and to gain the confidence
and political support of the
construction and
capital goods

interest groups.

3

In the case of Tucurui/

the principal

motivation was put forward by the Second
National Development
Plan's "second import-substitution
industrialization" and the
ideology of developing the Amazon on grounds
of National
Integration.
In both projects, concern for providing
electric
power for the industrializing regions of Brazil

and concern for

.

continued economic activity
activitv were expressed,
but the major
considerations were,
were without
w ifhn,,f question,
political rather economic.
Perhaps the best way to
conceptually the policyinitiating role of the executive
and of state enterprises

within
the military regime is in
terms of "relative autonomy."
The
executive was neither wholly
free f rom active pressures
from the
dominant classes, nor simply
an instrument directly manipulated
by members of the ruling
class.
The general limits of the
state's autonomy in any policy
area were contingent upon the
structural constraints and instrumental
pressures characteristic
of the particular period focused.
The specific limits were
always a product of bargaining,
compromise, co-optation,
leadership, and coalition-building
(within the military regime).
The executive could and frequently
did press against or "test"
the constraints and pressures that
restricted his freedom of
action

Once

sponsor

a

a

president had made the original decision to

particular project, the second stage in the policy-

making process was the drafting of

a

formal or informal agreement

between the ministry/state enterprise responsible with the
private sector.

During the drafting process, which generally

lasted several years in the two case studied, it was not uncommon
for the minister and his subordinates to carry out extensive

"consultations" with the major interest groups that would be most

directly affected by the decision.

In 1963-64,

for example,

Eletrobras President (and
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hydro . pQwer consultant)

^

Maroondes Kerraz teste*
the Paraguayan government
fcy stating
the best solution to tap
the h uge hydro-power
potenti.l in the
Parana River was to devisi-o
deviate the river into
Brazilian territory
and then build an entire!
entirely
v ny.
a ,n
Brazilian
power plant. Marcondes
Ferraz was "sounding out"
diplomatic problems with Paraguay
before the Brazilian government
finally decided to pursue the
twin military and diplomatic
course to convince Stroessner
and
his staff of building itaipu.
Prior consultations were by no
meanS obli 9 at °ry, however, as
evidenced by Minister Ueki's
failure to discuss his Tucurui
proposal with anyone outside the
Ministry of Mines and Energy and
the state enterprises under its
area of influence, Eletronorte
and CVRD.
Likewise, for Geisel's
failure to discuss the Nuclear
Program outside the military
ministries, National Security Council
and diplomatic
•

circles.

After the final version of major
development projects
had been decided, the third stage of
policy-making began with the
formal establishment of the institutions
responsible, Itaipu
Binacional and Eletronorte. Once the projects
reached the state
enterprise, they were inevitably subjected to close
critical

scrutiny by both bureaucratic tecnicos and concerned
private

sector groups

~

a

stage of policy-making process.

Closed meetings of construction companies and capital

goods manufacturers with state enterprise officials provided the

principal arena for this review process.

Over

a

period of months

.

or years, the objections
Dections ft
off «-v,
the ma] or interest
groups leaders
were taken again to
*
the
6 in«=m
lnsula ted
ministerial or state
.

enterprise's boardrooms
rooms.

Th^ was repeatedly
This
the case with
Itaipu final line-up
of construction
con^mnf
P or
companies (UNICON and
CONEMPA)
of equipment
manufacturers
cturers and assembly
(ITAMON)
Direct negotiations amonq
ntr„f.
contra
9 CO
ctors, industrialists,
bankers
with Itaipu officials,
the ministers and
the president both in
Brazil and Paraguay sought
modification or elimination
of
objectionable provisions,
such as was the case
with the .-cycle
question," and the --heights
question-, with Argentina.
These
direct negotiations constituted
a step in the
policy-making
Process: a process best
described as circular in which
decisions
were taken during the
implementation phase.
,

in the case of Tucurui,
negotiations between Minister

Dias Leite and the Japanese
mSA, and later between Minister
Ueki
and NAAC has similarly assumed
the form of closed consultation
and negotiations.
Although a more aggressive press
offered
society some view of was happening
inside the decision-making
process, particularly with the
political visibility represented
by the appointment of A.C. Magalhaes,
a clientelistic politician,
to the presidency of Eletrobras.
Political liberalization did
not automatically transformed demands
into public policy.

General-President Figueiredo and his Mines and Energy
Minister
Cals reinforced insulation on the Tucurui-Capemi
imbroglio.

418

Military regime presidents
attempted to mobilize mass
support behind their
development project. Bmilio
Medici was
particularly inclined to use
P R (public
relations)

^

boast the achievements of
his government, while
newspaper and
television news of resistance
against his policies were
censored
Ernesto Geisel austere figure
was not apt to marketing
techniques, so he marshalled
support for his grandiose
development project through
offers of ministerial and state
enterprise appointments and
other types of patronage to some
dissident faction within their
authoritarian-developmentalist
coalition.
The appointment of Severe
Gomes as Ministry of
industry and Commerce in 1974 was
a calculated attempt to
utilize
patronage to co-opt the nationalist
Paulista industrialist for
the government's Second National
Development Plan.
On the other
hand, the appointment of Jose Costa
Cavalcanti to the presidency
of Eletrobras in 1980 was prompted
by the Figueiredo

administration's desire to consolidate support
and to guarantee
the execution of hydro-power projects
making continued use of

Eletrobras borrowing capacity.
While the executive was the principal initiator of

development project and was able to exert considerable leverage
within the bargaining process, important limitations were placed
on presidential autonomy in policy-making by both economic

interests associations and international interests, particularly

during the implementation phase.

Aluminum producers stalled
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Geisel initiatives nn-Mi
until market conditions
were adequate and
Figueiredo government
agreed
greed to tho
the modifications sought
by the
Japanese partner with
regard
to cost of energy.
y
the Itaipu
case, while decision-making
»y process has k
been essentially
insulated and Brazilian
interests largely prevailed
in the
implementation phase.
nhacc
n-,
Paraguay and Argentina
resisted and were
able to modify initial
policy with respeot to
cyoles and the
height of the Parana River
dams downstream from Itaipu.
i

™

m

Opposition party and dissident
organizations also were
able to restrict executive
autonomy.
indeed, most of the public
debate over the Itaipu and
Tucurui projects was conducted
through
newspaper reports. Opposing
factions used newspapers as their
primary vehicle for mobilizing
opposition against
the

government's financial deals and
bad management of the
environmental questions at both
projects.

In effect the press

Played a crucial role in transmitting
opposition policy
preference to the executive during
the harshest years of the
exclusionary-military regime and thereby
helped to shape the
political environment within which
political liberalization took
place. That, however, was not sufficient
to modify policy.
The influence of the major interest
associations within
the state and state enterprises was a
function of economic

resources, the technical information, and the
strategic services
they controlled. The growing planning and regulatory
capacities
of the Brazilian state made the decision on state
hydroelectric

power and other development
project
3 CZ rel
relate
atively independent from
private cooperation.
But the count™-.
country's economic
development was
highly dependent on
continued
uea private sector
.
investment. This
investment, however, decrea^ ^
decreased considerably
after 1977-78, and
particularly during the
1981-83 xecession.
recession
t a
Industrialist
complained that the
governments economic policies
were
inhibiting capita! investment
and wrongly attacked
Financial capital thus
thu^ r-P.r-r--;^
carried a great deal of
importance in
state policy-making realm.
,

,

,

^u^.

To express their objections
or their support for
development projects major
interest groups had a number
of
channels open to them. Most
had trained staff capable
of
drafting technical studies
and position papers to
support their
policy preferences in direct
consultations with the state
enterprise tecnicos. Brazilian
tecnicos and politicians were
often capable of shifting from
one executive positions in a
state
enterprise to another and to shift
to the private sector
periodically.
These patterns of recruitment and
career mobility
between the private sector and ministerial
advisory board-state
enterprise, and from political position
to the administration has
been systematically studied" demonstrating
different forms of
elite circulation in Brazilian state industrial
enterprises and

private sector in recent years.
It s important to note that the influence of
the major

economic interest associations in policy-making appears to have

grown steadily during
"9
"

the same

industry

+-k

millta

^

„ hile in the 195Qs

lea ders influence(J

policies, in the 19 7 0s
and 1980ss that inf
influence was exerted by
heterogeneous economic
omic interest
int«.»-==t
associations.
indeed, whenever
»ass organization such
as the Ecclesiastical
Base Communities
the labor union
confederation Sole Worker.
Central (CUT, £antEaI
or other iarge labor
unions began to
assert some degree of
autonomy within the
political system, they
were guickly brought back
under control of the
executive
techniques of reDreq^inn
h-;,,repression, division or
co-optation.
The raids
against Sao Bernardo Metal
Workers Union in 1980 by the
Figueiredo administration
illustrates the basic mechanisms
utilized to demobilize the
peasantry and exclude them from
active
participation in politics during
the political liberalization
,

^-^^^Oim^^

•

years
The determining factor in the
fourth stage of policymaking is the extent to which the
executive was successful in
generating consensus on his projects
within the state enterprises
and interest groups during the
consultation phase.
The executive
did initiate development projects
during the military regime
relatively free from direct interest group
pressure or from

political Congressional opposition, but no
development project
could gain approval in the business community
unless it
was

a

product of consensus among the dominant economic
forces within
the military-bureaucratic-private sector coalition.

In the final
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analysis, the executive was
forced to make major
concessions t
the mterest groups before
any progress in
implementation could
be achieved.
In the case of Itaipu,
no effective consensus
between Brazil, Paraguay and
Argentina ever developed in
the
consultation stage and thus itaipu
project was approved in 1973,
partly as an outcome of the
Peronist victory in the Argentine
presidential elections.
In the case of Tucurui,
Japanese
retreated from their willingness
to invest in Tucurui and in
infrastructure for the aluminum
plants in the region forcing
the
Brazilian to pick up responsibility
for the project.
They
nullified most of the potential effects
of the "Law
of

Participation."

Figueiredo's efforts to speed up the
Project
through the establishment of Greater
Carajas Program equally
conceded on subsidized cost of energy
to aluminum manufacturers.
A final point to be made regarding
basic patterns of
policy-making during the military regime is
that even when the
developments projects passed the four stages,
there were still
considerable problems to implement them.
In both cases the
difficulties were related to resources being tied
up to loans and

equipment supplied.

Another type of problem was related to the

lack of political responsibility to execute them.

Contractors

knowingly spent project resources for other activities
not
related to Tucurui 's deforestation project leaving a
messy
environmental problem behind.

The enormous Brazilian foreign

debt is partly owed to irresponsible implementation of
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development project even if the
country's expansion of the
capitalist economy required higher
levels of investment.

To determine whether or not
a "ruling class- exist:
-s,
Pluralist like Dahl5 argue that it
is necessary tQ d
trate
empirically that the same leaders that
make policy in one issu,1G
area also make policy in other
areas and that the same allian.ice
wins consistently in all issue areas.
From the case of Brazil's
development project presented in the
preceding chapters, it is
evident that significantly different sets
of leaders were
involved in setting policy in each sector
and that no single

„

coalition won consistently over time, except
the large
empreiteira Camargo Correa.
Some degree of overlap was observed among
top executive

officers. Prominent figures such as Costa e Silva,
Medici,
Geisel, Figueiredo, Golbery, Costa Cavalcanti,
Velloso, Dias
Leite, Ueki, Magalhaes,

Cals appeared as influential in both

development projects in at least some stages of the policy-making
process.

But even in these cases, which are largely attributable

to the fact that all were important leaders with wide ranging

policy responsibilities, their relative influence fluctuated

dramatically over time.

In the electrical energy
sector, Costa Cavalcanti
appears to be a key figure,
capable of

providing political
gathering political support
for the rtaipu develops
project
and overlapping to the
Tucurui project.
proiect
m«
His *tenure in office as
Minister of Mines and Energy
(1967-1970, and Minister of
interior
(1970-1974, allowed him to preside
Itaipu Binaoional. Geisel
tenure as Minister-Chief of
the Military House of the
Presidency
and as president of Petrobras
added to the fact that his
brother was Medici's Minister
of the Army -, was politically
capable of conducing him to the
presidential term.

-

His chief

political advisor Golbery do Couto

creation of SNI and was

a

silva had masterminded the

e

strategist of abertura.

Although not
directly involved in the decision
and implementation of the two
major development project Golbery
was

political aspect of both projects.

a

key figure in the

His trip to Asuncion in 1965

was crucial to the final resolution
of the AJyLJ3as_Cataratas
In
1981 his resignation as chief political advisor
to Figueiredo had
the political effect of putting the
hard-line on the defensive
after the Riocentro incident, what facilitated
the denouncement
of the Capemi case.
.

Other key figures and factions involved in the
policymaking of the electrical energy sector were Mines
and
Energy

Minister Dias Leite, who had also been president of
CVRD, and
Minister Ueki, who had previously been Petrobras »s
Financial

Director under Geisel.

Dias Leite approval for Tucurui was
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related to his strong support
for mineral development of
th e
Eastern Amazon and its linkages
with electric power.
s ome
overlap was seen in the case of
Eletrobras president A.c.
Magalhaes and director of Coordination,
Cesar Cals. Magalhaes
left Eletrobras to be Governor
of the State of Bahia, where
by
1979 was being implanted an important
Petrochemical Pole in whic
the State government had high
stakes.
Cesar Cals was elected

indirectly to the Senate by his native
State of Ceara, and
subsequently appointed by Figueiredo to be
the new Minister of
Mines and Energy. Although key figures
changed positions some
continuity of personnel is observed from
one stage of decision
making to the next.
Key figures in state enterprises
of the

electrical sector who had been historically linked
to hydropower projects were still in action during the
last
decade.

Outside government and state enterprises, some
overlap

between policy-makers was observed.

Congressional figures and

party leaders had little interests in the policy-making
of the
project, except in cases where some political gain could
be

extracted by denouncing one or another aspect, particular the
environment-political-administrative Capemi imbroglio.
Integration and participation of other ministries, given their
functional specialization, was problematic.

The Ministry of

Agriculture participated in the Tucurui project but their views
were hardly adopted.
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The same type of specialization
was characteristic of
the private sector leadership.
E^ite^s. (construction
companies) had their interest
representation dealing directly
with technical and financial
sectors of state enterprise.
Equipment and other capital goods
manufacturers dealt separatel
y
with both Itaipu Binacional and
Eletronorte.
Example of other
projects were recalled on when
negotiating terms and schedules.
But some overlap existed: Camargo
Correa was probably the main
beneficiary of both projects. This
firm was personally called to
participate in the Itaipu project by
Generalissimo Stroessner.
Eletronorte awarded Camargo Correa the
first bidding, and its

president personally participated in extending
the bidding
process to the construction of the dam.
Although no formal
alliance existed between construction companies
and equipment
manufacturers and assemblers, collusion among different
companies
and subcontractors formally existed and
coordinated policy
and

political alliances.
As spokesmen for the industrialist, FIESP (FIESP,

Federacao das Industrias do Estado de Sao Paulo

^

leaders such as

Claudio Bardella, Paulo Villares and Luis Eulalio Bueno Vidigal
were at least tangentially involved in both development projects.

Their involvement as industrialists and as spokesmen for the
Brazilian entrepreneurs rallying for democratization and

embracing opposition views was crucial for the continued
allocation of resources to both projects, in particular Itaipu,

.
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as demonstrated in Chapter
V.

But in no moment were they
the

principal force behind the
policies finally adopted and on
several occasions they played
almost no role at all.
Low subject mobilization is

a

recurrent characteristic

of the Brazilian political
system for the unsubstantial

participation of citizens in
input-output bargaining,
citizens
demands continued to follow a
corporatist/patrimonial scheme
a
particular demand creation without
consideration of lower classes
demands

-

Some observers of Brazilian political
system have
termed this pattern of interest
representation and leadership as
a form of exclusionary elitist
model or more cautiously

authoritarian-modernization elitism.

6

But it does not preclude

the occupation of power positions by
competitive universal
impersonal rule, political appointment or
election.
Competitive
universal impersonal rules are the least used
to staff decision-

making position within state enterprises and state
agencies, with
the exception of Justice, Treasury and Diplomacy
careers.

Political appointment results from pressuring and

"bureaucratic rings" elites,
race in elections.

7

small

while all interest and groups

But despite fluidity in leaders, limited

pluralism best represent Brazilian political system for at least
two important reasons.

First, the low competition and the fact

that bargaining, negotiation and compromise took place among top

governmental, military and civilian officials and private sector

.
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leaders.

The representatives and
organizations of the dominated
classes were effectively
excluded fro m the process in
both
development project or granted
only token participation.
Kheneve,
working class mobilization
threatened the stability of
the
regime, it was systematically
repressed.
Second, there was some
competition among major interest
groups active in each sector,
international and national
construction and capital goods
interests acted in an unified
and cohesive fashion within
both
projects to kill or modify
objectionable points or aspects,
international capital goods manufacturers
competed tc supply
Brazilian Nuclear Program but they
coalesced to supply equipment
to Itaipu and Tucurui projects.

Obviously some important bargaining
and negotiation
took place among the political
representatives of the different
classes and class fractions represented
within the bloc-in-power
during the military regime and different
class alliances were
dominant in different sectors art different
times. But this type

of conflict certainly should not be
equated with pluralism, only

limited set of policy options were permitted
into the political
arena
a

The pluralists focus too narrowly on who participates
and which leaders and groups succeed at
the policy process.

a

particular moment of

Two or more actors with even slightly

different policy choices are enough for them to find pluralistic
competition.

Pluralist do not care that these actors might
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represent only minor variations of
the same basic class
interests.
From a Marxist point of view,
however, it matters a
great deal.
Political conflict that takes place
only among
dominant class fractions is not
pluralism but rather a particular
form of ruling class domination.

C.

The Electric P owe r Pr ojects

*nrl

the Ruling glass

All development projects produced clearly
identifiable

sets of winners and losers over the course
of the military
regime.
In the case of the Itaipu project, the
principal

beneficiaries were the Brazilian and Paraguayan
construction,
Brazilian and international industrial and financial

fractions of

the bourgeoisie who had sought since the start of
the military

regime to accelerate the expansion of capitalism in
Brazil.

Despite extensive subcontracting to small construction
companies
and industries both in Brazil and Paraguay there were
significant

pressures because of the grandiosity of the project.

In the

final analysis they too benefited substantially from the ultimate

outcome of the policy adopted. In the first place, the
international industrial and financial interests demanded and

obtained major concessions from the Brazilian government on the
crucial questions of loans, energy costs to aluminum plants and

generation and transmission systems to both projects that
significantly reduced their potential redistributive effects.

In

—— ™

«»
second place, Bra2ilian
and paraguayan
construction
lndU£trial
credit incentives to
carry out the modernization
of rneir
or
their plants and
„
equipment;
such
incentives had been one
on P -i-k^
the their principal
demands through the
debate over the Tfa^„
Itaipu project.
Finally, as a result of
the
capitalist development
achieved in industry and
construct!Lon
after 1964, both in Brazil
and Paraguay, industrialist
amd
(owners or construction
companies) emerged from
the
military regime far more
prosperous and politically
influential
than they had been when
military regime began.

«-

^

•

The principal losers of
the itaipu project were
land
Poor peasants and landless
agricultural workers whose
dreams for
access to land were effectively
crushed.
Most of them were
displaced by the flooding of
their fertile land both in
Brazil
and Paraguay, and they were
obliged to migrate to new
frontiers
in the Southwestern Amazon
region.
The working class must also
be considered losers visa-vis the enormous gains of the
construction companies and
industrial contractors.
While the towns around the
construction
site for middle-managers and
specialized workers provided for all
needs of construction workers,
low-skilled workers did not have
the privileges granted to specialized
and higher ranks workers.
Moreover, the massive influx of new
migrants into the cities
nearby inevitably resulted in the state's
failure to provide
effective urban services, provoked considerable
overcrowding,

created high levels of under
and unemployment, originated
intense
competition for the available
jo bs, kept wages for
Itaipu and
Tucurui workers low and inhibited
unionization efforts among
large numbers of workers.
the Itaipu case having
Brazilian
and Paraguayan workers made
it more difficult to unionize.
In both cases, the principal
winners were clearly the
construction companies, the Brazilian
and international capital
goods generation and transmission
equipment

m

industry, and the

international financial community, for
they were able to press
the sale the goods and services
which helped them weather
worldwide recession of the mid-1970s
at least to some extent.
The principal losers were the displaced
agricultural workers and
native Indians as well as the workers who
were denied access to
housing and improved urban services existent
in the new villages
built near the construction sites.

-

Three basic set of factors were involved
in influencing
these outcomes.
The first had to do with the class
perspective
or "bias- that characterized the key policy-making
personnel in
the executive branch and state enterprises.
The
second had to do

with the capacity of different classes and class
fraction to

organize and pressure the state for favorable policy decisions.
The third had to do with the structural constraints imposed
on
the state by the particular articulation of capitalist and

precapitalist modes of production characteristic of Brazil and
Paraguay during the military regime period.

The relative
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importance of each of these
factors varied
another, and within each
project

fron,

one project to

fro, one stage to another;
but

all three were involved in
some way at each stage of the
projects.

Of major importance in
determining the outcome of
either project was the common
commitment to the goal of

capitalist development shared by
all military presidents, their
principal advisors, the government
party leaders and state
enterprise managers and obviously the
private sector.
Reflecting
this commitment, these two projects
put forward during
the

military regime consciously sought to
increase the supply of
energy to the maturing industrial
Southeast and
to the

industrialization of the Eastern Amazon acting
as provider of an
essential industrial input to sustain economic
growth.

This ideological "bias"

among top development policy-

makers within the military regime was not the
consequence of
direct manipulation or persuasion on the part
of a united ruling
class.

Indeed, given the highly complex historical
development

of the Brazilian social formation, the private
entrepreneurial

elite was not

a

monolithic class, capable of issuing coherent

orders; rather it was

a

fragmented class divided into several

different fractions or segments each of which had different and

occasionally conflicting interests. Nevertheless, the general
interests of the bourgeoisie in creating and sustaining the

conditions for capitalist growth were the hegemonic interests
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within Brazil.

The objectives, targets,
posture, and
perspectives of top policymakers
were extensively shaped or
at
least greatly inspired on
the dominant ideology.
Thus, what most
top policy-makers considered
an "appropriate., or
..reasonable-

course of state action, or
non-action, in the energy sector
was
normally very much in tune with
the general interests of the
capitalist class.
In effect, the entrepreneurial
elite's basic
concern for capitalist growth had
become part of the
.'national

interest."

To work toward the achievement
of these interests was
also to serve the interests of
the nation as a whole.
As a
result of this class "bias" within
the state system, state energy

polices consistently favored capitalist
class interests over the
interests of all other classes within
the social formation.

Of course, this general consensus on
the goals of

capitalist development among key policy-making
personnel did not
mean that there was complete unanimity among
them on how best to
achieve this goal. There was an important
split within the
ruling class between the proponents of the
self-reliant and the

internationalized associated-dependent development
strategies.

These differences did not call into question the

basic goal of accelerating capitalist development, but
they did

generate important conflicts within policy-making circles over
the precise content and pace of state-led development project.

The final outcome of these conflict over strategies of

development was largely determined by the differential capacity
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of the various classes
and class fractions within
the social
formation to organize politically
and pressure the state for
Policies that favored their
specific interests.
But not even the
1987-88 Constituent Assembly
was able to find a conclusive

solution to the strategy.
With regard electrical energy
policy, the consumers,
the displaced peasantry, and
workers demonstrated very little
capacity to exert concerted
pressure within the policy-making
process.
As of 1974, labor unions were
a specter of what they
had been before or of what they
would become
in the 1980s.

The

peasants were unorganized and consequently
incapable of
preventing the provisions on land
expropriation

and relocation.

Moreover, the low level of organization
of the construction
workers did not enable them to press for
effective implementation
of some redistributive aspects of
the two projects.

m

the late

1970s, the industrial workers unions of Sao
Bernardo and Sao

Paulo surfaced as an independent political
force.

But the rapid

radicalization of the movement brought unions into
direct
conflict with the Figueiredo government and the
dominant classes.
As a result, these leaders were systematically
excluded from

policy-making circles during the crucial debates on general
economic policy in the 1981-83 recession years.

That independent

unions could be so excluded, despite relatively high levels of

mobilization achieved during the 1977-1980 period, revealed the
fundamental weakness of all peasant and industrial organizations
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and movements vis-a-vic fu„
vis the do ml nant classes
during the military
regime
in contrast to the
groups mentioned above

the

economically dominant groups
were well organized and
capable of
achieving and sustaining
high levels of mobilization.

As a
result, their capacity to
pressure the state for favorable
policy
outputs was considerable.
it is important to understand
however, that the specific
interests of the various
fractions o,
the bourgeoisie were affected
in different ways and to
varying
degrees by the development
projects. Under these circumstances,
some elements of the capitalist
class were much more motivated
to
intervene actively in the policy-making
process than were others.
The heavy civil construction,
industrial and financial
fractions, for example, participated
in all stages of the energy
policy-making through interest representation
such as National
Confederation of Industries (CNI)
FIESP, and civil construction
associations.
But the role they played was decidedly
a secondary
one with respect to bureaucratic elites.
This limited influence
in the energy policy-making process
is largely attributable to
the fact that their primary interest
promoting the conditions
for capitalist development
was adequately addressed within
,

—

—

policy-making arenas at all stages of the process

—

decision-

making by the executive, discussions on the bureaucracy
and key
private sectors interlocutors.
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As both the project-case
reconstruction and the
reputational findings presented
earlier in this study indicated,
the most active and influential
groups of the entrepreneurial
class involved in the electric
power policy during the military
regime was the heavy civil construction
fraction, represented by
some large Brazilian emp^teiras.
Industrial and financial
groups, both Brazilian and international,
were evidently active
and made efforts to influence
decision-making in the two
projects.
But their interest was a corollary
of the

developmental

ideology pervasive in the Brazilian state
during
the 1964-1985 period.
To accelerate the pace of development,
Brazilian internal savings were not sufficient,
therefore the
Brazilian state did have to borrow heavily, as
demonstrated in
the state enterprise's sources of investment
funds, what

coincided with

a

period of financial surplus in the international

banking system.
In summary,

the fate of the two development projects

over the course of the military regime was determined by
the

concatenation of both instrumental and structural factors. The
objectives and targets of the top policy-makers in the executive
and in the state enterprises, direct pressures on the state

mobilized by concerned interest groups and their political
allies, and the structural constraints inherent within the

capitalist mode were all involved in defining the nature and
impact of state policy in the energy sector.

No perspective that
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relies solely on either
instrumental or structural causation,
instead of the two juxtaposed,
can provide an adequate
explanation for the outcome of the
two development projects.
Both projects are generating
electric power
to the

respective regions which they serve.

Both projects have had

implementation problems and were
financially burdensome to the
state and society.

D.

The Military Regi m e and the Dejnocrat
izatioi] Process

The success of the military regime in
maintaining

political stability over the 1964-1985 period
is attributable
to a complex set of economic, political
and ideological factors.
But among these, it is the remarkable
strength of development
strategies that must be assigned fundamental
importance,

notwithstanding the perverse effects on non-privileged
groups in
Brazilian society. The first military governments
initiated

a

model of development based upon the implementation
of large

economic projects.

The last two military governments proceeded

the strategy despite the challenge posed by sequential
Opposition

parties victories on the 1974, 1978, 1982, elections which

culminated with Tancredo Neves-led victory which transformed the

military regime to a transitional democratic rule.
The very structure of the military tended to undermine
the traditional loyalties upon which the stability of the regime

rested.
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By de-emphasizing party
competition and encouragi

discretionary policies and
state-sponsored projects, the
»iUt ary
re9Ue redUCSd
Si5 " ifi
P°^tics to simply authoritarian
administration. The absence
of major socio-economic
'

^

-«

changes

widespread corruption, cronyism
and nepotism, electoral
manipulation, and continuing
privileged access to elites bred
cynicism and discontent,
particularly among the growing urban
poor in the largest cities.
By 1982, the government
party pds
only elected governors in
marginal Northeastern and Northern
States (with the exception of
Santa Catarina in the
South)

,

and

the majority of the votes were
identified with the Center-Left
political parties (pmdb, pdt, PT)
Although the voters were not
radical or revolutionary, they
pointed in the direction change.
They were plebiscitary in nature.
Democratic elections have
consistently shown a character of "referendum"
on governmental
policies.
Sixteen MDB Senators elected in the
majoritarian 1974
elections were the first to capitalize on
this discontent voters,
followed by the 1/3 Senators directly elected
.

in 1978.

Consistently major Southern states

—

the most industrial and

where patrimonialist practices were relatively
weaker

—

have

elected Opposition Congressmen.
Indeed, the elections occurred during the transition

Jose Sarney regime have confirmed the plebiscitary character
of
recent Brazilian democratic elections.

The point is that the

urban masses, the majority of the voting population, have become

.

4
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disillusioned with a model of
development which has undoubtedly
produced economic growth and
industrial infrastructure, but
has
failed to provide social
development for the majority of
Brazilians.
Brazil is presently reaping the
harvest of over twenty
years of vast economic growth
with lack of social reforms.
it is
by no means impossible that
the present political parties
will
manage to weather the political
crisis of legitimacy and
transpose the transition period into
a democratic rule.
it is by
no means certain the military
will remain docile; the
recuperative capacities of the military
should never be

underestimated.

it is clear,

political system has reached

historical development.

however,
a

that the Brazilian

critical juncture in its

The ruling class must choose, indeed
is

currently being forced to choose between social
change and
repression, between "inclusive" and "exclusive"

forms of social

and political control.

The reforms embodied in the 1988

Constitution need not to be revolutionary, but they will
have to
be more than cosmetic.
If such reforms are not forthcoming
Brazil will enter in a period of rising praetorianism
combined

with populist and leftist electoral challenges whose outcome is
indeterminate
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